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Summary of introductory chapters
•  It is estimated that more than 5,000 business 
entities in Papua New Guinea have, to date, been 
established in and around mining and gas/oil 
resource sites. This study selected four hundred 
of the largest of these which appear in the 
Investment Promotion Authority’s [IPA]register 
and looked at 130 of them which had, in 2014, 
contracts with resource companies. Of these 47 
were interviewed between May and October 
2014. Also, out of the 130 only 25 landowner 
companies [Lancos] were not exempt, under the 
Companies Act 1997, from submitting audited 
returns and for which, therefore, reasonably full 
financial details were available. 
•  Other Lancos that have grown up independently 
of the resource companies (or by 2014 no longer 
had contracts with them) are not covered in 
this study which, therefore, provides a very 
conservative set of estimates regarding the 
significance of mining and oil/gas extraction in 
the national and local economies.
•  Many companies are tardy in submitting their 
Annual Reports to IPA required by law. In 
addition S171 of the Companies Act permits small 
companies not to submit audited returns whilst 
S212 of the Act allows, providing all shareholders 
agree, companies not to reveal directors’ fees and 
expenses. Thus the total amount of information 
available to the study – and, more importantly to 
most company shareholders – is rather limited. 
In the relatively few cases where directors’ overall 
costs are available and on public record, there 
is – at least in some cases - cause for concern 
that Lanco directors’ receive very much more 
benefit than do shareholders. The fact that many 
of the gas project Lancos are of rather recent 
establishment means that very few of them have 
submitted reports to IPA.
•  The Oil and Gas Act has many more prescriptive 
requirements of resource companies than does 
the existing Mining Act (a revised Mining Act, 
whose drafts include prescriptive requirements, 
is likely to be presented to Parliament shortly). 
However, the MOAs associated with all mining 
projects (plus the special Act under which Ok 
Tedi operates) do lay out what companies are 
expected to undertake in the area of local business 
development [LBD]. It seems clear that, given the 
wide range of types of mining projects (in terms 
of capital expenditure, length of life, financial 
prospects etc), that one size of LBD requirements 
will not be appropriate for all of them. Each 
site’s mix of potential host community benefits 
(employment, infrastructure investment, 
training, and business development) might best 
be tailored to the site’s individual circumstances 
and the project’s varying characteristics.
•  In judging whether a Lanco has been successful 
or not, at least two key measures need to be 
used: a) on the one hand, they must rigorously 
comply with commercial best practice especially 
in the area of governance; b) on the other hand, 
their success or failure needs to be assessed 
in terms of the Lanco’s aim (does it intend to 
accumulate assets? Or are dividend payments a 
priority?  Does it intend to restrict shareholding 
to certain groups of individuals? Etc.). Such aims 
will certainly vary from one Lanco to another 
although general types of aims will recur. So, it is 
critical that such aims, and the means the Lanco 
proposes to adopt in order to achieve them, are 
explicitly laid out in its Constitution.  Only one 
–quarter of the companies examined in  detail 
have a Constitution of their own making. 
•  The small and medium enterprise sector is now 
a core policy of the PNG government; a major 
study of SMEs nationwide was released just as this 
report was going to press (Tebbutt Research 2015)
and the importance of the sector was emphasised 
in the Prime Minister’s address to the 2014 
Mining and Petroleum Investment Conference. 
In it, he urged established projects to re-engage 
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array of smaller companies, focussing more or 
less wholly on the mine’s needs, have grown up 
and now employ over 3000 people (this excludes 
the numerous businesses not having direct links 
to OTML). The average age of these companies is 
15 years (half that of the mine) and collectively 
they have accumulated K130m in net assets. This 
needs to be compared with the assets reported 
by MRDC to be held in 2010 (there are no more 
up-to-date figures publicly available from MRDC) 
in the two funds managed by MRDC on behalf of 
landowners’ and the Province at approximately 
US$140m (or almost three times the value of 
Lanco assets). Because of the fact that very few 
Lancos associated with Ok Tedi have diversified 
geographically to operations elsewhere in the 
country, most of them appear, at first sight, to 
have a life expectancy no longer than the mine 
itself. However, developments relating to gas in 
the North Fly promise an ongoing role for many 
of them. 
•  Porgera: The mine spends approximately K600 
million annually on services and contracts of 
which around K100m goes to Porgera Lancos and 
K280m to other PNG businesses.  The PJV has 
almost 600 PNG business entities on its books of 
which 121 are in Porgera and 246 in the rest of 
Enga. Porgerans were prepared well in advance 
of mine construction for business, fought for local 
business guarantees in the Development Forum 
and have concentrated all their efforts on a single 
company IPI and its ancillaries. IPI came close 
to bankruptcy in the mid-1990s and needed 
PJV help to rescue it. Since then it has gradually 
succeeded and now employs 1200 people, had 
a turnover in 2013 of almost US$90m and had 
accumulated US$34m in net assets. A key feature 
of IPI is indicated by the fact that only one-third 
of its employees are in Porgera itself; around ten 
years ago the company acquired a base outside 
Lae and since then has continued to expand 
geographically with one subsidiary operating in 
Australia. The key to its recent success appears to 
have been this expansion away from its original 
site into the wider commercial opportunities of the 
country as a whole. There are questions regarding 
who precisely owns shares in IPI. Other than IPI 
there are almost no significant Porgera Lancos, 
most not even being registered as companies 
but operating rather as family concerns. Several 
of the larger contractors are Engan but most of 
these are exempted from the need to provide 
audited accounts, and as few have constitutions. 
It is difficult to identify the numbers of Lanco 
employees but these are estimated at between 
2000 and 3000.  
with LBD and for new entrants to plan for LBD 
from the earliest stages of their projects.
•  For many years, the term ‘umbrella companies’ 
has enjoyed wide currency among all resource 
sector stakeholders. The PNG LNG project 
preferred the term ‘representative companies’. 
The function of an ‘umbrella company’ was 
originally envisaged – and still is by many – as 
one which would be communally owned, would 
undertake its own business activities on behalf of 
its shareholders and (this is where the ‘umbrella’ 
comes in) help infant local businesses to grow by 
providing with guidance on all aspects of business 
development. This umbrella function, the report 
concludes, remains of critical importance but the 
record shows that – with one partial exception 
– to expect a large Lanco which is tasked with 
growing its own business to wholeheartedly assist 
other businesses to grow is unrealistic.  Whilst 
this report, so as not to confuse matters, uses the 
terms umbrella companies and representative 
companies, it also concludes that those Lancos 
that are owned by a large community covering 
the whole of the project impact area or, in the 
case of very large impact areas (such as those 
involved in the LNG project or the Ok Tedi mine) 
distinct, large regions within the impact area, 
the term ‘representative’ is the term far more 
in line with what actually happens, and is the 
more realistic term to use. The umbrella function 
should remain with the resource company 
(or at least with an organisation that does not 
have its own, separate business functions).
Individual sites
•  Ok Tedi: The site has experienced repeated failures 
of its ‘umbrella’ company (first, Cloudlands; 
later SMIHL) and has had limited success in 
establishing what this report would prefer to call 
representative companies in downstream areas. 
It further appears as if businesses in Kiunga have 
largely been left to develop on their own, outside 
of most OTML LBD plans for the sector. In Kiunga 
there are a large number of businesses which, 
although they owe most of their prosperity 
to OTML (but increasingly also to gas and oil 
exploration), do not have contracts with the 
company. Even though Ok Tedi has no equivalent 
company to Anitua or IPI, the distribution of 
companies, by assets, is similar to that at Lihir and 
Porgera: there are two companies with assets of 
more than K20m whilst the great bulk of Lancos 
have assets of less than K10m. 
  Despite the failure of ‘umbrella’ companies (or, 
perhaps, because of this?) a reasonably impressive 
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(US$4.4bn) of which K4.5bn (US$1.7bn) went to 
local Lancos. ExxonMobil aimed from the start to 
establish Lancos that could stand on their own 
feet and to minimise the support they would 
need directly from the project. The project thus 
developed a National Content Plan that clearly 
set out what it would attempt to do for local 
business and was especially careful to plan for 
the fact that most of the business opportunities 
that the project would generate would occur in 
the construction phase (which ended by mid-
2014). Further, it invested heavily in LBD training 
at what had been the Banker’s College in Port 
Moresby to provide a capacity building and 
capacity assessment centre. It also established 
‘representative companies’ each of which covered 
a specified region of its very extensive impact 
area which stretches from the highlands right 
down to the capital. Most of these representative 
companies (and as stated earlier, the term is much 
more appropriate than ‘umbrella companies’) 
covered a wide range of ethnic groups and, 
drawing on OSL’s experience perhaps, had very 
carefully designed constitutions which paid 
special attention to shareholding arrangements. 
All other resource projects can learn a great deal 
from a perusal of the measures set out in these 
constitutions. Further, ExxonMobil required all 
of its major, non-local contractors to align their 
capacity building training for Lancos with those 
of the project overall. 
  One of the regional representative companies 
established, Laba Holdings, has the unique 
advantage of being located in and around the 
capital itself where its component communities 
are major landowners. Most other LNG project 
representative companies have also established 
themselves in Port Moresby to some degree – with 
the exception of the largest, Trans Wonderland 
which is based in Lae.
  LBD received very significant financial support 
from the State – far greater than for any other 
project. K120m was granted to a large number of 
business groups as ‘seed money’. This is almost as 
much as OTML-linked Lancos have accumulated 
in net assets in over 30 years of operation.
  Because so many LNG Lancos were only 
established after 2009 and because they are 
no more prompt than other regional Lancos in 
submitting returns to IPA, very little information 
relating to their financial circumstances is publicly 
available. Even if the data were available, given 
the history of Lancos failing at other sites several 
years after their establishment and given the fact 
that, with the end of construction, leaner times 
•  Lihir: In terms of both the investment of their share 
of mining revenues (by MRL Capital – Lihirians 
are the only resource landowners who run their 
own investment arm) and the development of a 
representative Lanco (Anitua and its subsidiaries), 
Lihir landowners have created the most successful 
and potentially most sustainable financial entities 
of any mining site in PNG.   However, in its 
earlier years (then named Lakaka) Anitua had to 
be rescued by the mine from bankruptcy and its 
success has only been marked since 2008. Anitua 
is easily the most dominant Lanco associated 
with the Lihir mine and also (like IPI) much of 
its success can be attributed to its expansion 
off site, particularly by concentrating on mass 
catering around PNG. The components of Anitua 
in all employ nearly 4500 people; as at all other 
mines, therefore, Lancos based on Lihir employ 
far more people than does the resource company 
on whose back they have grown.
•  Petromin (Tolukuma): Access to Tolukuma is 
amongst the worst of any resource project in the 
country and, in addition, the mine is both small 
and has proved unprofitable for its three sets of 
owners. Despite ambitious plans for LBD laid 
out in the original MOA and its later revisions, 
it is unsurprising that Lancos have been no more 
successful than the mine’s developers; the main 
Lanco collapsed and has yet to be successfully 
revived.
•  Oil Search: Oil Search has made very extensive 
inputs to the Lancos associated with it and also 
provides close supervision over their operations. 
It has exercised the most consistent set of support 
procedures for Lancos at any resource site in the 
country. It has what seems to be a far greater 
knowledge of how its associated Lancos are 
managed and what progress they are making 
than any other resource company covered in this 
study. It was the only resource company able (and 
willing) to say with precision how compliant with 
national regulations its contractors are; in this 
respect it deserves to be regarded as a model 
for all resource companies to follow. However, 
although it has a number of successful mid-
sized Lancos, no large representative OSL-linked 
company has emerged and the rate at which its 
Lancos have accumulated assets is low.
•  PNG LNG: This massive project dwarfs all 
previous resource projects in PNG in terms of 
capital expenditure. In terms of LBD it has been 
slightly less overwhelming (if still impressive), but 
has been especially innovative in terms of LBD 
management. Between 2009 and 2014 the project 
issued contracts within PNG valued at K12.4 bn 
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its finances regularly and independently audited 
– even if they have not all been reported to IPA.
•  Simberi: The company ascribes this project’s lack 
of an island community representative company 
to date on a lack of agreement among landowners. 
Nevertheless more than a dozen Lancos do exist 
which is something of an achievement for such 
a small project. It will be difficult to sustain 
any benefits derived from LBD on Simberi 
however – other than for a few families – unless 
a unified representative company emerges which 
operates a policy of investing profits in mainland 
locations. LBD does not offer the best available 
option to stakeholders in their quest to establish 
sustainable, post-closure project benefits even if, 
under the MOA governing the project, it must be 
undertaken and supported.
•  Elk-Antelope (InterOil)1: Even though any 
production at this site is several years away and 
exploration is still underway, a representative 
company has been established at site and some 
LBD is being undertaken in Port Moresby.
•  Hidden Valley: Given the long established 
history of enmity between the two major ethnic 
groups involved in this project, its developers 
deserve credit for having managed to keep the 
single representative Lanco, NKW Holdings, 
intact. This company has taken full advantage 
of the project’s location close to Lae and has, 
in financial terms, performed admirably to date, 
rivalling most older-established project Lancos 
in its accumulation of net assets. However, as at 
other mining sites with a successful representative 
company, it has not done much in terms of its 
umbrella functions as very few significant smaller 
Lancos have emerged. Uniquely in PNG, the 
Department of Trade, Commerce and Industry 
[DTCI] undertook, with considerable assistance 
from IPA and at the resource company’s request, 
a general audit of LBD policy and performance at 
Hidden Valley in 2013. This was critical of many 
aspects of performance but was welcomed by 
the MMJV which has initiated a series of reforms 
(insofar as it can persuade stakeholders to accept 
them). In particular, it is attempting to revise 
the Constitutions of the component lower level 
Lancos and to reform structures to ensure that 
umbrella functions are carried out. A feature of 
the site is that, given the location of NKWH in Lae 
and the relative absence of smaller Lancos at site, 
the overwhelming bulk of project expenditure on 
PNG companies has been in Lae.    
face the LNG Lancos, it is as yet too early to assess 
the extent to which the innovations introduced 
by ExxonMobil have had more or less success 
than the models used in the mining industry.
•  Ramu: A cascade of ‘umbrella companies’ 
dominates the structure of LBD at Ramu NiCo. A 
‘unifying umbrella company’ (Raibus) sits at the 
top of the structure. Its directors are drawn from 
members of the boards of four ‘area umbrella 
companies’ (AUCs) which cover the different 
regions occupied by the project. In turn these 
AUCs are supposed to both pursue their own 
business interests and support the growth of 
local level ‘clan companies’. The structure is 
also supported by a management assistance 
section within the resource company.  So far, the 
structure has not functioned very well. Raibus 
has had some difficulty in surviving and only 
rarely provides business assistance to lower 
tier Lancos, while the clan companies under at 
least two of the AUCs companies complain that 
they are left to their own devices. Whilst this 
is partly because the real power of ownership 
rests with the various landowner associations 
who appoint directors to the boards of the AUCs 
which in turn control Raibus, it is also because 
of the tendency noted at almost all other sites: 
‘umbrella companies’ are too busy pursuing their 
own interests to offer much support for lower 
level companies. All AUCs do have the apparent 
advantage of having access to the wider market 
offered by Madang town and some have made 
good use of this in widening their register of 
clients. The inland AUCs, especially that at the 
mine site, Kurumbukari, have performed poorly 
so far in part because pre-existing social divisions 
which have resulted from long-term, pre-mine 
migration into their areas which has bedevilled 
the establishment of unified views on what their 
AUCs will aim for. This rather weak performance 
overall is despite the fact the project Lancos have 
received support from the State. In addition to 
the K1m for LBD which the State committed to 
provide under the 2000 MOA, it also provided, 
in 2012, a further K10m with a promise of a 
further K10m (not paid to date) for this purpose. 
In fact this generosity has caused considerable 
dispute in the project area over who received 
(or did not receive) what. No company has paid 
dividends since their establishment in 2008. 
However, on a positive note: a high proportion 
of Lancos interviewed for this survey, irrespective 
of whether they were required to or not, has had 
1  The writer is a small shareholder in InterOil.
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result of mines’ purchases, another 15,000 
people. The three oil/gas projects considered 
(PNG LNG, OSL and InterOil) now employ 
collectively around 4,000 or so people. The 
Lancos associated with them employ at least 
6,000 and other PNG businesses relying on 
oil/gas company needs employ another 6,000 
or so. This gives us totals of:
  EMPLOYMENT DIRECT  INDIRECT
  Mine employment 10,000 
  Contract Lanco employment  15,000
  Non-contract Lanco  4,000+ 
  employment      
  Mine generated employment  15,000 
  in other PNG companies  
  
  Oil/gas company employment   4,000 
  Contract Lanco employment      5,800+
  Oil/gas generated employment  6,000 
  in other PNG companies    
  
  Totals 14,000 45,800
  TOTAL   59,800
   This is not an inconsequential number and it is 
a conservative one.
 o  In 2014, it is estimated that payments by the 
resource companies in the study to local near-
site Lancos, excluding payments by PNG 
LNG, totalled around K1.6bn (or US$640m) 
while their payments to other PNG companies 
were  in excess of K1.8bn (or US$740m). 
Again, this is not evidence of the weak links 
so often claimed. PNG LNG in the last quarter 
of 2014 alone paid out K97m to Lancos and a 
further K148m to other PNG companies. 
•  Asset accumulation rates by Lancos are in general 
respectable but not especially good. Weak data, 
especially that derived from MRDC makes 
comparison rather difficult, but it appears that 
investment by MRDC (and certainly investment 
by the independent Lihir capital investment fund) 
has shown a faster rate of asset accumulation 
than Lancos (with MR Enga being the apparent 
exception).
Other points: 
•  Umbrella functions are not well carried out by 
representative companies whose prime interest is 
in pursuing their own interests. It is concluded 
that is better if these functions are vested in 
resource companies or an independent agency.
Conclusions
•  Data weaknesses mean that the conclusions 
below should not be taken as being entirely 
precise; too much should not be read into them.
•  The challenge of establishing Lancos in remote 
areas of a developing country is a major one and 
should never be underestimated.
•  Weaknesses of the system to date:
 o  Tardiness in reporting to IPA – 84 of the 127 
Lancos for which data are available were 
more than one year in arrears in reporting.
 o  Exemptions in Companies Act allow 81% 
of companies surveyed to avoid having 
independent financial audits.
 o  What seems to be an unpoliced loophole in 
the Act allows many non-exempt companies 
not to reveal directors’ fees or expenses. On 
this and previous points – these omissions 
result in key financial data being unavailable 
to the public at large; it is even worse that, 
often, they are not available to shareholders.
 o  Only 26% of the companies surveyed had 
constitutions. Given that virtually all Lancos 
have special aims and special provisions re 
such things as goals and shareholding, then 
virtually all should have constitutions tailored 
for their own needs.
• Strengths of the system to date
 o  Survival rates are rather good – average age of 
Lancos at OTML which has operated for over 
32 years is 16 years and the rate is higher at 
other, younger sites.
 o  The almost universally held view that PNG 
resource projects are poorly linked to the 
national economy requires questioning in 
terms of both employment and financial flows. 
In employment, while the mining companies 
included in this study in 2014 employed 
around 10,000 people, the Lancos directly 
associated with them employed at least 11,000 
(and probably, allowing for omissions in the 
data, more like 15,000), while landowner 
owned business entities that did not have 
contracts with mines in their vicinity would 
add at least another 4,000 and probably many 
more than that. Further, given the purchases 
made by mines of goods and services from 
PNG businesses other than Lancos it may well 
be that these companies employ, as a direct 
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between local and outside companies will be 
essential, very great care must be exerted in the 
development of the contracts that govern such 
ventures to protect the longer term interests of 
local parties.
•  All the components for an even more efficient 
LBD push at resource sites are in place in Papua 
New Guinea, but more effort is required not just 
from some resource companies but also from key 
government agencies.
•  The push by PNG, which began at Ok Tedi nearly 
four decades ago, to get resource companies 
to support PNG businesses both in the project 
areas and across the country, has had its failures, 
but it has generally worked fairly well. It is hard 
work for the resource companies – but they 
rarely complain about it. It is also hard work for 
the Lancos themselves and by no means the easy 
way to wealth that some entrants at new sites 
imagine it will be. It doesn’t create (or hasn’t 
so far created) many millionaires. It is open to 
abuse but such abuse is rather rare nowadays – 
even if it happens. It is certainly open to failure. 
But in general it has been a success financially 
and perhaps rather more of a success in terms 
of training thousands of PNG entrepreneurs the 
hard way. And when one considers the challenges 
that have to be faced to achieve any success at 
all, then it can be concluded that the policy has 
been very well worthwhile.    
•  Large representative companies, especially once 
they become increasingly independent of the 
resource site that gave them birth, are a major 
potential source of sustainable funding for their 
community shareholders providing they report 
openly and frequently to those shareholders. 
The monitoring of representative company: 
shareholder links should be a function of normal 
State-run business monitoring agencies.
•  Smaller companies entirely or more or less 
dependent on the resource company are not well 
suited at present to provide sustainable benefits 
for the community either because they are not 
owned by the community or because they tend 
to be poor at accumulating assets, preferring 
instead to pay out profits as dividends. Resource 
companies and the State working together might 
consider providing means of persuading such 
Lancos that these short term profits could be 
invested so as to allow both some immediate 
consumption and some longer term investment.
•  Smaller resource projects (which will almost 
always be in the mining sector) and especially 
those in remote locations which will remain 
remote even when mining is completed, should 
be allowed some flexibility by regulators in the 
development of local business development.
•  While in the initial stages of any project, joint 
ventures (or alternatively, management contracts) 
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Whether or not this report is of any value for the 
reader, it was a great pleasure to research and write it.
I have worked on and off in various capacities on the 
mining and oil/gas industry of Papua New Guinea 
since 1973 when I first went to Kiunga to undertake 
part of a study on urban migration in the country. 
Since then, over the years, first from the University of 
PNG and what is now the National Research Institute, 
then from James Cook University, and, since 1997, 
mainly as an independent consultant, I have had the 
privilege of visiting almost every mining and oil/gas 
site in PNG. I am very grateful to the PNG Chamber 
of Mines and Petroleum (PNGCOMP) for their asking 
me to undertake this study which enabled me, in the 
course of four months, to revisit nearly every still-
operating resource site, some of which I had not seen 
for more than a decade.  I hope that the attached 
report is of as much value to them and the industry as 
doing the work was for me personally.
A very large number of people assisted in the production 
of this report including, at my base in Manila, Angie 
Raborar; and at PNGCOMP, Leah Warupi, Emmanuel 
David, Dolorose Aisi and Greg Anderson; and in PNG 
generally including Mel Togolo, Bill Searson, and Tim 
Omundsen; Carolyn Blacklock and Serah Sipani (of 
the IFC); Musje Werror and Jeff Ransley (of Ok Tedi); 
Joy Dutton (of Kiunga); Nick Bainton and Colin Vale 
(Lihir); Gibson Na’au, Jolson Kutato, Tim Andambo, 
Fred Posenu (of Porgera), Scott O’Reilly (of IPI); Don 
Flanagan (formerly of Porgera); David Wissink and 
Robert Grimwade (of Morobe Mining JV) and Neil 
Stuart (of NKW Holdings); Daniel Worrall, Kim Hahn 
and Sisa Kini (of ExxonMobil); Steve Grey (of InterOil); 
Peter Minai and Tim Richards (of Simberi); Callum 
Skeet (of HGDC); Peterson Pipi and Michael Baitia (of 
Gigira DC); David Ganai’i of the PNG Department of 
Trade, Commerce and Industry; Glenn Banks (of New 
Zealand); and especially Willie Kupo (of OSL), Francis 
Chibelle (of OTML), Stotick Kamya (of Ramu NiCo), 
Ivan Pomaleu (of IPA) and John Brooksbank (formerly 
of OSL). Many others kindly allowed me to interview 
them and some of them showed considerable skill in 
managing, despite that, not to provide me with any 
information whatever. 
Although we have never met, the person who provided 
me with most information was Alex Tongayu, of the 
Investment Promotion Authority whose PNG business 
database, accessible on the Internet, is extremely 
impressive and about to improve even further. 
It is not false modesty to state that there is a great 
deal to be modest about in this report; what follows 
barely scratches the surface of a fascinating area of 
economic endeavour in PNG and one for which a 
wealth of information, thanks to IPA, is available. I 
urge others to make use of that data and to improve 
on what follows – it should not be difficult.  
Richard Jackson, Manila, February 2015
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ADB Asian Development Bank
APCM Asia Pacific Christian Mission
AR Annual Return to IPA
AusAID Australian Aid for International Development
BCL Bougainville Copper Limited
BDO Business Development Office(r)
BDG Business Development Group
BDP Business Development Plan
BEC Business Enterprise Centre
BHP Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd
bn billion
CEO Chief Executive Officer
DPE Department of Petroleum & Energy
DTCI Dept of Trade, Commerce & Industry
ECPNG Evangelical Church of PNG
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction
FS (Audited) Financial Statement to IPA
FY Financial Year
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GR Growth Rate
HGDC Hides Gas Development Company
IFC International Finance Corporation
ILG Incorporated Land Group
IOTPR Impact of the Ok Tedi Project Report 1979/80
Abbreviations and Acronyms Used
IPA Investment Promotion Authority of PNG
JV Joint Venture
KBK Kurumbukari 
LBD Local Business Development
LBS Lihir Business Services
LGM Lihir Gold Mine
LNG Liquified Natural Gas 
LOTIC Lower Ok Tedi Investment Company
m million
MoA Memorandum of Agreement
MRA Mineral Resources Authority
MRDC Mineral Resources Development Company
MRL MRL Capital
NCP National Content Plan
NEC National Executive Council
OSL Oil Search Limited
OTDC Ok Tedi Development Company
PDL Petroleum Development Licence
PG Provincial Government
PRC People’s Republic of China
RN Ramu Nickel
SLOB Strategic Landowner Business (Ok Tedi)
SME Small/Medium sized enterprise              
SMIHL Star Mountains Investment Holdings Ltd                 
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1.1 A general introduction
At the December 2014 PNG Mining and Petroleum 
Investment Conference held in Sydney, the Prime 
Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Honourable 
Peter O’Neill, towards the end of his address, called 
on resource developers in the country to do more 
to encourage business development among both 
the people impacted by their operations and in the 
country in general through:
  ‘substantial engagement from the outset by 
new projects and new engagement for existing 
projects’.
All resource companies commencing operations in 
Papua New Guinea today are expected to assist in the 
establishment of, and to offer support and preference 
to, companies owned by people in their areas of 
impact. This is relatively unusual in the resource 
industries world-wide since such expectations are 
rarely encountered in other jurisdictions; requiring 
support for national business is common, for local 
businesses is rare. This report is focussed upon 
the emergence and progress of such ‘landowner 
companies’ or Lancos, and on the challenges faced 
and policies adopted by all the stakeholders involved 
in their development, including government agencies 
and resource companies.
There is a vast literature on small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) world-wide which, for reasons 
of time, this study will largely ignore2. One central 
aspect of the findings of such literature needs 
mentioning from the start of this study however: 
establishing and then growing an SME is difficult. 
There is considerable argument about SME survival 
rates; whereas much of the media coverage tends 
to indicate very high ‘failure’ rates (at 80% in some 
cases), several important commentators have pointed 
out that there is a definitional problem: ‘failure’ in a 
business is not the same as ‘terminating’ operations. 
But even when that is allowed for, and even when 
one also allows for the apparent fact that termination 
rates tend to be higher for businesses with smaller 
numbers of employees, the rates are reasonably high. 
According to one recent study by the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, of all Australian businesses operating 
in 2007, 25% of those employing more than twenty 
workers, 27% of those employing between five and 
nineteen workers and 32% of those employing fewer 
than five workers had ceased operations four years 
later (Connolly et al., 2012). Another earlier study 
in Australia suggested that once a business survives 
for four or five years, survival becomes easier (Veda 
Advantage, 2007), whilst the Australian Government’s 
Department of Treasury recently rather confirmed that 
finding when it concluded that whilst SMEs in the 
service sector had a ‘termination’ rate of 30% and 
those in the product sector had one of 40% in the 
first three years of their operations, that rate began to 
decline after that. Whatever the range of the survival 
rates of SMEs and however one defines it, all agree 
that, in general terms, starting up a business is hard 
and transitioning from being small to any larger size is 
even more difficult…. 
….and that is in metropolitan areas of well-off countries. 
How much more difficult is it to establish SMEs in 
mountain fastnesses or offshore islands3 where Papua 
New Guinea’s mining and hydrocarbon industries 
are clustered? And where peoples with rich cultures 
that have enabled them to survive and sometimes 
prosper but previously without roads, schools, health 
services or money are expected to become instant 
entrepreneurs (‘just add capacity building’). Under 
these specific circumstances, it is asking a great deal 
PART I - OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
2   The extremely valuable Tebbutt report on PNG SME’s was published too late (March 17th 2015) for comparison with this study. However, 
what is clear from that report is that the enthusiasm shown for small business among Papua New Guineans seen in and around resource 
sites is repeated across all areas of the country.
3   With apologies to John Burton who has argued with his usual forthrightness and clarity against the tendency of resource developers to 
overstate the remoteness of such sites (Burton, 1997).
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areas in taking advantage of entirely new concepts 
and opportunities, but on how the structures of their 
communities are radically (and sometimes not so 
radically) adjusting to such changing circumstances.
Local businesses of all types, whether connected to 
resource projects or not, have flourished, in numerical 
terms at least, in Papua New Guinea in recent years. 
When the first ‘umbrella company’, Cloudlands 
Investments Ltd, registered with the PNG Investment 
Promotion Authority (IPA) in November 1975, it was 
incorporated as ‘1-5421(local)’ – that is, it was the 
5421st PNG company to be listed. In July 2009, when 
Sakura Osura Investments – the Lanco representing 
people around the remote Elk-Antelope hydrocarbons 
site – was incorporated it was assigned the number 
68551. On average, more than five PNG companies 
per day (or more than seven per working day) had 
registered in the intervening 34 year period. As at the 
time of writing this section (August 2014), there are 
now approximately 110,000 such companies – so the 
rate of registration has accelerated even more (to over 
20 per day) in recent times. This rate of registration 
is one source of weakness in this report - the IPA 
has great difficulty in keeping up with the flood of 
registration papers although that situation is currently 
being addressed. 
Companies associated with resource projects are 
already astonishingly numerous throughout PNG. 
Bainton and Macintyre reported some years ago that 
over 650 Lancos were registered as being based in the 
Lihir group of islands alone at a time when the adult 
population was perhaps 6,0006; allowing for multiple 
board members and ignoring, for the moment, 
women, perhaps one in five or more of adult males 
could claim to be company directors. At Porgera, at 
present the company regularly deals with 300 local 
contractors and its business development staff estimate 
that there are at least 1,000 other ‘companies’7 in the 
area – which would suggest that perhaps one in every 
ten adult males there could claim to be a company 
director. In one graticular block (83.5km2) on the 
Moran Field, Oil Search investigators established 
that approximately 300 Lancos (or business groups) 
existed.
It might be imagined that the great majority of these 
companies are inactive or have failed. This may be 
the case but without carefully sifting through the IPA 
records (itself, as will be seen, not a simple task), one 
of all involved - whether in the resource company or 
in the villages that host the projects – to expect them 
to have any degree of success.  It goes beyond that 
into the realms of churlishness to then add, if by any 
chance some degree of success is achieved, that such 
businesses also need to demonstrate sustainability if 
they are to deserve to be judged successful.
It also needs to be stated at the outset – as a call for 
ongoing research into the Lanco phenomenon – that 
both the extent and the complexity of local business 
developments (LBD) in association with resource 
projects are very considerable indeed. Nick Bainton, 
who has worked for years, both as a researcher and 
mine employee on Lihir, has described the situation 
of Lancos in association with that island’s gold mine 
as ‘byzantine’ – almost suggesting that even someone 
as experienced as he cannot really grasp what is going 
on. Peter Johnson, who spent six months or more on 
a study for the PNG National Research Institute on 
the benefit flows associated with the Porgera gold 
mine (Johnson 2012) and hoped to include business 
development as one of such benefits, could ultimately 
give only a couple of paragraphs to the topic pointing 
to the grave difficulties he faced in attempting to 
gather accurate information on it. This was despite 
the fact that he could estimate that almost 30% of the 
value of the resources extracted from the mine was 
represented in business contracts (page 72) and that 
he concluded that at Porgera business opportunities 
for Lancos:
	 	‘were	only	a	way	of	maximising	access	to	financial	
benefits,	 not	 as	 a	 long-term	 source	 of	 income’	
(Johnson	2012,	p.914) 
In commissioning the present report, the PNG Chamber 
of Mines and Petroleum (PNGCOMP) originally hoped 
that it could cover all operating PNG mining projects 
and oil and gas fields5 in a period of forty days. Even 
allowing for the very generous assistance provided by 
John Brooksbank in respect of oil/gas Lanco issues and 
the extension by the Chamber of time allowed for the 
report, the report writer sympathises with the views 
expressed by both Bainton and Johnson – the matter 
is indeed complicated. This study only scratches the 
surface of a set of issues that has largely been ignored 
in the past and which is worthy of far more intensive 
study. Such studies could throw light not only on, 
what to me is, the ingenuity and adaptability of Papua 
New Guineans in some of the country’s remotest 
4  This view (or rather the view that maximising access to [short-term] financial benefits) will be, to some extent, challenged in this report
5  Mines: Ok Tedi, Porgera, Lihir, Hidden Valley, Tolukuma, Ramu Nickel and Simberi. Oil/Gas: taken as a single project. 
6  By the end of 2013 there were 9,152 Lihirians aged 18 years and over.
7  ‘Entities’ would be a better word since most of these ‘companies’ at Porgera (see below) turn out not to be formally registered as companies.
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some companies that on close inspection should not 
really be classed as ‘locally controlled’; it means that 
what is not considered a Lanco at one stage of a project 
might become recognised as such as the impact area 
of the project changes; and it excludes many entities 
owned by landowners whose establishment was 
facilitated by and whose continued existence remains 
heavily but indirectly dependent on the resource 
company.
Further, unless a Lanco has a direct link with a resource 
company it is also excluded from this study. This is of 
considerable significance for quite different reasons. 
a)  For the purely pragmatic one that in the time 
available for this study as many limits as were 
reasonably possible had to be imposed on the 
companies to be included;
b)  Because even if unlimited time were available, 
a precise but all-inclusive definition of a Lanco 
would prove difficult to arrive at;
c)  Unless such a link exists, then it is difficult 
to know if the ‘Lanco’ owed its origin and/or 
ongoing support to the resource project.
In this last case, one might point to the fact that there 
are scores of small business entities operating in 
and around Kiunga (for example), from whence the 
OTML product is shipped, or Porgera that are owned 
by landowners from that area (as well as many others 
that are owned by migrants, including foreigners, to 
the town) and that would not exist if OTML or PJV 
were not operating9. Ideally, these – when owned 
by local landowners – might have been included in 
this study, since they are businesses, developed as 
a result of a resource project by persons who were 
resident in the project impact prior to the arrival of the 
project (and, therefore,  must be defined as ‘lancos’). 
In fact, the remit for this study, as outlined in its Terms 
of Reference (see Appendix B), did suggest that they 
be included, but the time available for the study was 
simply inadequate to cover them.  
The major implication of the adoption of this definition 
here is that this study understates the significance both 
of the benefits of the resource industry to not only 
the local but the regional and national economy and 
also understates the significance of small businesses 
in resource project areas.     
It is debatable whether the investment arms of 
landowners fit this adopted definition. Most of those 
should hesitate to reach this conclusion. It may equally 
NOT be the case. The Lihir project classifies its Lancos 
under five broad headings. One of these headings 
refers to ‘Specific Issues Companies’ and it includes 
271 companies or groups, of which 141 are listed with 
the IPA. Virtually none are ‘inactive’; if they do not 
have contracts of their own, they are busy knocking 
on doors seeking them. Further, the six major clans 
on Lihir between them control close to 30 companies 
all of which are active. So ‘inactivity’ probably does 
not explain the remarkably high number of registered 
businesses. It seems safe to reach the rather interesting 
conclusion that there is probably a higher proportion 
of the populations of Lihir, Porgera and probably all 
PNG resource sites who can genuinely claim to be 
Company Directors than is the case in more famous 
commercial centres such as London, Zurich, New 
York or Melbourne. 
One should also note in passing that the Lihir and 
Porgera examples illustrate the fact that there are 
hundreds of groups or associations that are not listed 
with IPA who see themselves as being involved, or 
wishing to be involved, in business. In other words 
even the impressive IPA data sets understate the 
eagerness of people in PNG’s resource areas to be 
involved in business8.  
1.2 Defining a Lanco 
For the purposes of this report a Lanco is defined as:
•  a limited company (thus excluding Business 
Groups or other unincorporated entities) which 
is…
•  … recognised by a resource project operator as 
a local contractor/supplier (and there are several 
cases where such recognition seems to have been 
granted to companies that may not meet other 
conditions)….
•  …. as being largely under the control of local 
people (‘local’ as defined by the applicable 
agreement)….
•  …. which provides services to, and fulfils 
contracts awarded to them by, the resource 
company (as opposed to companies that do not 
depend on funds from the resource company for 
their operations).
This is a very limited definition which many would 
disagree with. It excludes business groups; it includes 
8   It is beyond the scope of this report to investigate why there is this zeal for individual business in PNG communities but the established strand 
of work by economic anthropologists started by Finney and Salisbury should be noted.
9   The situation has become more complicated as oil and gas companies have met with success in the region. But in the late 1970s, just before 
OTML started operations, only half a dozen companies (at most) were based in Kiunga.
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1.3.2 Audited financial data
Under Section 171 of the PNG Companies Act, 
smaller, ‘exempt’ companies may opt not to have 
their accounts independently audited. The great 
majority of Lancos exercise this option, are classed as 
exempt companies and thus do not produce audited 
information. The sort of business analysis usually done 
on companies world-wide can really only be done of 
a small minority of PNG Lancos. But even for these 
normal analysis is problematic, because their shares 
are not publicly traded and their market value is thus 
not readily calculable.
1.3.3 Data sources
Four sources of data were used in the compilation 
of this report. None can be regarded as either full or 
entirely reliable. They were:
1.3.3.1 Interviews with Lancos:  Forty-seven interviews 
were undertaken with the bulk being with OTML, 
Ramu Nickel and Porgera businesses10.  This enabled 
their offered details to be compared with those on the 
IPA website.  In general, frequent nonconformities 
were uncovered in such a comparison, partly because 
of delays in the entering of data on the IPA site, but 
more often through inaccuracies in interviewees’ 
statements. Despite this, the interviews were very 
valuable in giving a human picture of the struggles 
many Lancos had gone through; a genuine sense of 
commitment was transmitted in the great majority 
of cases. It should also be stated that in a handful 
of cases, it appears that the interviews might have 
been granted as a means of exhibiting an apparent 
willingness to participate in the study without in fact 
providing any information. 
1.3.3.2 IPA database: This is an extremely valuable 
source. It is likely to become even more useful once 
the current IFC-funded assistance program to the IPA 
is completed.  At the time of writing (third quarter, 
2014), the IPA cannot process the Annual Returns that 
all registered companies are supposed to submit to it 
within six months of the end of their financial year. 
This means that in some cases Lancos have actually 
produced returns but they do not appear on the 
website. This situation should be cleared up by mid- 
2015 by which time all registered companies will be 
required to have lodged up-to-date Annual Returns. 
One implication of this (if the program is successfully 
carried out) will be that fuller and more accurate data 
will be available in late 2015 in regard to LBD than was 
managed by the Mineral Resources Development 
Company [MRDC] have boards of management 
dominated by non-landowners and fall outside the 
definition adopted; in these cases, the MRDC entity 
managing the landowners’ funds has more in common 
with a bank or other financial management agency – 
and such organisations would surely not be classified as 
Lancos even under the broadest definition of the term. 
But at least one investment company, MRL Capital, is 
entirely (since early 2008) owned and managed by 
the Lihir landowners; MRL Capital clearly would fall 
within the definition. Consequently, a special, brief 
section of this report is devoted to such investment 
arms where all MRDC management companies will 
be described insofar as the data available allows a 
description to be made. 
One other point needs to be made here (and it will not 
be mentioned again elsewhere in this report): Lancos 
are about commercial business not bisnis. The latter 
word may often be glossed as the Tok Pisin equivalent 
of the English word; but the equivalence is not exact. 
Just as the English word ‘business’ does not always refer 
to commercial dealings, so bisnis frequently refers to 
political or social activities. As Nick Bainton put it to 
me in correspondence arising out of this study – “even 
if a ‘business’ fails, the ‘bisnis’ may be successful”. The 
report has deliberately ignored bisnis for two reasons: 
a) I don’t claim to be an anthropologist and b) the 
report is solely concerned with commercial aspects 
of LBD even if this might appear culturally insensitive.
1.3 The need for caution in the interpretation 
of this report 
The writer is aware of numerous reasons why findings 
in this report – and indeed the data on which such 
findings are based – have their flaws and must be 
regarded as largely tentative. Here are some of those 
reasons:
1.3.1 Sample size
In Appendix A of the report details of approximately 
130 Lancos are shown. Although that Appendix 
includes all the largest of Lancos, the number shown 
is a tiny percentage of the total number of IPA-listed 
resource project Lancos that are believed to exist 
(perhaps 5000) and an even smaller proportion if 
groups not listed by IPA were to be allowed for.
10   The availability of Lancos for interviews depended heavily on the willingness of project staff to arrange them in advance of the short visit 
made by the consultant to the sites. Staffing resources in some instances made such a task excessively onerous at several sites, while at 
some others (oil/gas) there was simply not enough time to even attempt many interviews. Special acknowledgement must be made for the 
efforts of Gibson Na’au (Porgera), Stotick Kamya (Ramu Nickel) and Francis Chibelle (OTML) in this regard; Francis even interviewed ten 
companies for inclusion in this report when the field visit by the consultant had ended. It should also be noted that the Lancos at Ramu 
Nickel were especially well prepared for the interviews presenting more and fuller information than those at any other site. 
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Further, even those Lancos which do submit Financial 
Statements, based on independent audits, can avoid 
disclosing some  of their financial details under 
Section 212 of the Act, for example payments to 
and fees earned by directors (in addition to being, 
frequently, late in being submitted).
It is arguable, but it may be possible, that a Lanco 
could avoid such a situation as has just been described 
without the need to amend the Companies Act simply 
by laying out in its constitution that, regardless of 
any provisions in national laws, their company shall 
have independent financial audits and shall release 
to its shareholders the details of such audits which 
shall include directors’ fees and expenses. It certainly 
seems to be desirable that this be done. 
Nevertheless, the IPA records represent an extremely 
valuable source of data and could be used for further 
(and more in-depth) research into the workings of 
Lancos and other businesses across Papua New 
Guinea. 
1.3.3.3 Resource company records: Presumably all 
companies keep precise records of what funds they 
pay out for awarded contracts. Yet not all companies 
have been able to supply such data to this study 
(irrespective of any willingness or reluctance to do so). 
Increased demands have been made on companies 
by governments and various international agencies 
to report a wider and wider range of data and one 
hesitates to ask them to extend that range even 
further…..but, there is clearly inconsistency across 
operating companies in PNG in the reporting of local 
business development within their areas of impact. 
One reason for this may well be that PNG emphasis 
on LBD is, as noted earlier, significantly greater 
than it is in most other operating environments; so 
what is demanded in terms of data requirements of 
companies by the international community tend not 
to give the emphasis on LBD that is adequate for PNG 
circumstances. This is unfortunate not merely for the 
parochial purposes of this study but because – as the 
study attempts to show – NOT reporting such activity 
does a disservice to the benefits the resource industries 
create and, further, by leading to an understatement 
of resource industries’ impacts and linkages, helps 
perpetuate the stereotypical view, widely held and 
constantly re-circulated by many commentators, that 
resource projects are isolated, sealed-off enclaves 
with little positive ties into national economies. 
Where companies have made considerable effort to 
collect data on local business development (and Ok 
Tedi and Porgera deserve credit for having done this) 
there appears to have been a falling off in the integrity 
and accuracy of that data in recent years. Only Oil 
Search was able to provide this study with a full 
available at the time this report was being prepared. 
On the IPA site there are occasional contradictions 
between the stated date for the last submission of an 
Annual Return (on the General Information page) and 
the date shown on the Filings page.  It is not always 
(or often) possible to tell whether the absence of an 
Annual Return on the IPA site is due to its non-entry 
by IPA or non-submission by the Lanco. 
A much more significant weakness, in terms of data 
gathering for this project, arises from the fact that 
many companies do not submit Annual Returns in 
the timeframe required under the IPA’s rules, often 
being many years in arrears. The evidence on the 
IPA site itself suggests that only when companies are 
issued with ultimatums (attached to the threat of de-
registration) do most feel it necessary to comply – and 
submit several years’ worth of returns all at once. Some 
of the very largest Lancos are several years behind in 
their AR submissions. The large number of ‘nil AR’ in 
Appendix A is partly due to the fact that many of the 
gasfield Lancos are of recent origin, but , even so, this 
only accounts for a small portion of the delinquency 
in reporting. While there are existing provisions for 
IPA to de-register nonconforming companies, this 
seems to occur only rarely. 
Important obstacles to data gathering via the IPA 
website arise from the provisions of the Companies 
Act (1997). The principal one is the provision in that 
Act that allows companies to dispense with the need 
for independent audits providing that at least two of 
the following three criteria do not apply to them:
• Total assets of more than K5m;
• More than 25 shareholders;
• More than 100 employees.
Very few Lancos have more than K5m in assets and 
more than 100 employees and most do not undergo 
independent audits and do not submit audited 
financial statements to the IPA – they simply provide 
an Annual Return where the only financial details 
included are the Lanco’s assets and liabilities in a 
simple summary form. No other significant financial 
details are included in the Annual Return. So, for the 
great majority of companies shown in Appendix A 
very limited financial data is made available in the 
IPA records. However, almost by definition most 
Lancos do have more than 25 shareholders – at least 
nominally so. So one potentially (and in several cases 
actual) unlooked for consequence of the exemption 
provision is that communities who are supposedly the 
owners of Lancos cannot be assured that independent 
audits of their companies’ finances are carried out. 
They have to place their trust in their directors and, 
human nature being what it is, sometimes that trust 
is not justifiable. 
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reasonably significant Lancos, not mentioned in 
resource company records were located. The Business 
Enterprise Centre’s annual reports also provide useful 
insights into Lancos.      
1.3.3.5 The reader should bear in mind that this 
report only deals with data that have either been 
voluntarily provided by resource companies and 
Lancos or is already in the public arena (normally the 
IPA website). 
1.4 The Study’s TOR 
The Terms of Reference for this study are shown in 
Appendix B.  In the light of the comments made above 
regarding constraints on data collection the following 
table shows in summary how such challenges 
have, in the opinion of the writer, impacted on 
the completeness of reporting in this study on the 
individual items specified under item 2 of the TOR:
and internally consistent (and therefore presumably 
accurate) set of contract payments by year to specified 
Lancos (though Ramu, Simberi and PNG LNG have 
also provided overall data). Partial data is available 
for Porgera and Ok Tedi. It would seem desirable that 
it be compulsory for resource companies to make 
public such information, providing that this does not 
breach commercial confidentiality. The most obvious 
central location for such data to be compiled would 
be the Chamber11. In any case, the Chamber, if it is 
to properly do its work of representing the industry, 
should be supplied with such information.
1.3.3.4 Anecdotal/accidental data collection: 
This has been more common than might at first be 
imagined. For example, in order to search the IPA site 
the exact name of the company looked for must be 
known (in many cases). Consequently, a mention in 
one Lanco record of another (as a part owner or as 
a JV partner, for example) is often the way in which 
11   Only after this conclusion had been reached did the consultant become aware that the Chamber staff have been circulating annually a 
request to members to provide basic statistical data of this form – with limited success – for many years.
TOR Group TOR Item Quality and source of data in the report
Business Structure Adequate; IPA records supplemented by interviews where 
undertaken  
Location Good; IPA
Size Good; IPA
Diversity Fair: only available for interview; IPA records cannot show this 
Subsidiaries For main companies, good; IPA Financial Statements
Joint Ventures For main companies, good; IPA Financial Statements
Number directors Good; IPA
Management Weak; IPA data rarely covers this. Interviews only
Start-up aid Fair; interviews, press reports 
Future outlook Fair but only for interviewed companies
Board Composition Good; IPA records
Turnover of members Good; IPA records
Background Weak ; interviews only
Training Weak ; interviews only
Board fees Weak because even some of those with FS do not disclose 
Gender Fair: IPA ARs – but depends on name being identifiable as M or F
Compliance Compliance Fair in terms of punctuality of reporting to IPA (which is the main 
indicator of transparency available); weak in other respects 
Constitution Very good – but usually in the sense that most do not have one
Table 1: Assessment of report’s fulfillment of TOR Requirements
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TOR Group TOR Item Quality and source of data in the report
Financial Turn over Not good; good only for interviewed companies and those with 
FS
Profit Only available for those with FS
Dividends Only available for those with FS + some interviewed
Dividends policy Weak; some interviewed companies only
Assets and liabilities Good from IPA ARs – but many ARs are not punctually lodged
Shareholders Numbers Good from IPA ARs
Origins Fair from IPA ARs – but place of residence does not tell the origin
Gender Fair from IPA ARs – but depends on name being identifiably M 
or F
Employees Numbers Good from IPA ARs
Expat/PNG Good for larger companies only
PNG origin Weak
Gender Fair only for larger companies; not available from ARs
Training Weak
History History Quite good; many clues in ARs. Good for interviewed companies
Table 1: Continued
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2.1 The emergence of LBD policies 
The establishment of local landowner businesses in 
association with PNG resource projects can be traced 
back to the 1979 study, Impact of the Ok Tedi Project 
(IOTP), of which the present consultant was a co-author. 
That study urged the PNG Government and Damco12 
to support Lanco development as a matter of fairness 
to local landowners in the Kiunga and Telefomin 
Districts. ‘Fairness’ because such landowners, under 
the then prevailing conditions, were not guaranteed 
more than a small amount of direct income (other than 
compensation for damage) from the project – a mere 
one-twentieth (5%) of project royalties, for example, 
would flow to them under the then arrangements with 
95% going to national government. 
Looking back, it is clear that the concept as then 
proposed was not as clearly thought through as would 
have been desirable. There was no consideration of 
some of its longer-term implications:
•  What (and whose) were the responsibilities if a 
Lanco ran into financial difficulties?
•  For how long should local companies have 
preference in the gaining of contracts (for ever?)?
•  Given the remoteness of the area, was it not 
inevitable that such Lancos would be entirely 
dependent on the resource company as their sole 
customer? And, would not this simply add to the 
local community’s dependence on the project?
•  Why would local people want to work for Lancos 
(except as bosses and board members) when they 
might have priority in better paid employment 
with the resource company itself? Would not this 
automatically mean that most Lanco workers 
would probably be migrants?
More than thirty years and lots of experience later, it 
is by no means clear that the answers to these and 
other questions have been sorted out even now or 
that different resource companies and government 
agencies are agreed on the answers. 
Not only were there significant weaknesses in 
the concept of LBD and Lancos championed in 
the IOTP, but it was implemented in the specific, 
local circumstances of the time and of Ok Tedi’s 
geographical setting. No-one at that time imagined 
the emergence of a future Anitua or IPI landowner 
company with branches across the country (and 
internationally). ‘Sustainability’ was not an issue in the 
mining industry (or in most other activities of the time) 
in 1979; improving the share of immediate benefits 
flowing to local people was the key challenge. Even 
within the context of OTML itself, it was not envisaged 
at the time that the impact of the project would spread 
all the way down the Fly River; it was thought then 
that giving preference to two whole Districts (Kiunga 
and Telefomin) was perhaps spreading the benefits too 
far.  
In short, the 1979 Ok Tedi model for LBD was time and 
place-specific and was not especially well-thought out. 
And yet, although the model has evolved somewhat 
over time, its essential emphasis on the right of local 
impacted people to be supported in efforts to establish 
their own businesses which receive preferential (some 
would say cosseted, risk-free) treatment, has become 
embedded in project development thinking in PNG. 
This principle is probably unassailable but the specific 
applications of it do not seem to have been much 
thought about in the more than 35 years that have 
elapsed since IOTP. 
2. General Matters Relating to Local  
Business Development
12   Damco = Dampier Mining Company the wholly owned BHP company that represented BHP in the earliest stages of Ok Tedi development. 
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profit is not the sole aim, what are the other aims? Are 
these aims stated? It would seem absolutely critical 
that every Lanco that intends to have aims that are 
not solely commercial or are designed to benefit a 
selected portion of the public, should specifically say 
so in its own specially designed constitution – yet, 
as will be seen, although the overwhelming majority 
of Lancos have very restricted share-ownership rules 
and although many of them are managed in ways that 
imply a somewhat modified approach to commercial 
norms, they do not have such constitutions and 
therefore do not spell out their rules.
Perhaps the most important question is: Whose aims 
are we discussing when trying to measure Lanco 
success? Such a measurement of success must be 
made in the context of the goals the stakeholders in 
LBD have in mind when they establish, or assist in 
the establishment of, local businesses; in particular 
success needs to be measured against the aims of 
the landowners involved. To do this, it should be 
noted, one is not being patronising to locals involving 
themselves in business in demanding that their 
expectations, rather than some rigorous and universal 
commercial standard, be the basis for assessment. But 
the following observation is relevant:
  ‘Venture failure will invariably [need to] be referred 
to the perceptions of the owner that is involved. 
As a result failure exhibits more subjective than 
objective	qualities’		
because it was made by an institution not especially 
well known for deviating from rigorous, universally 
applicable commercial standards, the Australian 
Federal Department of Treasury (op.cit. 2012).
Unfortunately, it can be stated at the outset of this 
report that it remains very unclear what either resource 
companies or landowners seek to gain in establishing 
and supporting LBD other than obeying the conditions 
of their operational MoAs or maximising their access 
to financial benefits respectively. In fact, it seems clear 
that the resource companies need to start planning 
and implementing a local business development plan 
well in advance of the signing of any MoA (which is 
not applicable until construction has already started). 
It can also be remarked here that resource companies 
operating in PNG, even if privately they may have severe 
reservations at taking on the challenge of supporting 
Lancos, rarely, if ever, complain about this aspect of 
PNG policy even if they are vocal on many aspects of 
mining policy overall. This suggests, at the least, that 
the resource companies accept their responsibilities 
in this area, and further, that perhaps they see some 
benefits for themselves in this requirement. Indeed, 
one specific advantage that local businesses have over 
2.2 The challenge today 
The wording in MoAs relating to resource project 
obligations regarding LBD remain more or less the 
same as those that were developed for the Ok Tedi 
project; if anything they offer less guidance to the 
project developer now as to what is expected of 
them than was the case thirty years ago. No guide is 
available for developers to follow in implementing 
their programs that will fulfil their obligations in this 
regard.
Such a guide would need to combine general 
principles with implementation guidelines that take 
account of the specificities of each project; such a 
guide is urgently needed even if one size will not fit 
all. For example, it is fairly evident that the sort of 
business development program that could reasonably 
be expected to be implemented at, say, Porgera, a 
large, long-life mine would not be appropriate at, 
say, Simberi, a much smaller, short-lived project. 
While LBD might be a major plank in a sustainability 
policy for the former, would there be sufficient time 
or resources during the life of a small mine for LBD 
to have any chance of success? Might not it be better 
to establish both immediate and sustainable benefits 
at smaller projects by means other than LBD or by 
a different form of LBD? Similarly, it is apparent that 
the LBD model applicable to a large gold project 
would not necessarily be as applicable to a large gas 
project – given the contrasting nature of expenditure 
and staffing patterns of these two types of resource 
projects.  The PNG LNG has indicated how important 
it is for Lancos to capture project benefits during 
construction – and, incidentally, set an extremely high 
standard in doing so. But is it realistic to expect all 
future resource projects, regardless of their size, to 
match the sort of attention that ExxonMobil were able 
to pay to local business development? It is hoped that 
this study will stimulate some debate as to the future 
nature of project approaches to LBD.
2.3 How is the success of a Lanco to be 
measured? 
In this report, Lanco results are presented and 
discussed, for the most part, in relation to revenues, 
profits, net assets and other accepted measures of 
financial progress. Ultimately, such a focus is entirely 
reasonable since a company that does not continue to 
make a profit will go out of existence and, therefore, 
be unable to meet any other markers of success. 
However, is profit the sole rationale of Lancos? And 
if so, is the aim, as Johnson stated in his study of 
Porgera, not so much to achieve sustainable profits but 
to maximise flows of revenue to people impacted by 
resource projects during the lifetime of the projects? If 
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non-local ones – irrespective of preferential treatment 
– is that some of their costs, labour mobilisation and 
on-costs, may in fact be lower. 
It was – at least until very recently - equally unclear 
what government’s aims for LBD have been. When one 
looks at the State’s actions in regard to LBD over the 
years, from the start of Ok Tedi (when the State gave 
no financial support to LBD) to the commencement 
of Ok Tedi’s much smaller near neighbour, the Stanley 
Project (where the State handed out K30 million 
as ‘seed money’ for business groups) it could be 
suggested that the policy is a purely pragmatic one: 
do whatever it takes to get landowners to agree to 
get projects underway. In defence of the State, one 
could in response argue that such a policy has worked 
– would the PNG LNG be shipping gas exports, as 
it has now been doing for some months, without the 
State having invested so heavily in LBD?  Fortunately, 
we now have clearer guidance – the government is 
placing a heavy emphasis on the development of 
small and medium-sized enterprises being developed 
and wants to see the resource companies help in this 
process. 
Further, landowners themselves, in the course 
of the interviews carried out as part of the study, 
indicated that they have very mixed motives, and 
they appropriately demonstrate that mixture in 
their management of Lancos. If Lancos stated their 
objectives in their constitutions the situation might be 
clearer but, in fact, of the companies examined in this 
study (as shown in Appendix A) less than a quarter 
opted to state their goals in their own constitution.
In short, it seems that few of its stakeholders have a 
clear concept of how a Lanco’s success should be 
measured.   
Here are some of the criteria by which the success of 
a Lanco can be assessed from a resource company’s 
viewpoint: 
i)  Does the company’s support for LBD enhance 
and strengthen community support for the 
project? To do this it must presumably be seen to 
have benefits for the majority of the community. 
If a Lanco fails, then it seems likely that unless the 
resource company helps it recover, the strength 
of its grip upon its ‘social licence’ will in fact 
weaken. Conversely, a Lanco that has extensive 
growth and profits but does not pay dividends 
or make significant contributions to its base 
community may also weaken the company’s 
support from the community because they see 
no benefits and blame the resource developer for 
this. For LBD to contribute to maintaining ‘social 
licence to operate’ (i.e. not having operations 
stopped or interrupted) then, it seems reasonable 
to conclude, resource companies will need to 
monitor its outcomes carefully, to protect their 
own interests.
ii)  A key aspect of such monitoring would be to 
establish if Lancos are being managed according 
to the established rules of commerce and 
properly governed. If they are, then it might 
be presumed that the balance between being 
successful commercially and spreading the 
benefits across the base community would be 
achieved if as many people in the community 
as possible were shareholders, if they were paid 
dividends regularly and if they – as shareholders 
- were able to vote at regularly convened annual 
general meetings. In other words, the ‘normal’ 
company rules could apply and would work, 
providing shareholding was spread widely 
amongst the base community and if this could be 
maintained by restrictions on who could acquire 
what amount of shares. However, what sorts of 
sanctions could be brought against errant Lancos 
– even if their shareholder base was both widely 
spread across the community and restricted to 
that community – whose directors do not face 
regular re-election, do not pay dividends, do not 
reveal the generality of the Lanco’s accounts (let 
alone details thereof)? The resource company 
may have the responsibility to help establish and 
to support Lancos but it has no authority whatever 
to close them down. Even if it attempted to apply 
sanctions against what it considered to be poor 
governance by, for example, no longer awarding 
contracts to an errant Lanco, it could expect a 
severe backlash since Lanco directors are often 
local, political leaders. This is not to say that such 
sanctions should not be employed  - only to warn 
of the difficulties likely to arise when they are.
iii)  Can a Lanco fulfil the contract work assigned to 
it efficiently? Ideally, could efficient Lancos cut 
project costs? How much does the commitment 
to support LBD cost? There appears to have 
been no research, whether inside or outside 
resource companies, to establish the answers to 
such questions. Yet it would not be too difficult 
to arrive at partial answers – what is the cost of 
hiring BD staff? What, for established projects, 
has been the total cost of rescuing Lancos that 
have been considered too important to fail? And 
it might also be possible to calculate roughly, 
by looking at different projects, what the cost 
of undertaking a specific sort of service task has 
been when undertaken by a Lanco or a contractor 
from outside the impact area.     
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critical of the industries. One may be reasonably sure 
on picking up an article on mining or hydrocarbon 
activities by such outsiders that it will contain serious 
criticisms (if not flamboyant denunciations) of those 
industries. A number of ‘truths’ about the industries 
are taken as read by the great majority of academic 
and media commentators (and through them by the 
general public)13. It is not argued in this study that such 
‘truths’ are in fact absolutely false but rather that they 
are neither fully true nor are they entirely universal; 
they need to be modified where local conditions take 
off some of their sharper edges. 
One such basically valid ‘truth’ but one which is 
not the whole truth in PNG circumstances is that of 
resource industries’ links with the national economy. 
It is almost always said of the mining industry that its 
links to the wider national economy of the countries 
in which it operates, especially if that country is 
relatively poor in economic terms, are weak and, 
consequently, it has a small multiplier effect – that 
is, the industry does little to stimulate other forms 
of economic activity within the country in which it 
is located. In general terms, this argument is a valid 
one. But it is worth making three points regarding the 
situation in PNG. First, almost any economic activity 
in the country (other than small scale agriculture) 
which requires significant investment is likely to have 
to import either the investment funds or to use those 
funds to import equipment and human resources in 
order to proceed. Mining and oil/gas extraction is 
not all that different from any other activity in this 
regard (something which is rarely, if ever, mentioned). 
Second, in PNG all  mining and oil/gas projects are 
contractually obliged to maximise  their purchases 
from within the country. Even if those purchases 
ultimately are sourced from abroad, this means that 
value is added internally not merely in terms of profits 
earned by PNG-based companies but also in terms of 
expertise and skills in the supply and logistics sectors. 
Third, when one starts to examine LBD at resource 
sites, then one also starts to question, not the basis but 
some aspects of this ‘lack of linkage’ concept. If only 
because of the numbers of people employed in LBD – 
both at site within the impact area of the project and 
beyond it at urban centres around PNG.   In short, this 
study will indicate that the resource industries have 
greater linkages to the overall economy than they 
are generally given credit for although this is not to 
say that even greater multiplier effects could not be 
achieved.
iv)  Can LBD be a significant part of sustainable 
closure planning? Is it likely to make a bigger 
or smaller contribution than in-house training, 
or an MRDC-style investment? Can the business 
skills absorbed during mine life be extended to 
business after mine closure? 
These are critical and practical, not theoretical, 
questions. One of the motivations for the present 
writer in undertaking this study arose from a desire 
to see if these questions had been answered over the 
many years since Lancos were first established in the 
PNG resource industry in the late 1970s. It was a 
personal (as well as a public) matter for one reason: 
I, together with two colleagues, Craig Emerson and 
Robert Welch, played a small role in establishing 
Lancos in the first place – and we asked ourselves 
those and other questions, but were unsure of the 
answers to them, 35 years ago, when we compiled a 
report on the possible impacts of the Ok Tedi Project. 
When I began the present study it seemed to me that 
the specific circumstances of Ok Tedi development 
had had a key influence on the proposals for Lanco 
development made in our report of 1979-80, but 
even though those circumstances have not been 
fully reproduced at later projects, the basic model 
for Lanco development there seemed to have been 
(roughly) followed at least until the agreements for the 
PNG LNG were arrived at quite recently.  
In short, one of the aims of this study was to see if over 
the years greater clarity in the answers to the questions 
just posed had been achieved.
2.4 Some recurrent themes
The body of this report deals with LBD on a site-
by-site basis. This tends to emphasise the individual 
characteristics and challenges of LBD at each site and, 
simultaneously, to leave it to the reader to spot generic 
features. At least  five general and intertwined themes 
which keep on turning up in the site studies are worth 
indicating from the start. 
2.4.1 The ‘weak links between mining/hydrocarbon 
industries and the national economy’
Most of the literature produced within the resource 
industries is technical in nature and, thus, of little 
general interest to the wider public. Most of the 
material that is of public interest concerns social and 
environmental matters, is produced by academics, 
international agencies and NGOs, and is generally 
13   The present writer’s favourite stereotype is that which portrays any mining company as a ‘giant multinational’ Goliath in contrast to the 
community in which it operates as a gallant, powerless David.  This comparison does not take into account the fact that the original David 
was far from powerless – indeed was almost certain of victory -  when one considers Who was on his side. Whilst He (or She) may not be 
on the side of landowners at resource projects, to portray such landowners as powerless is just silly. 
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will, equally inescapably, reflect poorly on the project 
itself and require the project to step in. 
The answer to this dilemma seems to be that whilst both 
approaches will be necessary at all times throughout 
the life of a project, their ratios of input will vary. That 
is: that LBD’s significance in terms of community 
relationships will need to be especially strong initially 
– and remain strong until a degree of self-sustaining 
capacity has been developed by local businesses. 
Conversely, whilst the principles of good commercial 
governance MUST be insisted upon from the very start 
of any local business development program, it will 
need to permit a degree of subsidisation if any success 
is to be achieved. As time passes and (if) self-sustaining 
capacity is achieved then commercial principles will 
steadily come to dominate all aspects of the program.
In the descriptions of actual practice that follow two 
issues that arise from this are worth looking out for:
•  What sort of LBD philosophy seems to 
predominate at different sites? Is the ‘ideal’ 
situation just outlined followed or does the 
approach tend to follow either one approach 
(‘essentially community affairs’) or the other 
(‘essentially a purely commercial approach’)? Has 
any project switched between the approaches 
over time?
•  Are there any signs that the original commitments 
made by resource companies in the area of LBD 
are modified over time? Or, do they remain 
constant over the whole life of a project? For 
example, assuming that the resource company 
has fulfilled any commitment to give priority to 
immediately local interests in LBD, are there cases 
where, once some success has been achieved, 
such preferential treatment is wound back?
2.4.4 LBD is only one component of local impact 
area development; what should be LBD’s weighting 
within an impact area development program?
Resource companies provide employment and 
training, pay compensation, taxes and royalties, and 
involve themselves in a wide range of community 
investments both through the TCS and their annual 
community budgets, in addition to developing local 
business. What, at any specific site, is the optimal mix 
of such activities? Is it the same at all sites? Would 
investment at Site A in community infrastructure be a 
more efficient way of achieving both short-term and 
sustainable development than any other form of input 
whereas, at Site B, greater emphasis on training or 
LBD make more sense?
2.4.2 Since projects need to develop LBD the very 
different circumstances (size, capital involved, 
project location, project life span etc.)it is unlikely 
that one size of LBD programming will fit all
Some projects have won a reputation for excellence 
in their development of local businesses and national 
content planning while others seem to lag behind. The 
laggards need to lift their game certainly BUT it will 
become evident in the following pages that excellent 
programs cannot readily be shifted wholesale from 
one project to another. Small mines with a life span 
of ten years or less cannot implement LBD programs 
that large mines with long lives can. Further, given 
that the nature and timing of expenditure and business 
opportunities in the oil/gas industry are significantly 
different from those in the mining sector, rather 
different plans need to be drawn up for the two types 
of industry.
2.4.3 What is the prime purpose of LBD?
This has already been touched upon above but it needs 
to be stressed that different projects (and sometimes the 
same project at different periods) have different views 
as to why they are involved in LBD. In generalised 
terms, LBD is seen by some as part of the process of 
winning social licence (and is therefore a community 
relations function) while others see it as part of a 
long term program of sustainable development, 
of the creation of new, independent, stand-alone 
commercial entities (which makes it more of a purely 
commercial function).  These polarised views of LBD 
imply different implementation strategies. The ‘social 
licence’ approach implies the ongoing responsibility 
of the project for LBD entities associated with it 
and also implies that LBD is primarily one aspect 
of community relations which has very significant 
implications for the relations a project has with the 
community. The obvious drawback to this approach is 
that it may provide a disincentive to local businesses 
efficiency insofar as some may feel they can always 
fall back on the project developer if they don’t manage 
their businesses particularly well. 
The ‘sustainable’ approach implies a hands-off attitude 
on the part of the project developer and implies that 
LBD is undertaken on purely commercial grounds (and 
therefore requires little involvement of community 
affairs staff). Given the very large sums of money 
involved (as will be demonstrated later in this report), 
there are very good grounds for such an approach. 
But its drawback is that it seems inescapable that 
businesses developed in the remote areas in which 
most projects are located could never develop at all if 
a purely ‘hands off’ approach is adopted and, further, 
that any failure of a major project-connected business 
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b)  A description of the present circumstances of 
Lancos at each major resource project. The 
projects are discussed more or less in order of the 
date of their commencement although the oilfield 
development under Oil Search Ltd and the PNG 
LNG project under the leadership of ExxonMobil 
are combined as one.
c)  Arising out of the individual site description, there 
follows a section that attempts to draw together 
common experiences, challenges and possible 
lessons and which also goes back to some of the 
questions asked in this introduction and attempts 
to answer them, together with a set of suggestions 
for possible improvements in the ways resource 
companies, government agencies and Lancos 
themselves might work together.
2.4.5 Over the life of a project community needs 
will change: how should community development 
programs, including LBD, reflect this?
The expectations of an impacted community change 
as a project develops; in an extreme form such change 
might become one of Colin Filer’s intergenerational 
time bombs. This, of course, is one reason why 
almost all project MoAs include clauses providing for 
periodic reviews of community development inputs or 
‘integrated benefits packages’. In the case of LBD, this 
raises the question of the life expectancy of guarantees 
of local business prioritisation: at what point do any 
original MoA provisions under which local businesses 
have priority have priority start to lapse – or do they 
last for the lifetime of the project?  
2.5 Layout of this report
The remainder of this report consists of three sections:
a)  A brief analysis of the larger and more active 
investment subsidiaries under the management 
of the MRDC.
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3.1 Introduction
MRDC cannot be regarded as a Lanco yet it manages 
most resource landowners’ funds derived from their 
equity holding in projects (and some other assets). 
Consequently it is included here as a separate item.
3.2  MRDC details – albeit outdated
When Kennecott withdrew from the Ok Tedi project in 
1973/4, the responsibility for the site was taken over 
by a specially formed, wholly owned government 
body, the Ok Tedi Development Company. Once 
Damco (the local BHP subsidiary) took over Ok 
Tedi management, OTDC was renamed the Mineral 
Resources Development Company (MRDC) for the 
original, specific purpose of taking over the planning 
of the use of land allotments in Kiunga which were 
set aside by the Department of Lands for later 
allocation to local businesses, in line with one of the 
recommendations in the Impact of the Ok Tedi Project 
report. Many other proposals were made for the 
ongoing future of the MRDC, but when the Porgera 
landowners successfully negotiated for a share of 
the equity in that project in 1989, it was agreed that 
MRDC would take on the role of helping landowners 
manage the investment of their share (and that of the 
Enga Provincial Government) of these benefits.  Lihir 
landowners followed the Porgera lead and in 1995 
Ok Tedi landowners and the Fly River Provincial 
Government (FRPG) were, belatedly, also granted a 
similar share in the OTML equity (although, unlike 
the Porgera case, the Fly River Provincial Government 
and landowners’ portions have always been kept in 
separate accounts). Oil and gas landowners similarly 
have been assisted in the investment and management 
of their dividends by MRDC.
At first sight it might appear that MRDC is solely an 
investment management agency and as such is not 
much more of a Lanco than would be any other 
organisation into which landowner funds were 
deposited for investment, such as a bank. Several 
features do, however, distinguish MRDC from such 
other financial institutions:
• It is a government statutory body
•  All the funds it manages are derived solely from 
resource projects (and the funds it makes from 
investing this capital)
•  Further, it is not solely an investment agency; the 
outcome of a complex problem over the future of 
two of Ok Tedi landowners’ largest companies, 
Tabubil Engineering and Fubilan Catering 
Services, was resolved by placing them under 
MRDC management.
•  Importantly, the directorships and shareholding 
arrangements of the individual MRDC 
subsidiaries do vary to some extent. In some 
cases the arrangements suggest more or less full 
MRDC control, in others they suggest landowners 
have most of the responsibility for managing the 
subsidiary. In such latter cases, there is a strong case 
for arguing that they are landowner companies. 
For example, whereas the board members of 
Petroleum Resources [PR] Gobe are three MRDC 
employees, two Provincial politicians and one 
landowner, Porgera landowners have three of 
the six members of Mineral Resources [MR] 
Enga and. given the closeness of their common 
interests with the Enga PG, which also has two 
representatives on the Board, apparent control of 
the company.
•  In one case, landowners have decided to run their 
own investment fund; Lihir people took what had 
been Mineral Resources Lihir out of MRDC in 
2008 and now manage it entirely independently. 
None of the publicly available MRDC data are 
particularly up-to-date; the last time MRE reported to 
IPA was at the end of 2007 – at which time it was 
doing very poorly. Because the gas project has only 
recently commenced (plus the fact that MRDC does 
3. The Investment Arms of MRDC
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sustainable development at Porgera) had close to zero 
assets when it last reported in 200715. 
A third reason why the absence of more up-to-
date MRDC data is unfortunate is that despite the 
many public criticisms that have been made of the 
organisation and despite the fact that it has made some 
unfortunate investments, in general its performance 
has been not bad - especially when compared to that 
of the use to which other forms of mining benefits 
have been put.
Finally, the tardiness of MRDC in submitting reports to 
IPA hardly sets a good example for lesser companies. 
not report very promptly) means that there are very 
few data available for those gas resources funds 
managed by MRDC14.
It is unfortunate that MRDC was not able to release 
more up-to-date data (although for a minority of the 
companies shown data for 2010 - and for one or two 
for 2011 - are in the public domain) if only because 
since 2009 the Gas Resource companies have taken 
off and may well already rival, or have surpassed in 
terms of assets, those possessed by the metal mining 
funds. It is also a pity that in the absence of more up-
to-date information, it would appear that MREnga (and 
thus one of the most important sources of funding for 
14   When they do report these funds usually take advantage of Section 212 of the Companies Act that allows companies not to reveal 
certain forms of data which include payments to Directors. However, the Financial Statement for GR Kutubu for 2010 does include a line 
item indicating that from the time of the inception of the company (July 2009) up to the end of December 2010 directors’ fees totaling 
US$1,864,077 were paid out. The board of GR Kutubu had seven members at the time, including the Governors of the two affected 
Provinces, at least two MRDC employees and at least two others (seven in all).The line item does not distinguish individual payments but 
simply states the total paid.
15   As shareholders in the PJV, the landowners and Enga PG (in the form of MRE) were empowered to market their share of project production 
as they saw fit. It appears that they committed to future gold sales at prices well below what turned out to be market prices in 2007, thus 
losing considerable revenue. In addition, since that time especially, cash calls on shareholders made by the JV have eaten heavily into MRE 
net revenues. One knowledgeable insider informed the author in early 2015 that cash calls accounted for more than 90% of MRE income 
in the previous year and that MRE had indeed minimal funds at its disposal.
Table 2: Net Asset Value in US$ of some major MRDC resource subsidiaries to 2009
  Company 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
  MR Enga 15.3 15.1 13 12.6 16 18.3 14.9 2.7 3.5 NA NA
  MR Ok Tedi 2 0 0 0.7 1.2 4.1 8 16.1 31.8 50.7 62.2 71.3
  MR Star Mountains 4.1 4.5 3.1 ? 7.2 10.8 17.8 31.1 40.5 47.1 60.1
  MR Lihir -11.8 -22.5 12 23.9 33.4 21.2 83 144.6 181.6 156.3 178.0
           
  PR Gobe 5.1 4.6 6.1 6.5 7.5 9.1 9.9 6.5 9.9 13.6 14.5
  PR Kutubu 34.1 42.1 34.5 36.4 65.3 80.4 118.5 134.2 199.6 282.8 262.0
  PR Moran NA NA NA NA NA 2 0.8 1.8 4.3 4.7 8.8
  GR Kutubu NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA --0.8
  GR Gobe NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.2
  GR Hides No.4 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2.3
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Introductory note
The sites are described in chronological order 
of the dates of their establishment, with one 
exception: the oil operations of Oil Search 
Ltd (which commenced before the mining 
operations at Lihir) are amalgamated with 
those of the PNG LNG and these are dealt with 
together.
In each case sub-sections are arranged as 
follows:
a)  Background – development of Lancos at 
the site
b)  ‘Umbrella’ or ‘Representative’ Companies 
- usually with audited Financial Statements 
where available
c)  Other companies in the sample (as shown 
in Appendix A) – usually with only general 
statements regarding assets and liabilities
4.1 Background 
This site is dealt with in much more detail than others 
for the simple reason that not only has OTML been 
operating much longer (since 1984) than any other 
site, but because, in addition to the material available 
in terms of the original establishment of LBD at the 
site, there have been two extensive internal reviews 
of Lancos and one is underway at present. In other 
words, there is a great deal of material available.
4.1.1 The first umbrella company
The bloody aftermath of the failure of BCL’s operations 
necessarily tend to block out any positive results that 
project might have had. It certainly generated major 
financial benefits for the infant Independent State of 
Papua New Guinea, whilst operating mines across 
the Asia Pacific region are even today beneficiaries 
of BCL’s very fine training program for Papua New 
Guineans (if not so much for Bougainvilleans). 
Individuals at the top of the BCL management 
structure also did make concerted efforts to push 
for local business development16. However, Craig 
Emerson (who was the main author of the Business 
Development section of the Impact of the Ok Tedi 
Report) concluded that the overall efforts by BCL in 
area of business development were too bound up 
with the labour management interests of the company 
and, consequently, he proposed a different approach 
for Ok Tedi: he strongly recommended that the model 
envisaged by Cloudlands, and in operation by the 
time he was writing, should be the one to follow. 
Cloudlands was the original ‘Umbrella Company’ in 
PNG17.
Cloudlands Investment was established in 1975 by ex-
Kennecott employees whose employment transferred 
to the State-owned Ok Tedi Development Company 
(later MRDC) when Kennecott withdrew. Funding of 
Cloudlands was raised by share issues among OTDC 
employees including some Wopkaimin, the people on 
whose land the project developed. After 1977 share 
ownership was both widened - residents of Kiunga 
District were allowed to buy into the company – and 
narrowed since no-one outside the District could 
buy18. By 1980, the control of the company passed 
PART II - LANCOS AT SPECIFIC SITES
4. Ok Tedi (including some comments on Bougainville Copper Ltd)
16   Information provided by Mel Togolo who was the Bougainville Provincial Planner for some years during the period of BCL operations.
17   The term ‘umbrella company’ as well as the idea of a company that would help local businesses during their infancy to overcome the more 
difficult challenges facing any small business were the personal inventions of Les Kewa and Charlie Cole. I cannot be sure, but I believe that 
this was not merely the first time the concept was put into action in PNG but was also the first time anywhere in the world such a scheme 
had been implemented and such a phrase used. The term (as well as ‘Cloudlands’) was singularly appropriate for Tabubil, the recipient of 
10 metres of rain a year.
18   One of Cloudlands’ founders, Les Kewa, who is from the Minj area, was still, as of September 2014, the owner of one share (of 22,000 or 
so) in Cloudlands Investments.
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to OTML and other mining companies. Moreover, it 
can be seen from the graph that whilst the quantum 
of PNG purchases made by OTML (but not the share 
in the overall total) fell on average by 5% a year 
between 1989 and 2002 (the year BHP withdrew), 
between the latter date and 2013 it grew (as did 
purchases as a whole) by an annual average of 14%. 
For most of its period of operations OTML also kept 
precise (though not necessarily entirely accurate20) 
records of those landowner businesses with which it 
had dealings. After 2006 however its records - which 
before then were based on a survey of Lancos – are 
based on estimates because an increasing number of 
Lancos did not respond to the company’s request for 
information. From 2011 onwards the data were in fact 
not collected. Thus Figure 2 shows data from 1988 to 
2010 inclusive (with that part of the graph after 2006 
presenting doubtful data).  Because the vertical scale 
applies both to the number of Lancos OTML dealt 
with and the gross revenues (in US$ millions) of those 
Lancos, the relationship between the two lines gives 
an indication of the average annual revenues of the 
Lancos included.
into local hands with major clan leaders becoming 
directors. 
Cloudlands received considerable (if irregular) 
assistance from OTML but received none (and 
certainly no funds) from the State. One commentator 
at the time of mine planning reported that Cloudlands 
was viewed with some suspicion by State officials19. 
Whether or not this allegation was well grounded, the 
simple fact of the State’s need, for financial reasons, 
for Ok Tedi to proceed goes a long way to explaining 
its desire not to surrender the mine’s benefits to 
landowners. The Wopkaimin were to receive only 
one-twentieth of any royalties from the project (which 
was the main reason why the IOTP report championed 
local business) since the State’s exchequer needed to 
maximise its own receipt of benefits.  
The Ok Tedi Impact Report recommendation had 
been that Cloudlands be the umbrella company 
for the project, but that this should not exclude 
independently operated, landowner companies from 
competing for contracts. In fact, while Cloudlands 
played a leading role early on, it did not really take 
on an ‘umbrella’ role; most Lancos established 
preferred to act independently or with assistance from 
the Business Development staff of OTML. This both 
undermined Cloudlands and simultaneously placed a 
greater burden on OTML business staff members, who, 
it is fair to conclude, over time had varying levels of 
competence – sometimes excellent, and at other times 
not so good. This weakness in the implementation of 
the umbrella function has been repeated throughout 
the subsequent history of LBD at almost all other sites.
4.1.2 OTML Lanco records and mining’s linkage to 
the regional and national economies
OTML is one of the few mining companies which 
has published its expenditures not only on contracts 
awarded for services (which Porgera also does) but 
on goods purchased. The graph below shows the 
annual expenditure (converted into US$) of OTML on 
supplies other than of services. In the period between 
1989 and 2013 OTML purchased goods valued at 
US$4.22 billion and of this total exactly half (worth 
US$2.11 billion) were sourced from PNG suppliers – 
an average of US$84 million a year. 
This is far from being an insignificant stimulus to 
suppliers around the country. These may not be 
landowner businesses but they owe at least some of 
their prosperity (and in some cases all their prosperity) 
19  Russell Hunter, 1st July, 1981, ‘Mixed fortunes at Ok Tedi’, New Internationalist
20   This is not necessarily a criticism of OTML; the more that any Lanco became independent of OTML, the less likely it was to provide good 
data. Note also that OTML could not collect data on landowner companies which ultimately depended on its presence but with which it 
had no contractual dealings.
Figure1: OTML purchases of goods 1989 to 2013 in US$.
Between 1988 and 1994, revenues and numbers of 
Lancos grew steadily and in parallel. By 1994 there 
were 66 Lancos having contracts with OTML and 
each (on average) had an annual revenue of roughly 
one million US dollars. The number of companies 
continued to grow reaching a peak of 81 in 1999, but 
average revenues fell by half to around half a million 
US dollars.
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the red line on Figure 2 above, looks as if LBD was 
proceeding well. Such was not the case, however. In 
2008 the Asian Development Bank (in association 
with AusAID) published an important paper by Paulina 
Siop which was a case study on economic capacity 
development among communities around the Ok Tedi 
mine.  By 2000, according to Siop:
•  The mine area community had developed an 
unhealthy dependence on the mine
•  Had squandered many economic opportunities 
through lack of control and poor management
•  Had developed no form of culture of savings and 
investment
•  ‘the hierarchical leadership structure has not 
always performed in the best interests of the 
community’
• Had developed no alternative economic base
•  And local businesses had performed ‘dismally’. 
‘Even the joint ventures [had] shown no real 
partnership spirit in their working arrangements 
with their local partners’.
 In 2001 Siop became:
   ‘the team leader of Business Development 
[BD] with OTML Community Affairs 
Department’. She ‘took charge of the local 
Business Development Program to assist 
landowners to benefit from mine-related 
business opportunities…[and] developed 
strategies for addressing economic 
sustainability….As a result the Mine-area 
Community Investment Program ….was 
developed…The key components of [this] 
program included development of an 
investment structure, support for….[the 
establishment of] a representative umbrella 
company…that would take control of existing 
business opportunities,…to create a context 
in which other local business activities could 
be supported.’
The focus of the new business development effort was 
to be Star Mountain Investment Holding Ltd (SMIHL) 
which would act as a true umbrella company for 
investment by clan companies. This would involve 
the streamlining of ‘local businesses under SMIHL 
because there were too many small but unsustainable 
businesses demanding work from OTML’.
Then companies’ numbers collapsed, from 72 in 
2001 down to a mere 20 in 200321. Since then the 
number of companies (on OTML’s records) has slightly 
increased while their revenues have grown rapidly; by 
2006 (the last year in which records can be regarded 
as totally reliable) the 31 Lancos had turnovers of 
US$100 million, or in excess, on average, of US$3m 
each.  
4.1.3 ‘Dismal’ performance and Lanco rescue stage 
one
The performance in purely financial terms of Lancos 
at OTML overall until the early 1990s, as shown by 
Figure	2:	Landowner	business	numbers	and	revenue,	 
Ok Tedi 1988-2010.
Notes: 1. No record available pre-1988; 2. data for years 
after 2006 is doubtful, some companies.
Figure 3a: Number of contractors per contractor category 
1988-2010.
Figure 3b: Value of contracts per contractor category 1988-
2010.
21   This may be a function of record keeping but it is much more probable that it is a reflection of the difficulties OTML faced at the time. It is 
also noted that the number represents those Lancos doing business with OTML which is not the same as the number of Lancos doing any 
business.
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Contrary to both public opinion among its critics and 
its own statements concerning its withdrawal from the 
project in 2001/2, there are strong grounds to believe 
that BHP probably abandoned Ok Tedi in the fashion 
it did for purely economic reasons. Not, however, 
because it had ‘made its pile’ as many nowadays 
allege. Figure 4 which is derived from the Historical 
Statistics pamphlet issues annually by OTML indicates 
that BHP received less than 1 percent of the profits 
the project had made 1984 to the end of 2013. The 
irony of BHP’s withdrawal from Ok Tedi has been that 
within a few months of that event, metal prices began 
to rise and the mine became financially successful 
after years of near failure.
In short, in 2001 when Siop took up her position, it 
was not just the contractor businesses attached to 
OTML that were performing ‘dismally’; rather, the 
whole project was in serious (and many thought 
terminal) trouble. 
In business development, the way forward proposed 
by OTML was heavily dependent on its main 
What had happened to the original hopes, plans and 
companies? In answering this question one needs 
to consider not only the points Siop raises but the 
general circumstances of the mine, of which by far the 
most important was that it was barely profitable – the 
whole project was looking to be in jeopardy.  Table 3 
illustrates this important point – and also shows how 
the overwhelming majority of the mine’s financial 
benefits to all stakeholders only started to accrue once 
BHP left.
Under this rather important circumstance, the OTML 
managers were in no position to coddle contractors and 
may have needed to cut back significantly on support, 
whether direct or indirect, to local businesses. The 
desire by local companies to run their own businesses 
rather than operate under any umbrella company 
(touched on earlier) was exacerbated by rivalries 
within local leadership. Cloudlands Investments 
did relatively poorly under these circumstances; but 
the OTML-sponsored and owned Star Mountains 
Holdings, had done even worse – it was wound up in 
August 1995. 
In terms of the project’s general circumstances, worse 
was to follow. There was the acrimonious and highly 
publicised legal action brought by downstream 
riparian landowners that began in 1995/6. One of 
the more important outcomes of that action was that 
OTML took on the responsibility of encouraging the 
establishment and support of a series of communal 
business groups along the length of the Fly River. 
In the midst of this, the drought in 1997 prevented 
products (and supplies) being shipped along the Fly 
causing production to be cut in half for the year. And 
throughout the nineties, the kina’s value continued the 
precipitous decline it had begun in 1989; what in that 
year had been worth US$1.15 was to fall to a mere 
US$0.25 by 2002.
Figure	4:	OTML	financial	benefits	by	recipient	1984-2013.
Table 3: Indicators of OTML financial performance: 1984-2001 compared to 2002-2013
  Indicator % 1984-2001(18 years) % 2002-2013(12 years) Total 
 Share of total Share of total
  Profit 8% 92% K14.3bn
  Net revenue 22% 78% K46.9bn
  Company Income Tax 6% 94% K5.5bn
  Other taxes 22% 78% K2.8bn
  Copper produced 55% 45% 4.4bn t
  Gold produced 54% 46% 12 mn oz
  Dividends paid (US$) 17% 83% US$4.8bn
Note: In this table values are current and, except for the last row, in kina; they have not been converted into US$ values.
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Development Department for OTML had 
become confused with the shared task of…
regional economic development……The purpose 
of this work plan is to focus the work effort of 
the Economic Programs Department back to 
what was the original intention of Business 
Development	as	outlined	in	the	Ok	Tedi	Act.’
This document set out the principles on which this 
new plan would work:
•  It would operate under accepted commercial 
principles
•  Contractors would deliver goods and services 
both to OTML and the general public at 
competitive rates
•  Local businesses would develop the capacity of 
being viable after mine closure
•  Their board and staff would be fully accountable 
to shareholders
•  They would need to show that any wealth they 
generated flowed back to shareholders in a 
transparent and equitable manner.
umbrella company. To quote Siop: ‘SMIHL,	 being	
locally	 controlled,	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 main	 commercial	
arm to harness and manage the current economic 
opportunities for further business and investment 
growth’.  In other words, despite the ‘dismal’ failure 
of the earlier ‘umbrella-company-focussed’ business 
model, there was no loss of faith in the concept – that 
failure was put down to lack of early preparation of 
communities for business and poor leadership. The 
conclusion was that properly managed umbrella 
companies have ‘the potential to develop into large 
scale investment vehicles for the community….[and] 
to contribute significantly to the overall development 
of the country…[as well as having]…the capacity to 
finance business investment and growth activities’.
The restored system, whose structure is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 5, did not overthrow 
the original umbrella concept or the communal 
orientation that underlaid it; it re-instated it with 
what was thought to be better planning. The new 
umbrella was to be SMIHL whilst individual business 
activities in Level III, even though they were 
‘somewhat detached from those in level I and II….
[were] nevertheless recognised and supported’. This 
was, in effect, the 1979 approach resurrected but, 
hopefully, better implemented.  Landowners were 
persuaded to re-invest some of their mine incomes in 
SMIHL. When Siop’s paper was published (in 2008) 
she was able to be optimistic:  SMIHL ‘has progressed 
very well as a business with solid performance over 
the last three years. The company is currently worth 
over K7 million…[and] there are exciting future 
growth opportunities….its success [can be credited]
to good business leadership in the board and effective 
management’.
4.1.4 Lanco rescue stage two
Even before the ADB booklet authored by Siop was 
published, the program it outlined was no longer 
operative22. In 2006, OTML’s Economic Programs 
Department issued a ‘high level work plan’ entitled 
Back to Basics. It was designed with a 2011 closure 
of the mine in mind. It was based on two simple 
principles: OTML is a business but OTML economic 
programs are ‘fundamentally a community relations 
function…that seeks to mitigate social risk to our 
business’. Its opening statement was that:
 	‘through	 the	 process	 of	 redefining	 OTML’s	
community	 obligations	 (from	 2000	 to	 2004),	
the function of what was then the Business 
Figure 5: Revised structure for business and investment.
Source: Adapted from Siop (2008) p.13.
22   This is not the only example of a PNG mine concept being championed by an international multilateral lending agency, only to then be 
set aside by project managers. The Misima Closure Plan was cited by the IFC on several occasions as a model worth following across the 
world before Placer changed their minds and abandoned it. The IFC also sought to publicise the Project-Induced In-migration Management 
Strategy for the Frieda Project just before Xstrata ceased its work there. In PNG’s case, therefore, praise from the World Bank and its sister 
agencies has often been the kiss of death. 
Page 36 Resource Project LANCOS
sort of active help from the Provincial Business 
Development Office. 
In addition a series of Economic Program activities 
designed to support different levels of business, each 
with its own sunset clause (in the light of the then 
assumed 2011 closure date) were adopted:
 •  Directors’ training would be facilitated for 
levels 1 and 2 but would cease after 2-3 years 
being then outsourced.
 •  On-the-job training for level 2 businesses 
would continue also for 2-3 years after which 
such companies would have to either stand 
on their own feet or use government services.
 •  Assistance in meeting compliance 
requirements for level 2 companies would 
cease after one year pushing them into using 
accounting firms.
 •  Levels 1 and 2 companies would continue 
to be assisted for a period of 3-6 years in the 
appraisal of business proposals.
 •  All levels would be informed about new 
business opportunities.
 •  Levels 1 and 2 would continue to be provided 
with advice on operational matters for a 
further 3 years.
It will be noted that neither in any of the above points 
nor elsewhere in the document is there any mention 
at all of clan companies. The document implicitly 
accepts that companies can choose who will be their 
shareholders and explicitly emphasises time and 
again both that leadership in what it refers to as ‘The 
Big Man’ style should not be tolerated and also that 
there must be strict adherence to the accepted rules of 
company management and organisation. 
4.2 The present situation 
4.2.1 OTML purchases and contracts
Between 2002 when BHP withdrew and 2012, 
OTML purchases overall rose by almost four times 
in value. The company’s purchases within PNG 
averaged K300m per year in the period 2011-13. Total 
expenditure on contracts (for service) from all sources 
in each of 2012 and 2013 was K1.1 billion. Of this 
amount approximately K230m (or about US$107m) 
each year was expended on contracts fulfilled by either 
wholly locally owned (as opposed to PNG-owned) 
companies or local companies in joint ventures with 
other PNG companies. There is a degree of vagueness 
about these numbers because, as noted earlier, since 
2006, OTML has experienced some difficulties in 
collecting accurate data on the numbers or turnover 
of local businesses. Even though the estimates just 
There is no mention of ‘clan companies’ in this new 
plan and although ‘umbrella companies’ are referred 
to they are more generally referred to as ‘local 
strategic businesses’. Sustainability, a key feature of 
the Siop paper, was given even greater emphasis in its 
replacement whose slogan was Skills Transfer And No 
Dependence.  Three levels (as earlier) of companies 
were identified:
A.  Local Strategic Businesses with whom OTML 
will build an active relationship since they are 
considered to ‘be at the forefront of creating 
a sustainable economic base’ for the host 
communities. 79% of the Department’s available 
resources will be devoted to these companies 
which are specified as:
 1.1 A future South Fly representative company
 1.2  Flood Plains Ltd the Middle Fly 
representative company
 1.3  Hore Binkia Engineering and the Highway 
Development  companies set up by 
villagers along the Kiunga-Tabubil road
 1.4  Lower Ok Tedi Investment Company 
around the dredging operations at Bige
 1.5  Star Mountains Investment Holdings Ltd 
(SMIHL from the previous review) for mine 
area villages.
No company is specified that relates to landowners in 
Kiunga township.
B.  Local businesses other than strategic ones 
that were (in 2006) receiving support from the 
Department and were regarded as ‘key local 
businesses’; 20% of its resources should be 
devoted to such support in future. The companies 
are listed as: Azobelle Electrical, Bultem 
Holdings, Camp Administration Ltd, Ela Motors 
JV, Faiwol Investments, Fubilan Catering Services, 
Kiunga Catering Services, Kiunga Security 
Services, Ningerum Holdings, North Fly Rubber, 
Star Clothing Company, Star West, Tabubil 
Engineering, Tabubil Security Services, and some 
minor contractors. In addition, a number of local 
businesses which at that time did not receive 
support but were to be regarded as ‘key’ were 
Tabubil Automotive, Tabubil Bakery, Tabubil 
Hotels, Tabubil Pharmacy, Tabubil Traders and 
Tawap Kamen Investments.
C.  All other local businesses were grouped as being 
at level  three.  For these individual and small 
businesses the policy was to be that while they 
might seek advice on commercial matters from 
the OTML Economic Projects Department, 
they should be encouraged to seek any other 
Resource Project LANCOS Page 37
re-investment by villagers of their royalty payments 
together with a K5m loan. Thirty two village/clan 
groups (which together have 85 directors including 
five women and around 500 shareholders, including 
120 females, in all) contributed to it, mainly in 2002. 
Wangbin villagers only signed up in 2006. Some 
of these village/clan investment groups do have 
investments elsewhere (notably in Tabubil Traders Ltd) 
but for most their SMIHoldings represents their only 
investment. It has been a poor one.
Its last AR submitted to IPA (it is an exempt company 
and does not have an independently audited FS lodged 
with IPA) was for 2010 when it reported itself to have 20 
employees, assets of K3.7m and liabilities of K2.2m. It 
may be that its financial situation has improved since 
2010 (something devoutly to be wished in view of its 
original funding), since in the course of an interview 
with the company in August 2014 it reportedly had 
increased its workforce to 70 and had a gross turnover 
of approximately K6m. It is involved in a small joint 
venture with Kwembu (one of the three component 
landowners at Hidden Valley); precisely what value 
this might be to the Kwembu landowners is unclear. 
However, its representatives stated that the company 
provided fall somewhat below the levels of flow of 
contracts to local businesses in the period 2004-06, 
they are nevertheless healthy. 
4.2.2 The umbrella companies
What has happened to the ‘umbrella’ companies of 
1979 (Cloudlands) or of 2001 (SMIHL)? How are the 
2006 Local Representative Companies faring?
Cloudlands:  Cloudlands Investments still exists but 
is the very opposite of an umbrella company – 77% 
of its shares are owned by one person, the son of the 
late MP for North Fly, Bob Bubec, who had bought 
a majority of shares from other shareholders shortly 
before his passing. Almost all Cloudlands’ subsidiaries 
have now been sold off23. The last AR for the company 
was submitted in 2010, at which point Cloudlands’ 
had remnant net assets of K1.9 million and a single 
employee. Its major asset is its 71% ownership in 
Tabubil Hotels.24 
SMIHL: This was, under the 2002 plan for restoring 
LBD to health, to be the new umbrella company 
for project-associated business.  It was originally 
funded with K12m just over half coming from the 
23   This raises two important points: the first, which is not addressed in this report, is that because shares in Lancos are not publicly traded, it is 
difficult to know – especially in companies that have no audited reports, what the ‘fair value’ of the shares is; in any case there is no record 
of the price paid for the shares. The second is that as far as I can establish Cloudlands has no constitution and therefore there is no bar to 
its being turned into a sole proprietorship company.
24   The Cloudlands Hotel at Tabubil charges its guests slightly more than do some of the premier hotels in Port Moresby (which are themselves 
expensive in international terms). It provides rather less in the way of service and amenities than they do.
Figure	6:	SMIHL	structure,	by	village,	sub-group	(clan?)	and	shares	held.
Page 38 Resource Project LANCOS
shares while two small village/clan-based companies 
(one from Bolangong and one from Migalsim) hold 
the remainder. In terms of turnover, assets, and net 
assets it is the single biggest company at Tabubil. 
Whilst it regularly pays a dividend (unlike FCS), it has 
also been successful in building up its assets, thus 
achieving a comfortable balance between growth 
and return to shareholders.  Further, it has played a 
significant role in supporting the development of 
other locally-owned companies, in which it holds 
equity sometimes together with Fubilan Catering 
(as in the case of Fubilan Security Services). It is the 
nearest thing at Ok Tedi to a Star Mountains Anitua or 
IPI – but such a comparison is but a pale one since 
landowners here depend on MRSM for management, 
whilst the company’s assets, though substantial, in 
no way compare with those of the Lihir and Porgera 
companies. Perhaps most important of all, while 
Tabubil Engineering has investments outside Tabubil, 
it has relatively little non-investment activity beyond 
the township and none outside of Western Province. 
It cannot, therefore, be termed either a fully-fledged 
umbrella company (which shelters infant local 
businesses) or a representative landowner company 
(given its shareholding). It is, to date, both generating 
immediate benefits for landowners in the form of 
employment and accumulating assets for the future 
use of two landowning villages, but it is not what 
planners for the mine at various stages in its life had 
envisaged as an ideal Lanco.
4.2.3 The Strategic Landowner Businesses (SLOB) as 
identified in 2006
As noted in 4.1.4 above, the 2006 OTML internal 
paper Back to Basics listed five then existing businesses 
and one putative one as being of strategic importance; 
each covered a specific geographic area (they can be 
compared to LNG’s later ‘representative companies’): 
South Fly, Middle Fly, the northern half of the Kiunga 
–Tabubil access road villages, the southern half of the 
access road villages, the area around the Bige dredging 
site and  Tabubil. It is of interest that no SLOB was 
identified for Kiunga Town. What is the present state 
of these companies?
There is no South Fly Lanco. As far as the Middle 
Fly is concerned, a liquidator was appointed to 
the representative company, Flood Plains Ltd, in 
December 201225. As for the Tabubil villages, and as 
noted above, SMIHL has not achieved success, though 
it still survives. Of the remainder:
LOTIC (Bige area): The company is operating 
satisfactorily with 265 employees, with ARs submitted 
had not held any recent Annual General Meeting, 
could not afford to offer training for its employees, 
was 80% dependent on OTML for its revenues, has 
paid no dividends and had no investments (other than 
some cash on deposit). In short SMIHL has lost money 
and is barely viable.
The MRDC-managed companies: Under the 2002-
04 plan, SMIHL was classed as a Level 1 company 
alongside MRDC (MRSM and MROT2) managed 
companies. Together these Level 1 companies were to 
be the leaders for all LBD.  MRSM is unusual in terms 
of MRDC components insofar as it plays an important 
business management role (as opposed to an 
investment management role) at Ok Tedi. It effectively 
runs Fubilan Catering Services (which it owns) and 
has a lead role in managing Tabubil Engineering and 
a significant one in managing Highway Transport 
Company. The first two can be regarded as Level 1 (in 
terms of the 2002 Plan).
a)  Fubilan Catering: This is the third largest 
company at Tabubil in terms of net assets (after 
Tabubil Engineering and Camp Administration). It 
bought out its original joint venture partner (P & 
O). While all but one of its five directors are from 
local landowner villages, its two shares are both 
owned by Mineral Resources Star Mountains. 
However, these observations are based on 
[financial] data for 2007 which was the last year 
for which such records are available on the IPA 
website and on a 2010 submission to IPA showing 
changes in directors. A wide-ranging interview in 
April 2014 did not reveal any more recent basic 
financial information. It did however indicate that 
the assets include various properties, including a 
part share in a Port Moresby hotel, and a share 
portfolio valued at K4m; that the company has 
no policy on dividends; that 98% of revenues 
are directly from OTML; that no AGM appears 
to have been held since 1997; that training 
programs for employees are extensive; and that 
at any one time the company will have food 
worth K7m in its warehouses and K3m worth in 
transit (on water).  Not only is FCS almost entirely 
dependent on OTML for its revenue, but this 
dependence is entirely on OTML Tabubil; FCS is 
not involved in catering for OTML at either Bige 
or Kiunga.
b) Tabubil Engineering: An AR for this company 
was lodged with IPA covering 2011 as was an audit 
for 2010. The company commenced operations 
and was originally named Kiunga Engineering; the 
change of name may be telling. MRSM holds half the 
25   This is not necessarily the end of this company. Other companies including some of what are now the most successful Lancos have faced 
similar situations in the past but recovered from them.
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company of two of the 2006 nominated ‘strategic 
interest companies’. This is not, however, the case 
– or, at least was not according both to its 2010 AR 
and interviews on site. Assets in 2010 at K4.4m were 
four times liabilities but given the potential profits 
to be made from moving goods to and from Tabubil 
are surprisingly small. One of the two interviews 
suggested that there is a dispute between OTML and 
the company.  
In short, not one of the Lancos identified in 2006 as 
of being of key strategic interest to OTML can even 
be described as being on a firm financial footing 
let alone being leading Lancos in their areas of 
operations.
4.2.4 Local businesses as identified as ‘KEY’ in 2006
Fourteen Lancos were identified as having ‘key status’ 
in Back to Basics. How are they performing in more 
recent times? Selected data for some of them are shown 
in Table 4 (and reproduced in Appendix A). They are 
briefly mentioned below in alphabetical order:
Azobelle Electrical:  This company was founded 
over twenty years ago and survives. But by the time 
it submitted its 2010 AR (in 2013) it was in difficulties 
since its liabilities (at K1.7m) were more than double 
its assets. This was not the first time it had experienced 
major challenges. In February 2007, supposedly 
because it was unable to pay its tax bills, Azobelle 
borrowed K1m from OTML at 3% interest over a five 
year period. Despite this, in that year (the last for 
which there is a financial statement for the company) 
on a turnover of just under K5m it managed to run up 
administrative expenses of just over K2m. In 2006, on 
a turnover of K3.3m it had wages and staff costs of 
close to K2.5m, lost K1.1m but still paid a dividend 
of K220,000 (at a time when it couldn’t pay its tax 
bills). It managed to slash staff costs and wages by 
75% in 2007 and make a small profit (K543,000), the 
majority of which it then returned to shareholders as 
a dividend (K300,000). This does not seem to exhibit 
prudent management.
Azobelle is jointly owned by SMIHL and the Kafi and 
Kimsa clan investment companies set up in the 2002 
restoration efforts whose members are predominantly 
residents of Finalbin. Since Finalbin is the nearest 
community to the actual mine, it might be especially 
unfortunate were this company to fail altogether.
Bultem Holdings:  Formed in 2002, this company filed 
a single AR (for the last six months of 2002) reporting 
that it had 8 employees and liabilities (K684,000) that 
exceeded its assets (K607,000). No further reports were 
made to IPA and it has been removed from the register.
for all years up to and including 2012, and net assets 
valued at K2.6m (gross assets K5.1m). Its success in 
terms of employment and asset build up mean that 
it is no longer an exempt company, although, as yet, 
it has not submitted any FS to the IPA. It draws its 
directors from villages along the banks of the Ok 
Tedi (Alice) and Fly Rivers and on the access road 
(via Dande and Senamrae) to Bige from the Kiunga-
Tabubil Highway. Some of the villagers so represented 
fall within the area to be covered by benefits arising 
from the exploitation of the Stanley gasfield; among 
benefits already provided by the State are K120m 
which includes K30m for business development. 
Thus LOTIC’s representative status is likely to be 
overshadowed by non-OTML activities even if its 
‘special interest’ nature will remain important for 
villages lower downstream. 
HWDC Ltd (southern portion of Kiunga-Tabubil road 
area): As with LOTIC, HWDC covers an area of which 
part will also fall within the impact area of the Stanley 
Gas Project. Whatever was originally planned for it, 
it is now effectively a vehicle for people from Gi’i, 
Ipoknai, Miasomrae, Pampenai, Tmindemasuk and 
Holpenai to become 25% shareholders, along with 
Hore Binkia (25%) and MRSM (50%), in Highway 
Transport (see below). Although it draws its directors 
from six villages, its two shares are held by one 
individual from a seventh, which is not an ideal 
situation. It cannot be considered to have fulfilled a 
function of anything greater than a special interest 
holding company.
Hore Binkia Engineering (northern road villages): 
This company maintains a workshop at Tabubil but 
lives a hand-to-mouth existence. In the latest AR 
to IPA (2011) its assets of around K540,000 barely 
covered its liabilities (K450,000). This is despite the 
fact that it not only runs the Tabubil workshop but also 
holds 24% of Highway Transport (see below). Its share 
structure is also odd insofar as 80% of its equity is 
owned by a company (Totrusa Investments Ltd) which 
has been removed from the IPA register – the balance 
being owned by a single individual26. 
Highway Transport Ltd: (Whilst never proposed as 
a ‘representative’ company this is considered here 
because of its links with Hore Binkia, HWDC and 
MSRM.) OTML is said to have provided prime movers 
worth K2m to help establish this company which is 
a JV between MRSM and the two Lancos. Given the 
amount of goods traffic moving daily between Kiunga 
and Tabubil then one might suppose this company, if 
it operated well and to OTML’s satisfaction, to be both 
profitable and secure in its contractual arrangements 
with the mine – especially if it is effectively the 
26   One of the referees for a draft of this report commented: ‘How can this be?’ It is the same question I had, but cannot answer.
Page 40 Resource Project LANCOS
poached its General Manager at the end of 2013 to 
run its Economic Programs Department (which, as this 
review has indicated implicitly, has had its problems 
particularly once the author of its Back to Basics 
program left). Hopefully, the systems put in place at 
Camp Administration will survive this loss.
Faiwol Investors (including Faiwol Holdings and 
Faiwol General Supplies):   Nicole Polier27 has written 
of the Faiwolmin and the impact Ok Tedi she believes 
has had on their lives; her conclusions are almost 
universally bitter and unremittingly gloomy. Ok Tedi 
is a ‘massive new center of power and wealth [in] a 
hinterland of colonial and capitalist expansion’ where 
land ‘is plundered for profit (land, however, ‘to which 
Faiwolmin could once negotiate usage’), and where the 
montage of ‘an opulent European enclave’, ‘carefully 
managed by OTML’28 puts Faiwolmin ‘manhood on 
the margins’; further, ‘not only have foreign interests 
invaded the home of clan ancestors, they have 
given the Faiwolmin nothing in compensation’. She 
simultaneously laments the anomie that is replacing 
what are said to be the old certainties of ‘her’ Golgubip 
people while being angry that they themselves do not 
have a fair share of ‘the dizzying display of goods in 
Tabubil supermarket’. Neither ‘dizzying’ nor ‘opulent’ 
are words that I would use to describe Tabubil or 
the contents of its supermarket; neither can they be 
applied to the activities of the Faiwol Investors group 
of companies, but at least that company’s work over 
the years does a great deal to dispel Polier’s picture of 
hopelessness. The story of Faiwol Investors has more 
than a hint of Cinderella about it.
The Faiwolmin occupy virtually the whole of the 
Olsobip District lying in the east of the preferred 
areas of the Ok Tedi project (Kiunga and Telefomin 
Districts).  In the years when the Ok Tedi mine was 
being planned, the historic fear with which most of 
their neighbours regarded the Faiwolmin was being 
forgotten. But one of the most active local politicians 
supporting the project was Noah Daikimeng of Polier’s 
Golgubip village; he wanted his village to become 
the food supplier to the mine using the airstrip then 
recently built by Father Bouchard of the Montfort 
Catholic Mission. At the same time, the Evangelical 
Church of Papua’s pastor based in the lowland 
Faiwolmin settlement of Olsobip was also anxious 
that his people should participate in the project. The 
Catholics and evangelical Protestant factions of the 
Faiwolmin, along with Noah Daikimeng, set aside 
religious differences and set about establishing a 
District–wide company and obtaining contracts of 
work from OTML. 
Camp Administration Ltd: This is the largest 
independently run Lanco at Tabubil and, whilst it has 
experienced problems a decade ago, can be regarded 
as the most successful in the writer’s opinion. It has 
a widespread shareholding among a mixture of local 
individuals, of landowner business groups (none of 
whom are among the multitude of shareholders in 
SMIHL shown in Figure 6) and small companies. Its 
directors are relatively young and well-educated, are 
paid modest annual fees (K5000 per head), and the 
company (as of the end of 2011) was not owed any 
money by them (in the form of unre-paid advances). It 
trains its steadily growing number of employees (370 
at the end of 2011) and has money set aside for their 
leave entitlements. It produces clear, readable Annual 
Reports for its shareholders. In the two-year period 
2010-11 it made an annual average after tax profit of 
K2.1m from an annual gross turnover of K29.2m. This 
is modest in comparison with the results of some other 
Lancos at other sites, but in the Ok Tedi setting it is an 
excellent performance. Its assets totalled K25.2m at 
the end of 2011 and its net assets totalled K14.9m. It 
pays regular dividends (though not in 2013), makes 
small but significant community donations, and has 
K20m worth of investments in Port Moresby property, 
taxis and stores. Perhaps most significantly of the 
estimated K33m turnover it gained in 2013, K24m 
came from customers other than OTML (even if most 
of those other customers were themselves reliant on 
OTML for their incomes). Lastly, in the interview (and 
follow-up resulting from it) with Camp Administration, 
and in contrast to most of those carried out (at all 
sites), information was freely given. In short, Camp 
Administration is a bright spot in LBD at Ok Tedi. On 
top of all this, CAL is the only company of any size in 
the whole survey with a female General Manager (as 
of the start of 2014).
But a reservation needs to be made. Most of the 
circumstances in which Camp Administration 
operates are no different from those which apply to 
all Ok Tedi companies; several of its directors are 
involved in other, less successful local companies, 
its business is no easier to manage at the end of a 
very long supply line from Port Moresby than that 
of any other Tabubil business and its employees are 
not necessarily better qualified than those in other 
local Lancos. But it does seem that its management 
has put in place a system and a working atmosphere 
based on good governance, sensitivity to local needs 
(both commercial and social) and relatively modest, 
but steady, growth. The reservation is this: Camp 
Administration has performed so well that OTML 
27   Nicole Polier, 1996, ‘Of Mines and Min: Modernity and its Malcontents in Papua New Guinea’, Ethnology,35(1), pp.1-16.
28  Perhaps Polier flatters academe’s favourite Goliath here – the idea of OTML carefully managing a montage…!
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Kiunga Security Services:  This was identified as a 
‘Key Local Business’ in 2006. It consisted of a three 
way partnership between residents of Mission Kona in 
Kiunga (whose company, Amboram Security Services 
was established in 1991 but has not made any reports 
of any kind to IPA) and two Business Groups from 
villages on the lower Ok Tedi (Dome, Iogi, Komokpin). 
KSS provided an AR to IPA for 2005 at which time 
its net assets were K131,000. Since then it has not 
submitted any further reports.
Ningerum Holdings: Ningerum Holdings is part 
of the Progress group of companies established by 
Warren Dutton, who was the only businessman of 
any significance in Kiunga town before the mine 
started (Ningerum Transport is the oldest established 
company in this study having been set up in 1969) 
and who, much to his credit, remains committed to 
the region’s development. Ningerum Holdings is 
designed as a means for local people to own shares 
in Ningerum Transport which in turn owns 95% 
of the shares in Progress Ltd. Ningerum Holdings 
controls 39% of Ningerum Transport shares and 
Dutton controls the remainder. Effectively, therefore 
Ningerum Holdings/Ningerum Transport/Progress is 
a Dutton family business, but one with long-lasting 
and strong local support. As at the end of 2012 the 
net assets (of Ningerum Transport and Progress) were 
slightly in excess of K25m. In many ways, Dutton’s 
business is a model from which local businesses could 
learn; the K25m has only been accumulated by steady 
work over a period of 45 years.
North Fly Rubber: North Fly Rubber [NFR] is an 
agricultural company buying, selling and encouraging 
the growth of rubber across all the lowland area of 
Western Province (an area the size of many European 
countries). It is not therefore comparable with virtually 
any other Lanco included here. Arguably it is not a 
Lanco, but under the second part of the definition 
adopted in this report, that a Lanco has to be a 
company recognised by the resource project as being 
one, then it qualifies not only because it was identified 
in 2006 as a ‘key local business’ but because two of 
its directors are senior OTML employees acting ex 
officio.  There is insufficient space here to do justice to 
the work of and challenges facing the company.
NFR was the brain-child of Warren Dutton as a device 
to bring permanent sources of renewable income to 
thousands of people across Western Province through 
rubber growing. Rubber growing began in the Kiunga 
area in the 1950s when patrol officers brought 
seedlings across the border from Mindiptana and 
planted them in the Lower Ok Tedi villages and along 
the rudimentary track they were building north of 
Kiunga (it ended just beyond the village of Miasomrae 
until Ok Tedi extended it to Tabubil). This encouraged 
Faiwol Investors was established, without a 
Constitution, in November 1983 and as such is 
the oldest established locally managed company 
considered here which is not in terminal decline. This 
is itself noteworthy.  Originally eight Faiwol villages 
(Dumunak, Baktamin, Kongabip, Bolivip, Golgubip, 
Olsobip, and Selbang) which effectively covered the 
whole of the District each raised K8000 (then worth 
US$10,000) to float the company and each provided 
a director. Today, thirteen Olsobip District village-
based Business Groups collectively hold 52% of the 
company’s shares whilst a further 42 individuals (all 
Faiwolmin) hold the balance. Four female shareholders 
control just over 1% of the shares. The company has 
never received any financial assistance from any third 
party – although it acknowledges the assistance in the 
form of advice provided by OTML. 
The contract work that Faiwol Investors obtained in 
1984 and still does to this day rather confirms one of 
Polier’s points: garbage collection and cleaning (which 
is a euphemism for looking after the septic tanks and 
toilets at Tabubil) could be regarded as ‘menial’. But 
it has one big advantage: because no-one else wants 
to do it, the contract is well paid and secure; further 
there are always more toilets to attend to and more 
garbage to pick up.
Faiwol Investors has not always run smoothly. In 1999 
its net asset value came close to zero and it came 
close to bankruptcy in 2002 (attributed by present 
directors to ‘external mismanagement’). It also fell 
sharply in 2008-09. A venture to Madang (also in 
garbage collection and cleaning) in 2004/05 fell 
through. But by 2012 the company had net assets of 
K4m, operations spread across the North Fly (neither 
Bige nor Kiunga people are any keener on taking on 
toilet cleaning contracts), investment properties in 
Port Moresby, Kiunga and Tabubil, regularly elects 
and re-elects its directors on a four-year cycle, and has 
a turnover in excess of K8m a year. In three of the past 
four years it has paid a dividend. Faiwol Investors is 
not only owned by village shareholders but its Board 
is of village leaders and it is managed by villagers 
who have succeeded in getting an education. And, as 
a reflection of its origins, Faiwol Investors pays a tithe 
to the church in Olsobip.
During all interviews with Lancos, the question of 
long-term planning was discussed. In almost all cases 
this led to reasonably depressing conclusions – in 
most cases there was no plan. Faiwol Investments’ 
shareholders, directors and managers have an 
advantage in this regard: the Pnyang hydrocarbon 
project, long known about but only now becoming 
reasonably feasible as the network of gas lines from 
other fields (including Juha) approaches it, is on their 
land.
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OTML. This is fortunate since manufacturing clothing 
in such a remote environment incurs considerably 
greater costs than in a larger city; the prices of its 
Tabubil-produced uniforms would not be competitive 
in Port Moresby, although they are of high quality. 
Indeed, there is evidence that they are not especially 
competitive even in Tabubil itself – since at least one 
Lanco in town finds it more economical to buy its own 
uniforms from Port Moresby.  Its Board contains some 
of the most senior local businessmen (some hold five 
or more directorships). It pays a dividend regularly 
(2013: K100,000) and is, proportionately, the biggest 
single employer of females  of the OTML supported 
companies  – 116 of its 145 employees are women. 
At the end of 2011 its net assets were valued at K3m. 
It can overall be regarded as a success much of which 
can be ascribed to its Asian managers over the years.
Tabubil Automotive: OTML business development 
staff members over the years have played a key role 
in bringing into the town established, major PNG 
businesses such as Boroko Motors, Toba Motors, 
or Curtain Brothers and then carefully sharing out 
joint venture partners from local communities. Any 
perceived imbalance in this allocation of external 
partners has been an immediate cause of complaint 
to the mine staff. In the case of Tabubil Automotive 
(with Boroko Motors), Migalsim and Atemkit were 
assigned as local partners.  The last AR (including 
an FS) was submitted to IPA for 2008; at that time 
according to the FS the company had net assets of 
K2.8m indicated. It paid a dividend of K200,000 in 
2007 and one of K391,000 in 2008. In other words, 
its strategy appeared to be one of maximising present 
income rather than accumulating funds with mine 
closure in mind30.
Tabubil Bakery:  This is an old-established, small 
company running a store in the town centre of Tabubil. 
Originally dominated by expatriate shareholders it 
was taken over by three people from Kavorabip and a 
lady from Oktidetau in 2007. It last reported to IPA at 
the end of 2008 having assets of K0.7m and liabilities 
of K0.6m. 
Tabubil Traders: Although small this company is of 
interest for two reasons: a) it draws its shareholders 
from a very wide range, from Tabubil to Kiunga, one 
of the few companies to do so and b) its shareholdings 
are dominated by investments made by the village/
clan investment bodies which owned/own what was 
supposed to be the new umbrella company back 
in 2002, SMIHL. This is important since it indicates 
that whilst the SMIHL idea (like Cloudlands before it) 
villagers to relocate themselves to this road. However, 
the industry languished until Dutton revived it.  He 
raised funds from Ok Tedi, hired a Malaysian expert 
for thirty years, built a processing factory at Kiunga, 
organised shipping collection services and slowly 
introduced rubber along most of the length of the Fly 
and Aramia Rivers and to Lake Murray, where he had 
been a Patrol Officer. 
However, the industry needed substantial subsidies, 
especially in years when rubber prices were low, 
particularly in the form of free transport to Port 
Moresby on OTML barges. Without this support 
it probably would not have survived. In the 1990s, 
it was hoped that if a critical mass of growers was 
reached then this subsidy would no longer be needed; 
it was thought at the time that 10,000 growers would 
equate to such a threshold29. It now appears that this 
may have been optimistic.  However, OTML subsidies 
– in recent years through OTDF – explain why that 
organisation owns 16% of NFR shares. NFR had placed 
considerable reliance on ongoing assistance from the 
PNG Sustainable Development Program (PNGSDP) 
but with the changed status of that company, its future 
must be in some doubt. It is unlikely however that 
OTML – having spent so much effort and resources on 
supporting this venture – would  not continue to do so 
as part of the mine’s closure planning programs.  
NFR is not merely a business but partly a research 
organisation seeking ways of better rubber production 
through project development. It now brings some 
income to at least one-third of Western Province’s 
people. In this respect, therefore, the fact that it has 
limited net assets (about K2m when it last reported 
to IPA six years ago) is not a reflection of success or 
failure. Further, NFR - if it can eventually solve the 
problem of transport costs to world markets – is one 
activity that not only brings some benefit to thousands 
of people in Western Province but has a decent chance 
of surviving even the worst downturn in the metal and 
hydrocarbon industries.
Star Mountains Clothing Company:  The company was 
helped to start up in 1996 with a K300,000 loan from 
OTML. The concept was simple: OTML uses thousands 
of uniforms each year, so why not produce them on 
site? And the bulk of its shares are held by individuals 
or investment groups from Bultem. Its management 
is foreign. The company operates in Tabubil, Madang 
(also clothing), Lae (where it recently bought a paper 
manufacturer) and Port Moresby. It has a turnover of 
K3.3m a year from its Tabubil operations and K10m 
overall. Thus, only 30% of its revenue is directly from 
29   David Wissink, personal communication.
30  One of the anonymous referees for the draft of this report asked: ‘After so many years in business, have the local people taken over the 
business or some of the management?’ The answer appears to be ‘no’.
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In addition to the companies mentioned above one 
should not overlook the fact that there are estimated 
to be several hundred more registered with IPA from 
the North Fly – and with the start-up of the Stanley 
Gas Project many more can be expected to be formed. 
4.3 Restoration stage three 
OTML awards local contracts valued at between K250 
and 300 million each year with catering being by far 
the single biggest single contract (worth between K150 
and K200m annually). As noted earlier, its statistical 
records for local companies began to weaken in or 
around 2006 and were more or less abandoned by 
2010. The author of the Back to Basics strategy had 
moved on and, it is fair to say, shortly afterwards 
OTML – whilst still managing to issue contracts – had 
more or less lost track of LBD. To rectify the position, 
it poached the manager of the most successful, 
local, privately owned company to run its Economic 
Programs Department at the end of 2013 and asked 
him to immediately draw up a plan to re-establish a 
working system. 
His analysis was as follows:
a)  Weaknesses in the OTML system itself: ‘as and 
when required’ contracts provided Lancos with 
irregular incomes; improved vetting of Lancos 
was needed in the contract awards process; joint 
venture arrangements – usually arranged by 
OTML – were generally disadvantageous to local 
businesses.
b)  Weaknesses among Lancos: few benefits were 
flowing into the community; many businesses 
appeared to be unsustainable; many companies 
were failing in the area of compliance with 
statutory requirements; boards and managers were 
frequently inexperienced and/or incompetent; 
board interference in management was frequent; 
many companies had cash flow problems.
c) Rectification of issues under b) above: 
 •  Undertake a compliance audit including 
indicators of compliance with IPA, IRC, 
Nasfund and insurance requirements; with 
OTML safety and environmental compliance; 
payment of dividends; extent of community 
benefits; regularity of board meetings and 
AGMs;  analysis of liquidity; frequency and 
promptness of production of annual reports 
and audits; regularity of payment of wages to 
workers.
 •  Assess all applicants for contracts in terms 
of past performance and future capability of 
delivery.
failed, many of the small clan/village units of which 
it was composed have survived better than it.  This is 
in part an indication of the individualisation; smaller 
groups seem to survive longer than larger ones. 
In addition, in this case, where one small clan unit 
decides to invest, others have followed it.
4.2.5 Other companies
Many, if not most, of the companies identified as 
being strategic or key in 2006 have, as seen in the 
preceding section, not performed very well in 
the intervening period.  By contrast, some other 
companies, not identified as of being significant in 
2006, have performed reasonably well – some very 
well. In Appendix A sixteen companies in addition 
to those dealt with so far are listed. Some (Tabubil 
Hotels or Star Mountains Properties and Investment) 
are effectively failed companies;  several – Suku, 
Bugum, Umeng, Handup, Adiyap, KS Investments 
– are new companies set up by individuals rather 
than clans, and some of them are new ventures from 
Oksapmin people living in Tabubil. Six others are 
briefly mentioned here:
W & W Construction: Established by a Highlander 
(but long-time resident in Tabubil) and now employing 
125 people, its principal is also an investor in the 
other business interests of his local partners in W & W. 
Tabubil Security Services:  A rival to the Tabubil 
Engineering/FCS-owned Fubilan Security Services. 
In a fiercely competitive market (every landowner at 
virtually every mine site wants a security contract), 
this company’s margins are very slim despite the fact 
that it is one of the biggest employers at Tabubil.
Kana Kumgit:  Although classed as a Lanco by OTML, 
51% of the shares in this company are held by a 
Southern Highlander in partnership with his partners 
from upper Ningerum. When it last reported to IPA in 
2009 its net assets were close to K5m.
Tawap Kamen Investments: Employs six expatriates 
and as a consequence spent K11m on wages and 
salaries when it reported last in 2009 – as against a 
total turnover of K26m and a pre-tax profit of K0.5m.
KCS Ltd: This is a small company in Kiunga originally 
established to run the OTML accommodation at 
Kiunga Airport and owned by Kiunga landowners. 
Despite its small size it had, when it last reported to 
IPA in 2010, nearly K11m in net assets; it has used the 
profits it made from catering to invest in real estate.
Mepu Investments:  A very small company in Kiunga 
mentioned here because it is the only one in the 
OTML impact area where the majority of shares are 
owned by females.
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4.4.3 Exempt companies
Ten of the 36 companies listed are not exempt from 
submitting independently audited accounts. Two of 
these have not submitted such accounts (and one is 
MRSM dealt with earlier). 
4.4.4 Promptness in reporting to IPA
In the study as a whole the companies included were 
(if they had reported at all to IPA) on average 3.5 years 
behind in terms of their AR reports appearing on the 
IPA website.. At Ok Tedi the average lag time was 3.1 
years. 
4.4.5 Directors
A total of 190 directors for the 36 companies 
(excluding MRSM) were reported. This included 
seven expatriates (1 Malaysian, 6 Australians) and ten 
females (or 5%).  For the companies for which data 
existed, 195 former directors were listed; this suggests 
that there is a turnover rate of less than 0.5 directors 
per year of the average company’s operations. Again, 
for those companies for which full data was available, 
the mean number of directors per company was just 
under five. Among the companies listed, exactly half 
the directors held a single directorship and the other 
half held multiple directorships; three individuals held 
five or more directorships (and it is known that these 
individuals also hold several other seats on boards of 
companies not included in the study).
4.4.6 Ownership of companies
Ten of the companies studied can be said to be 
owned/controlled by one or two people – these 
include: Cloudlands Investments, Tabubil Security 
Services, Kana Kumgit, H.W.D.C.31, Suku, Umeng, 
Adiyap, Bugum, Ningerum Transport and Progress. 
This group contains companies that have enjoyed 
some success and others that have been abject 
failure. Another ten companies can be said to be 
controlled by a small (<10) number of individuals, W 
& W, Hore Binkia, Tabubil Hotels, Tawap Kamen, KS 
Investments, Handup, Mepu, Kiunga Security, Tabubil 
Automotive and Tabubil Bakery – which are again a 
mix of largely undistinguished performers with, in 
this case, few outright failures. A third group, again 
of ten companies, has a broad based shareholding; 
it contains some rather successful companies (Camp 
Administration and the Faiwol Group) as well as some 
failures (SMIHL, Azobelle). The only group with no 
(financial) failures is that controlled by MRSM (Tabubil 
Engineering, FCS and – less so – Highway Transport). 
In other words, it does not look as if the nature of 
shareholding as such is a key to failure or success.
 •  Assess strategic implications of Lancos and 
their external partners.
 •  Assess financial capacity and technical 
resources.
 •  Select contract awardees at least in part on the 
nature of their shareholdings (implicitly, the 
wider the share spread, the better).
The structure recommended for adoption was two-
tiered:
A.  Economic Programs Department would liaise 
directly with two reformed ‘umbrella companies’, 
one being SMIHL and the other being one to deal 
with all downstream Lancos (CMCA Lancos), 
plus nine large companies and MRSM.
B. i)  SMIHL: to act as umbrella company for 15 
smaller Tabubil-based Lancos
 ii)  The CMCA Umbrella Company: to deal with 
eight major downstream companies.
This would reduce the total number of contractors to 
35. 
The present study has no comment at this stage on 
the proposals; the practical record of the Economic 
Programs Manager is too good to ignore. However, 
it will become apparent in the rest of this report that 
other alternatives to these proposals may be available 
to OTML.  
4.4 Ok Tedi summary 
4.4.1 Caution
Because of the irregularity of reporting by Lancos 
to IPA and because the financial data available for 
exempt companies is of limited extent, summarising 
the data overall provides imprecise results which 
should therefore be treated with caution.
4.4.2 Constitution
Of all the Lancos examined in this study, a quarter 
have their own company constitution (irrespective 
of whether or not they are appropriate). In the case 
of the OTML-associated Lancos the proportion is 
slightly more at 30%. There are significant advantages 
to a company in working out its own constitution. 
However, although in the Ok Tedi case the larger, 
more financially successful companies tend to have 
them there are also small companies that appear to do 
well without them.
31   On the technical ground that its two shares are both owned by one person from Tmindemasuk.
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unfortunately. There is a distinctly strong 
possibility that most of these employees were not 
residents of the area when OTML construction 
started.
•  Data on employment of females is slightly 
more substantial but cannot be guaranteed to 
be accurate: 12% of employees in interviewed 
companies were female (but half these were in 
one company, Star Mountain Clothing).  
4.4.8 Assets and liabilities
No data is available for three companies (either 
because they are recently founded or because the 
relevant page is missing in the IPA record) and MRSM 
in this case needs to be omitted. For the 33 companies 
remaining the total net assets shown in Appendix A 
(bearing in mind they refer to different years of AR) 
totalled around K230m with liabilities totaling K100m.
4.4.7 Lanco employment
Whilst the total in the column labelled employees in 
Appendix A (3066) does not make a great deal of sense 
because those numbers refer (in most cases) to the 
figure mentioned in the year of the last AR submitted 
to IPA, it is reasonable to state:
•  OTML in 2013 employed 2,310 people, it is likely 
that the Lancos shown in Appendix A employed 
at least 3000 people and probably more. 
•  Whilst those Lancos include almost all the largest 
ones there are several hundred small businesses, 
some owned by landowners, some not, in 
the mine’s impact areas. Businesses around 
Kiunga are notably under-represented in those 
selected for study. It is probable, therefore, that 
Lancos across Kiunga District employ twice as 
many people as does the mine itself.  Very few 
expatriates are employed directly by Lancos 
(although expatriate accountants and auditors 
gain indirect employment by them).  Only nine 
were enumerated in the companies shown – or 
about 0.4% of the total, compared to 5% by 
OTML – and six of these were in one company 
alone. 
•  It might be possible to establish the provinces of 
origin of employees with a more intensive census 
(though given the risks that respondents might 
perceive in stating they did not come from a 
particular ‘local’ area, even this may be doubted). 
This study cannot provide such information 
Figure 7: Assets of OTML Lancos.
Table 4: Selected financial data for Ok Tedi ‘umbrella’ and non-exempt companies
  Company Assets Liabilities Turn over After Tax Profit Dividend Donations
  Cloudlands K2.4m[10] K0.5mK[10] ? ? ? ?
  SMIHL K3.7m[10] K2.2m[10] ? ? ? ?
  Tabubil Engineering K37.2m[11] K8.6m[11] K33.1m[10] K5.5m[10] K0.3m[10] K14,920
  Fubilan Catering K23.6m[07] K11m[07] K29.9m[07] K3.3m[07] Nil[07] K33,024
  Camp Administration K25.2m[11] K10.3m[11] K31.5m[11] K0.7m [11] Nil[11] K17.268
  Tawap Kamen K9.8m[09] K4.8m[09] K25.9m[09] K0.4m[09] Nil[09] K500[09]
  Highway Transport K4.4m[10] K1.1m[10] K3.85m[10] K0.17m[10] Nil[10] Not specified
  Madang Star 
  International Hotels K31.1m[11] K30.9m[11] ? ? ? ?
  Lower Ok Tedi 
  Investments K5.1m[12] K2.5m[12] ? ? ? ?
  North Fly Rubber K3.2m[07] K1m[07] K4.4m[07] K0.42m[07] Nil[07] Not specified
  Tabubil Automotive K5.0m[08] K2.2m[08] K12.7m[08] K1.4m[08] K0.4mK Not specified
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4.4.10 Directors’ fees and expenses
The sample size for these items is even smaller 
than for the preceding item because a) the largest 
company, Tabubil Engineering invoked clause 212(3) 
of the Companies Act which allows a FS not to reveal 
directors’ remuneration ‘where all shareholders 
agree not to do so’32 and b) because four companies 
revealed directors’ fees only, while two revealed those 
and directors’ expenses. Along with the dates of the 
reports the data are of extremely limited value. This 
is unfortunate not least because it is by no means 
improbable that some of the expenditure by board 
members may not, in the accounts, be classified under 
their fees or expanses but under such items as travel, 
training and accommodation.
4.5 Conclusions, a question and a potentially 
happy ending 
4.5.1 Some conclusions
a)  Business development at Ok Tedi, despite 
the small spots of light cast by companies like 
Ningerum Transport, Camp Administration and 
Faiwol Investors, can be described as having 
been only modestly successful – and in many 
cases entirely unsuccessful - from almost all 
viewpoints. It has, in general, involved OTML 
staff in a great deal of often fruitless work; it has 
enriched very few people; as a means of storing 
money for the future it has been shown to be a 
When companies are clustered into groups by gross 
and net assets, as shown in Figure 7, it is evident that 
the distribution of Lancos by asset size is rather like that 
of the world’s mining industry itself: there are many 
small companies, a few large ones and very few in 
between. When net assets are considered, it is a little 
disappointing to realise that each of the two Ok Tedi-
related, MRDC-managed investment funds (shown in 
Table 2 above) had generated more value than have 
all the listed businesses combined (note that Table 2 
is in US$). To add to that disappointment it should 
be noted that there are only two companies with net 
assets in excess of K20m; one of these is managed by 
MRSM and the other is the old-stager run by Warren 
Dutton for the past 45 years, Ningerum Transport.
4.4.9 Profits and dividends
Some data collected during interviews is available for 
smaller companies but the only data relating to profits 
and dividends of an independently audited nature 
comes from Financial Statements submitted to IPA. 
That data is shown in Table 4. Only seven companies 
reported turnover but this ‘totalled’ (if one ignores 
the fact that the numbers come from different years) 
over K140m which is the equivalent of nearly 60% 
of the total value of local contracts awarded annually 
in recent years.  After tax profits represented around 
9% of gross revenue while dividends, paid by only 
two of the seven companies, represented only 5.5% 
of profits.
32   No documents are on file to show that all shareholders did in fact consent to this. The shareholders are MRSM, Imiba Investments Ltd., and 
Bolangong BG. At least one of the Tabubil Engineering directors is a director of MRSM and two of its directors are also directors of Imiba so 
presumably they could invoke 212(3) but whether all shareholders did so cannot be confirmed unless documents are available. In a matter 
such as directors fees one might think it reasonable that this should be the case.
Table 5: Directors’ fees and expenses Ok Tedi Lancos 
 Company Year No. of Directors Directors fees/person Directors expenses/person 
    (Kina) (Kina)
 Camp Administration Ltd. 2010 5 10,000 28,000
  2011 5 10,000 28,400
 Tawap Kamen Ltd 2008 6 3,333 Not shown
  2009 6 1,250 Not shown
 Highway Transport Ltd 2009 5 745 Not shown
  2010 5 660 Not shown
 Fubilan Catering Services Ltd 2006 5 14,600 44,900
  2007 5 15,200 39,900
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project) combined with the suspicion that LBD work 
has always tended to be heavily focused on Tabubil 
whilst Kiunga (or rather non-Tabubil businesses) have 
been left largely to go their own way. 
Jealousies between communities exist in the area and 
have done so for a long time. At least some of the 
fuel for the great Ok Tedi legal battle of the mid-1990s 
arose from this, in my view, as people in the lower 
Ok Tedi, who had been the beneficiaries of what few 
benefits Australian rule had brought to the North Fly 
till then and had always tended to look down at the 
people around Mt Fubilan, reacted with not just envy, 
but with uncomprehending annoyance when the mine 
benefits went largely to the ‘uncivilised’ mountain 
people. It will be noted in the above descriptions that 
very few companies studied operate in both Tabubil 
and Kiunga (Faiwol Investments, outsiders to both 
Wopkaimin and Awin, is one of them).   
Now, whilst the bulk of the OTML money, contracts 
and support may be in Tabubil, Kiunga is far more 
conveniently located to undertake business generally. 
Businesses there can gain from working with OTML 
but can also involve themselves in a wider range of 
more ordinary, more urban, non-OTML activities33. 
OTML never quite managed to get companies that 
bridged both mine site and Kiunga under one heading. 
Indeed it can be argued that OTML has tended to let 
business in Kiunga go its own way; neither Siop’s work 
nor that of Back to Basics paid much attention to what 
was happening in the town. It may be too late, but 
as OTML embarks on its third re-appraisal of LBD 
structure perhaps it might consider how Kiunga might 
fit into the overall structure of its LBD programs?
4.5.3 A surprisingly rather happy ending
Many OTML businesses have been provided with a 
second chance because OTML has felt it not to be 
in its own best interests to allow some companies 
to fail and because of extensions in the mine’s life. 
Some have failed nevertheless after rather more 
than a second chance. But right now all businesses 
in Kiunga, Olsobip and Telefomin have a very large 
second chance. Those in Kiunga (or with good 
relations in the area) can look forward to many years 
of trying to satisfy the needs of the emergent oil/gas 
industry. The Faiwolmin who have spent thirty years 
learning business the hard (and smelly) way can 
with reasonable certainty look forward to applying 
their business skills to whoever develops the Pnyang 
hydrocarbon project34 – on their own terms. Somewhat 
less certainly (since so many false dawns have risen 
there in the past) the Telefomin and Oksapmin have 
renewed hope of seeing the Frieda come into being 
shortly.
distant second-best to professional investment; 
it has caused envy when contracts have been 
awarded and misery when companies have 
found that contracts awarded are not contracts 
fulfilled (and paid for); only in rare cases have 
communities at large benefitted. On the other 
hand there are several dozen small or medium 
enterprises that manage to survive and a few that 
prosper.
b)  There is enormous scope for a much more 
detailed analysis of the companies around the 
project.
c)  Despite the lack of success, there are now a 
score or more young business people who have 
learned their trade. A small return perhaps for an 
investment of so much energy.
d)  Clan-based companies have not worked at 
Tabubil and there has not been any successful 
attempt to set up companies serving the whole 
project area. Kiunga in particular appears to have 
been left to its own devices in terms of LBD. 
Some other companies, not run on a clan basis, 
have reasonably successful despite the fact that 
successive umbrellas supposedly protecting them 
have been blown away by local economic and 
political realities. The stimulus for business seems 
to come from – no surprise here – individuals, not 
idealised communities. Some of these individuals 
are greedy, selfish and simple rentiers; but there 
are others who can see that their own future to 
some extent depends on having a relationship 
with the community that helps them reach their 
own goals and some of these are emerging at Ok 
Tedi.   
d)  In general, in this case, two sets of umbrella 
companies have failed, so it is a little daunting 
to know that another set are currently being 
proposed as a means of improving the situation. 
This leads to the question…..
4.5.2 A question
Why has a Star Mountain Anitua or IPI or Trans 
Wonderland not emerged at Ok Tedi? Siop’s booklet 
provides her analysis and I will not repeat it here 
other than to mention that it ascribes LBD failures at 
Ok Tedi to lack of preparation of the community for 
participation, and lack of local leadership, in business. 
She may be right. I would simply add that perhaps 
there is a larger-scale factor at work: the fact that the 
project covered such a wide range of ethnic groups 
(a coverage that has only grown over the life of the 
33   The advantages of doing business in Kiunga are not lost on the Chinese retailers who have moved in there in recent years.
34   As of February 2015, there is growing interest by ExxonMobil to bring P’nyang into production.
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b)  The project should develop an LBD program 
and employ fulltime staff to assist Papua New 
Guineans to set up businesses, to implement the 
LBD program and to provide advice to businesses, 
especially those that had the potential to outlive 
the project itself;
c)  A committee chaired by the then Department of 
Trade and Industry would monitor progress….
d) …based on quarterly reports from the PJV.
The first two points were to a large extent implemented 
in practice, the third and fourth points were only 
implemented desultorily.
These guarantees won by the Porgerans were important 
because they had taken the initiative, well in advance 
of the Development Forum discussion during the 
exploration phase of the mine, and had, with the 
assistance of PJV, established their own umbrella 
company.   In early 1983, Mick Searson, the then 
Porgera Exploration Camp manager and Jolson Kutato 
had visited Les Kewa (Mick’s counterpart at Ok Tedi) 
to pick his brains on how local landowner businesses 
might be organised. At the time Kewa’s brainchild 
Cloudlands was doing well. When they returned 
they both began to plan for business development 
at Porgera; Jolson Kutato has been the Chairman of 
Board of the company he and Mick founded, Ipili 
Porgera Investments (IPI), for nearly thirty years.
By mid-1983 IPI was established and had started 
business in the most basic way – by establishing a 
supermarket at Porgera Station and developing a 
service station35. IPI originally restricted ownership of 
its shares to Porgera residents who were allowed to 
purchase a maximum of 500. By 1985, 5000 shares 
had been bought. The company was effectively 
run by PJV employees36 until April 1989 when its 
5. Porgera 
(with some comments on Misima)
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 The original MoAs and the emphasis on IPI
Porgera and Misima projects were negotiated 
sequentially within a few months of each other; the 
Misima SML was issued in late 1987 and the Porgera 
SML was issued in May 1989.  The two projects were 
not only very different technically and financially 
(Porgera was big and had high grades of ore, Misima 
was much smaller and blessed with more marginal 
grades) but also socially. Misima people, who did 
not wish to see outsiders on their land, effectively 
overruled the Cabinet of the country who wished 
to ban fly-in/fly-out mining; Porgera people insisted 
that FIFO must be minimised and outside workers 
must be resident at site. Porgeran negotiators were 
unified (in the face of outsiders); Misima negotiators 
were split. The national rules on who should receive 
royalties had the unfortunate effect on Misima of 
dividing a small island community into recipients and 
non-recipients, which bedeviled the whole project. 
Whilst the same rules did leave some of Porgera’s 
residents marginalised (and all those people living 
in the Paiela portion of the District), most Porgerans 
managed to stake a claim to be royalty recipients 
through their overlapping clan membership system. 
Further, the Porgera negotiators surprised the State’s 
parties to the negotiations by working closely with the 
Enga Provincial Government’s representative (Harry 
Derkley) and by the forcefulness with which they 
made and pursued their demands, and the details of 
the arrangements they proposed to ensure demands 
agreed to would need to be carried out.
In terms of LBD the Porgerans demanded (and believed 
they had obtained) guarantees that:
a)  Competitive local (first priority) and PNG 
companies should be granted supply contracts;
35   Although Misima Landowners also tried to do this, internal rivalries led to Bwagaoia’s small retail sector quickly falling under the control 
of foreign traders.
36   For an excellent discussion of IPI’s early history (as well as of a survey of small scale businesses at Porgera in 1994) see Glenn Banks, 
‘Business as Unusual’ in Dilemmas of Development edited by Colin Filer in 1998 and available on ANU epress.
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– the repository of the Enga Provincial Government’s 
and the Landowners’ 5% share of mine production39. 
The fourth and more diffuse focus was on the various 
bodies established to receive project royalties at 
the centre of which was the Porgera Landowners 
Association. Different groups of allied landowners – 
almost as if by tacit agreement – focused on one of 
these four sources of funds (and political power).
Unfortunately for those Porgerans focusing on IPI, the 
newly independent company soon ran into difficulties, 
experienced heavy losses in 1991 and 1992 and was 
close to bankruptcy. As Banks accurately describes 
the events of that time, PJV had too much at stake 
to allow IPI to fail. The PJV worked with the PNGBC 
in a successful attempt to reschedule IPI’s loans and 
seconded one of its senior employees, Don Flanagan, 
to resurrect IPI in 1993. It was a slow but eventually 
successful recovery.
5.1.2 Business development as a project risk 
minimiser
Very early on in the development of the mine at 
Porgera, Vic Bott, the Site General Manager at the 
time, realised the risk posed to a project dependent for 
its supplies on the Highlands Highway along which 
most communities had no development opportunities. 
This was the motivation both for Bott’s proposing the 
establishment of the Tax Credit Scheme and for PJV’s 
spreading its LBD program far beyond the immediate, 
physically impacted areas of the Porgera Valley. The 
TCS allowed the PJV to use a small fraction (2%) of its 
due taxes to build approved community infrastructure 
across a wide swath of country around the mine. But, 
in turn, the award of contracts to build schools or 
health centres, or improve bridges and roads provided 
local businesses across Enga and beyond with work. 
Whatever the motivation for a resource company 
might be for supporting LBD, in this particular case 
there is no doubt that it was a community relations 
exercise – and one that has worked quite well to the 
present.
5.2 PJV’s inputs to LBD 
PJV put considerable effort and resources into LBD 
(see Banks, cited earlier, for early details on staffing 
inputs). 
It continues to have active participation in the area. 
According to PJV statistics, between 1990 and the 
end of 2013 the Porgera mine has issued K3.7 billion-
management was handed over to landowners. A 
previous PJV staff member joined IPI as its manager. 
In other words IPI was well-established and operating 
several years before the Development Forum 
took place. In this respect the Porgerans followed 
the Wopkaimin at Ok Tedi – but they, unlike the 
Wopkaimin, were able to follow up the establishment 
of a landowner company by taking advantage of the 
Development Forum (something never available to 
Ok Tedi landowners). In addition to the commitments 
they squeezed out of the State37 mentioned above 
they also got the State to agree to ‘make available 
loan guarantees on a case by case basis of up to K1 
million per annum to Ipili Porgera Investments for a 
period of five years commencing on June 1, 1989’ and 
provide ‘the services of a professional adviser’. The 
first commitment was partly fulfilled38, the second was 
not; the PJV had to provide that. This was the first time 
the State had agreed to provide a source of funding for 
project-related Lancos. The Porgera negotiators also 
insisted that, in order to encourage local business, land 
blocks at Porgera Station be resumed and re-allocated 
purely for commercial or government purposes, much 
as had been done at Kiunga; they also laid down the 
outline of a plan for a new township at Paiam.
It is important to note that right from the start local 
Porgeran leaders put their combined faith in one 
company – Ipili Porgera Investments. They did not 
all compete against one another in business – even 
though it is certain that they do compete with one 
another in most respects, fiercely. They focused their 
considerable combined energies on getting IPI to work 
as THE Porgera business. In this sense IPI was never an 
umbrella in the form of the original conception of Les 
Kewa; it was not there to protect, like a mother hen, 
little fluffy local businesses and encourage them each 
to lay their own quota of little eggs. It was there to 
lay the very big egg that would sustain Porgerans for 
decades to come.
Other financially golden eggs were to be laid as a result 
of the Forum. The Porgera Development Authority 
[PDA] was set up, originally seemingly as a servant of 
the Porgera Local Level Government. That relationship 
was rapidly turned on its head, unsurprisingly since 
the PDA was rather generously funded whilst the 
Local Government was not allowed to participate in 
mine benefits. Further,  the Paiam Town Development 
Authority (which was established under the aegis 
of the PDA) was another focus of landowner leader 
efforts. A third focus was on Mineral Resources Enga 
37   Since PJV was not a party to the negotiations, it was relatively easy for the State to agree to the need for an LBD program.
38   Though it took a court case in 1996 initiated by IPI Board members to encourage the State to fulfil this commitment.
39   As shareholders in the PJV MRE bought into a system whereby each partner in the JV paid its share of the project costs and was allocated 
its share of production; it was then entitled to market that gold in any way it decided upon.
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Local (i.e. PNG) contractors are formally divided by 
PJV staff into three groups:
•  Local community project contractors – these 
largely undertake work on TCS and other 
infrastructural projects; 163 such contractors 
were listed as current in mid-2014 of which 12 
were Porgera-based, 122 Enga-based and 29 
based elsewhere. By far the most common form of 
contract was for the contractor to lease a vehicle 
or some form of plant to the PJV community 
projects (128 of the 163 contracts were for 
plant hire). But only 11 of the contractors were 
registered with IPA  as an incorporated business 
group or company   
•  Local supply contractors – overwhelmingly these 
are suppliers of everything from toilet paper to 
heavy equipment from other parts of PNG. Of the 
344 listed as current in mid-2014 only 23 were 
Porgera-based and eight were from Enga.
•  Site services contractors – 133 contractors were 
registered as largely undertaking work around 
the site and Porgera more generally. Of these 
86 were listed as Porgeran, 36 Engan and 11 
others; it should be noted that at least some of 
the ‘Porgerans’ may well be people who migrated 
into the valley after production commenced. Two 
forms of contract dominate this sector: labour 
hire (44) and bus or light vehicle hire (37), with 
plant hire accounting for a further 19. (Labour 
hire has unfortunate implications for inward 
migration – since most of the labour thus hired 
through Lancos is not of local people.)  Of these 
133 contractors a mere seven were registered in 
any way with IPA.
In other words the overwhelming majority of 
businesses involved in LBD at Porgera are small family 
or individual concerns which are unregulated and 
make no appearance in the IPA records. Appendix 
A is a list of selected PJV contractor Lancos registered 
with IPA. Not only is it a short one, but seven of the 
Figure 8: Distribution of Porgera contracts 1990-2013 
[Total	value	3,706.5	million	kina].
worth of contracts of which value a little more than 
70% was awarded to PNG companies. Porgera 
businesses alone worked on contracts worth K764 
million (or just under 21% of the total) in that period, 
or, on average, dealt with contracts worth K30 million 
a year. However, because of very large variations in 
the value of the kina over this period, the absolute 
values just quoted do not make a great deal of sense 
(the percentages do, however).
5.3 The present situation
5.3.1 Local contractors are almost all small scale
All contracts are awarded by the PJV contracts 
section. Ideally, (if one accepts the idea that the key 
function of LBD is one of community relations and 
the maintenance of the social licence to operate), the 
PJV Community Affairs staff should also be involved, 
or have some say, in every contract award. But the 
limited staffing availability in the community affairs 
area has undermined this need to some extent. 
Table 6: Average value of contracts awarded 2011, 2012 and 2013 by location of contractor PJV
 Location of Average value per year Value in US $ % share Share 
 contractor Kina million   
 Porgera 102.5 46.1 16.8 )
 Enga 58.8 26.4 9.6 ) ------- 63.8% 
 Other PNG 227.8 102.5 37.4 )
 Foreign 220.6 99.3 36.2 36.2%
 TOTAL 609.7 274.3 100 
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Appendix A amount to 1213 people but this excludes 
the hundreds of people who work in the family or 
individual business that dominate contracting services 
(as well as the hundreds more who run businesses that 
are not contracted to work for PJV). The best estimate 
that I can give here is that it seems unlikely that fewer 
than 2000, and more probably closer to 3000, people 
around Porgera are involved in LBD. 
A further implication of Porgera LBD being dominated 
by unregistered companies is that it is reasonable to 
conclude that for most Porgerans, their involvement in 
business is simply to try and maximise the immediate 
benefits the mine can provide them with.
5.3.2 The large companies
a) IPI
  In 1997, the company had negative retained 
earnings, a K2m debt to banks, 132 employees, a 
turnover of US$4.7m and net assets of zero. In the 
same year, Donald Flanagan was seconded from 
PJV to manage the company and recovery began. 
In 2006 Scott O’Reilly took over from Flanagan. As 
of the end of 2013 IPI had US$13.2m in retained 
earnings, nearly 1200 employees (although fewer 
than 400 of these are in Porgera), a turnover of 
US$87m and net assets of US$34m (Figure 9). 
Flanagan and O’Reilly deserve considerable 
credit for these achievements. 
  IPI is now the 100% owner of ten subsidiaries, 
one of which in Australia is also a 50% owner of 
an eleventh. It has operations at seven locations 
around PNG and nowadays derives the bulk of 
its income from customers other than PJV.  This 
fact is especially important because it suggests 
that, with IPI having matured to become a 
national company increasingly independent of 
PJV, there is some possibility of revisiting the 
issue of providing a local umbrella company – 
one whose main task is to nurture local, infant 
companies. IPI has never taken on this function – 
and with justification since its main aim has been 
to succeed in its main goal of amassing assets that 
will last long after the closure of the mine. To date 
it has succeeded in doing this which is fortunate 
since no other local company seems to be doing 
this and, although we have no information after 
2007, MRE was seen earlier to not be performing 
very well.
  ‘Revisiting‘ the issue is not to say that such an 
umbrella support company should definitely be 
established. It may turn out to be the case that 
fifteen companies on it are certainly non-Porgeran 
owned.  So, in effect, and in rather strong contrast to 
the situation at Ok Tedi, Porgera LBD is dominated on 
the one hand by a giant, IPI, (and to some extent by the 
company dealing with camp cleaning)40, and on the 
other hand by a swarm of Lilliputian enterprises, with 
very few formally registered companies of any size in 
between (and those that do exist – such as EJ Sisters 
of Laiagam, Jim Leo of Mulitaka, Soakofa of Wabag or 
Mapai Transport of Lae - are owned by non-Porgerans). 
Why this should be so is not clear. Many Porgerans 
themselves will simultaneously remark that too many 
contracts go to non-Porgerans and that trying to get 
a business going in Porgera is very difficult as one is 
‘expected to share one’s blessings’, a point made by 
Banks’ papers referred to earlier. The impression given 
is that for a Porgeran to be successful at business it is 
necessary not to be resident in Porgera. 
One other feature of the IPA records relating to Porgera 
businesses is the very high number of companies that 
have the status ‘removed’, that is, removed from the 
IPA register. It is difficult to state with any precision 
what that proportion is because that would require 
one to track down all such Porgera businesses and 
establish their status but simply searching on the IPA 
website for ‘Porgera’ (that is for companies which have 
ever registered with IPA which contain Porgera in their 
name) provides 69 names. Of these 39 have the status 
‘removed’, and only 26 are still registered. The names 
of many of these failed businesses are suggestive of 
what sorts of business do not go down very well at 
Porgera: Porgera Cultural Commodity Exports, Porgera 
Theatre, Porgera Restaurant, Porgera Fun Haus, Lagaip 
Porgera Paradise…. In other words, whilst to prove 
this assertion would require a great deal of careful 
searching through the IPA records, there is the strong 
suspicion that not only do most Porgera businesses 
not register with IPA but that the failure rate of those 
that do is unusually high.
If this conclusion is correct, then the main point made 
in Banks’ paper, ‘business as unusual’, written 16 years 
ago remains valid today: formal business compliance 
to best practice is not only weak among the hundreds 
of tiny trade stores and haus kai that line all roads 
around Porgera, but is also barely applicable to the 
hundreds of businesses that undertake contract work 
for the mine. And because they are unregistered, it is 
more difficult at Porgera to establish if they comply 
with normal business practice, to specify the numbers 
of people employed in LBD and to assess their 
earnings (one of the problems faced by Johnson). The 
total numbers shown in the employment column in 
40   Halfway through the write-up of this paper, the contract for camp cleaning came to an end and PJV used the opportunity to  award it to the 
commercial arm of the Porgera Women’s Association.
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  The other interesting fact is this: in December 
2014, after this section was written, IPI submitted 
to IPA its Annual Return for 2008 – which had 
been audited and signed off for in April 2011. It is 
the most recent year covered in the IPA database 
for IPI. In that year the consolidated company 
had revenues of K79m, costs of K76m and a 
pre-tax profit therefore of K3m. The costs were 
made up of K35m for costs of inputs and K41m in 
administrative expenses. In the course of the year 
donations made by the company totalled just 
under K96,000. Directors’ costs were assessed at 
K827,000, directors’ fees were stated to be K5.2 
million41, and directors’ ‘accrued gratuities’ were 
valued at K7.12m. These numbers are a rather 
high proportion of the company’s costs (as well 
as being four times the value of the company’s 
pre-tax profits for 2008).  In the same year, the 
directors determined that no dividend would be 
paid. No comparable information for any year 
after 2008 is publicly available.
b)  Kupiane Yuu Anduane [KYA] and Kupiane 
Investments Limited [KIL]
  In discussing MRE earlier it was argued that, 
although that organisation is part of the MRDC 
group, because its Board is overwhelmingly 
composed of EPG and landowner representatives, 
there is a strong case for terming it a Lanco, whose 
would-be business owners prefer to work as 
unregistered, family or individual operations. 
However, given the facts that:
 •  so few  medium-sized Porgeran-owned 
companies exist;
 •  that a new generation of leaders is now 
emerging in the Porgera Valley who, in 
general, do not control any of the major 
centres of politico-economic power in the 
valley, and
 •  that whereas in the past IPI might have 
jealously guarded its proprietary ‘rights’ over 
major  business opportunities around the 
mine, it does not need to do so now; then 
such an option at this stage has its attractions.
  One other aspect of IPI may be a cause for 
concern whilst a second is of interest. The 
matter of possible concern is this: from the 
papers lodged with IPA regarding shareholding 
(which, in contrast with financial data, are up-
to-date) it seems as if shares may now be held 
by a very small number of people – largely the 
directors – rather than being held by the wider 
Porgera community. This report cannot come to 
a definitive conclusion on the matter but should 
mention it.
Figure 9: Financial Indicators for IPI.
Table 7: Some (outdated) financial data for Kupiane Yuu Anduane
 Year Profit/Loss Retained Earnings Net Assets Directors Fees 
  (Kina) (K’Million) (K’Million) (Kina)
 2005  2.5  
 2006 -14,8423 2.4 10.4 260,000
 2007 -11,6240 2.3 10.3 260,000
41   In the table showing directors’ remuneration the total is K10.1m
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  For Kupiane Investments the picture is similarly 
incomplete. This company too has no Annual 
Return (though some other entries are present) 
in the IPA website in any year since 2007. All 
the shares in KIL are owned by KYA. In 2007 the 
company had twelve directors but in March 2011 
this was cut to six in a reshuffle that re-introduced 
Mick Searson to the Board; Searson, it will be 
recalled had, with Jolson Kutato, set things going 
for business at Porgera back in  1983. These 
changes cannot be tied in here to any significant 
financial changes in the business, given the lack 
of publicly available information for the past six 
years.
  The last available Financial Statement for KIL 
provides the following information:
  The income for KIL comes largely from the rental on 
properties it owns in Port Moresby (which include 
the building in which the PJV Port Moresby office 
and that of PNGCOMP are located). In 2007 
at least its profitability was somewhat impaired 
by the fact that major expenses were accrued 
in maintaining these properties. But a further 
restraint on KIL’s performance was that it had 
business happens to be investment. In the case 
of these two companies, KYA was established to 
invest in both MRE and, later subsidiarily, in KIL; 
its income is solely derived from dividends paid 
by these two companies. Its 112,600 shares are 
distributed between landowning clans and sub 
clans for whom 24 representatives act as trustees 
(the Porgera Development Authority is also 
allocated shares). It has twelve directors most of 
whom are trustee shareholders (including one 
woman).
  The main expense of KYA is in distributing the 
income it gains. In 2006 it handed out just under 
K675, 000 to clan and sub clan members (and 
spent K18,560 on security for the event). In 2007, 
it had not received any dividends and did not pay 
out. However, in that year its accumulated loans 
made to the Porgera Land Owners’ Association 
had reached a sum in excess of K2.8m. According 
to the auditor these were ‘advances to meet 
Operational Expenses’ and had ‘no fixed term 
for repayment’. Perhaps surprisingly, the auditor 
included this sum (together with a further K600, 
000 loaned to KIL) in KYA’s assets – of which 
these loans comprised one-third of the total.
Table 8: Some (outdated) financial data for Kupiane Investment Ltd
 Year Turnover Profit/Loss Assets Liabilities Dividend Director 
  (Kina) (Kina) (K’Million) (K’Million)  Fees
 2006 2,595,268 -74,7195 24.2 1.4* Nil 0
 2007 2,965,435 12,925 24.2 1.2 Nil 0
*   Annual Return shows liabilities as 22.8mK; once a revaluation of assets was allowed for this number was reduced to 
1.4mK
Table 9: Financial data for Total Cleaning
 Year Turnover Profit/Loss Dividend Donations Directors’ Net Assets 
  (K’Million) (Kina) (Kina) (Kina) Costs*(Kina) (K’Million)
 2008 4.5 98,870 0 0 263,653 1.7
 2009 4.8 86,431 0 9,760 240,000 1.8
 2010 5.3 112,263 0 13,191 240,000 1.9
 2011 6.7 -(9,757) 0 27,611 240,000 2.7
 2012 6.7 216,459 0 4,000 466,348 2.9
Note: This represents fees and expenses.
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company is left with no flexibility at all - which is 
why it is so important to ensure that LBD is NOT 
presented as a form of compensation.
5.3.3 Other companies
Of the remaining companies shown in Appendix A all 
but Peroko, Ipili Wanda, Tupa Resources and Kairik 
Cleaners are owned by people from outside Porgera. 
The four mentioned collectively employ no more than 
fifty people and have a combined asset value of less 
than K6m and are illustrative of the general point made 
earlier: Porgeran businesses with the exceptions of IPI 
and Total Cleaning are small, rarely incorporated and 
frequently fail (or are removed from the IPA register – 
as Tupa Resources has been).
5.4 Porgera summary
5.4.1 Polarised LBD
LBD at Porgera is polarised between IPI (and to some 
extent Total Cleaning) on the one hand and hundreds 
of tiny, largely unregistered family operations on the 
other.  The only registered, middling sized businesses 
appear to be those established down-road.
5.4.2 IPI success
IPI after a shaky start is now a highly successful 
Porgera-based company; even more impressively, to 
a significant degree its success is now independent of 
the project itself. Furthermore, IPI - on the available 
published evidence – is the biggest single source of 
potential funds for Porgera people after any mine 
closure as well as having every chance of being 
able to thrive on its own after such a closure. Unlike 
other sites, this ‘representative’ (in the sense used by 
PNG LNG) company has apparently been far more 
successful than the landowners’ investment arm 
(MRE), which makes IPI even more important.    
The delay in the appearance on the IPA website of the 
Annual Returns of IPI, Kupiane Yuu Anduane, Kupiane 
Investments and Mineral Resources Enga means that 
it is difficult to analyse to place a precise estimate of 
funds that might be available to Porgerans after mine 
closure (though the IPI CEO’s kindness in providing up 
to date data largely removed this difficulty in the case 
of this study). This is not a remote concern. In mid-
2013 Barrick Gold specifically stated that any of its 
projects where ongoing all-in costs of gold exceeded 
US$1000 an ounce would either have their mine 
plans changed, or more significantly in the present 
context, suspend operations, be closed or be sold off. 
At that time, June 2013, PJV per ounce production 
lent out funds (with no fixed date for repayment 
and apparently at nil interest) to Porgeran clans, 
individuals and the Landowners Association. The 
latter had outstanding debts to KIL of slightly 
more than K1m in 2007 and other local debtors 
owed a further K0.2m. 
c) Total Cleaning and Housekeeping
  This is an unusual company insofar as it is the 
only one of any size owned by Porgerans but 
not under IPI control. It looked after camp 
maintenance and cleaning at PJV’s camps (until 
late 2014). It has some additional interesting 
features. First, its shares are controlled by four 
people (the other eight shareholders control a 
mere 1.6% of equity42), so it cannot be described 
as a company that spreads its benefits across 
the community at large. Secondly, almost all 
its employees are classed as part-time and 
are females.  Third, it does not appear to have 
accumulation of retained earnings as a major 
goal, although some accumulation has occurred. 
Fourth, it has quite high levels of directors’ costs 
as a proportion of its earnings (although one 
should add that in comparison with international 
levels of remuneration for directors, like most 
of the Lancos covered in this study, these are 
modest). 
  Total Cleaning’s contract with PJV was in line for 
renewal in November 2014. After the first draft 
of this report was completed, it was announced 
in the PNG newspapers that PJV was to re-assign 
the contract to Ipili Wanda Investments (see 
below). This resulted in a reported 3,000 person 
demonstration in Porgera and the presentation 
of a set of demands to PJV that the decision 
be reversed. Since two of Total Cleaning’s 
shareholders (who are also directors) – and who 
own 57% of the company - are from Suyan village 
(on which the main residential camp stands) and 
just over 41% is owned by the remaining two 
directors (of Yarik), this presents problems. Not 
the least of these is that, if correctly reported in 
the press, one of the Yarik directors stated that 
since he had given up his land for the project, his 
contract should be permanent. This highlights a 
point raised earlier in this study: because of the 
local politics involved, it is always a challenge for 
a resource company to withdraw or re-assign any 
contract. This is especially the case if landowners 
regard contracts as a more or less direct form 
of compensation; in such cases the resource 
42   A feature of IPA reports which is widespread (and puzzling to the consultant) is the frequency with which directors are major shareholders 
in their companies but are said not to be shareholders in the Annual Returns.
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5.4.4 Failure of local business to develop and evolve 
Banks’ earlier paper suggested that most business 
opportunities in and around Porgera had merely been 
taken up as supplements to existing socio-economic 
relationships. The situation almost two decades after 
his work appears to be that it has barely changed 
since he did his fieldwork. Alex Golub writing in 2014 
has stated:
 	‘In	 theory,	all	 Ipili	 [Porgerans]	 love	 the	 idea	
of owning and running their own business. 
In	 practice,	 however,	 most	 tradestores	 in	
the settlement were not actually open for 
business’(p.139)
Whether this is a good or bad thing is arguable: 
it depends on one’s viewpoint concerning the 
desirability or otherwise of social change.  But it does 
suggest that whilst one can reasonably argue that at 
many resource sites in PNG experience of business 
is creating new skills, it would be difficult to promote 
this argument in the light of the evidence at Porgera 
alone.        
5.4.5 Statistics
Of the fifteen Porgera associated companies shown in 
Appendix A only two have their own constitution and 
eleven are exempted from the requirement to have 
independent audits. Most small companies are not 
especially prompt with their IPA reports; the average 
time between end of year and AR submission to IPA 
for the fifteen is 3.6 years but they are far prompter 
than the bigger companies: the equivalent time lag 
for IPI and the two Kupiane companies is six years. 
Eight companies have only one or two directors and 
owners. Total employment is a little over 1200 (note 
that IPI employment only in Porgera is counted in 
this total). The companies shown have assets worth 
approximately K350m with liabilities of K205m.
costs exceeded US$1300. It is widely known, at least 
within the mining community, that Porgera has been 
looked at by a number of other companies responding 
to Barrick’s indirect offer to sell it43. With gold prices 
now near to or below $1200 an ounce (and with 
Porgera’s general reputation) potential buyers have 
not yet flocked to Toronto. As with Lihir LBD, so at 
Porgera: Lanco owners should be watching world 
gold prices right now with as much, if not more, 
concern than the resource companies. Recognition 
of mutual dependence might be more beneficial for 
both groups than the adoption of zero-sum gaming 
strategies.
The issue of public availability of broad financial 
details is becoming acute in relation to KYA and 
KIL since the absence of up-to-date information for 
these on top of a similar lack for MREnga makes it 
impossible, in this study at least, to state what the 
overall position of funds available for future Porgeran 
development are – at a time when such a statement 
may be of immediate interest.
5.4.3 Control of Porgera’s future
The control of MRE, of KIL, of IPI and of non-business 
agencies such as PDA lies largely in the hands of a 
small number of landowner leaders, and has done for 
the past twenty years. They deserve their success. But 
there is a growing risk that this may not be in anyone’s 
interests (including those of the older leaders) for 
much longer especially as a younger generation of 
leaders emerge. Given PJV’s renewed emphasis on 
‘buying Porgeran’, the amount of money available for 
local contracts and IPI’s increasing development well 
beyond Porgera, one way of tackling this potential risk 
might be to reconsider the ways in which the benefits 
of new local business could be organised.
43  This became public knowledge through media reports in February 2015.
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6.1 Background
6.1.1 Some advantages for Lihir landowners in 
unpromising circumstances
Most resources sites in PNG are located in places 
which are not readily accessible or central to trade, 
transportation and communications networks. If 
businesses established to serve resource projects are 
to gain customers other than the project they were 
originally created to serve, then, it is reasonable to 
suppose, they must find ways of making a geographic 
move of at least part of their business to more central 
areas. Ok Tedi landowners have so far not done that. 
Misima landowners certainly did not do so. IPI did so 
when it purchased land near Lae from which it based 
its transport operations. Aside from the sheer extent 
of its success, perhaps the most interesting feature 
of Anitua, the Lihir landowners’ company, is that it 
has developed a presence across Papua New Guinea 
(and beyond)  from a location just as peripheral as 
that of Misima or Ok Tedi, but still maintains its major 
physical presence on Lihir itself.       
Lihir landowners had the advantage of seeing the 
results, from the Porgera Development Forum, of 
what happens when landowners are well organised 
and know what they want. But additionally they had 
another two edges: first, a number of knowledgeable 
and well educated expatriate Lihirians came back to 
assist in negotiations and, almost uniquely in the PNG 
context, stayed on to ensure that the initial outcomes 
were taken further. Second, the fervour that had long 
been brewing on the islands under the leadership of 
Ferdinand Samare had given a sense of mission to 
Lihirians; their beliefs, so often mocked by outsiders, 
seemed to become entirely justified by the arrival 
of the gold mine, and were reinforced as a result 
of that. In some ways (rather like the Huli and their 
belief in traditional ‘prophecies’ seemingly justified 
by oil and gas finds) they had the confidence of a 
‘chosen people’44. It was, in the present writer’s view, 
fortunate that this ebullience was reined in a little 
and channelled by the returning expatriate Lihirians 
into such ventures as Lihir Society Reform and more 
recently into the Personal Viability Movement.
The leadership among landowners that has emerged at 
PNG resource projects has been markedly varied. It is 
important to note here that the role played at Lihir by 
a single man, Mark Soipang, has all the appearances 
of being extraordinary. For more than two decades 
this individual, ably assisted by his equally long-term 
lieutenants, has been at the centre of all aspects of 
landowner affairs on Lihir, in development philosophy 
and in the practical implementation of that policy - 
and not least in the areas of business development 
and of investment strategy.
6.1.2 The work of Bainton and Macintyre
Fortunately, LBD on Lihir has already been the subject 
of a major study by Bainton and Macintyre whose 
work should be read by anyone wishing to get a full 
grasp of the implications of and interactions between 
LBD and Lihir society.  ‘Business’ is keenly sought 
after by the residents of all resource sites around PNG 
but perhaps nowhere more so than on Lihir. Whilst 
the outsider might wonder at the zeal for an activity 
whose outcomes are never assured, nowhere is such 
enthusiasm more marked than in the Lihir island 
group. Given the existence of at least 650 Lancos on 
the PNG IPA register in 2012 (as reported by Bainton 
and Macintyre), then even allowing for individuals 
with multiple directorships it would seem that at least 
one in every five (or possibly more) of the original 
(1990) Lihir resident adult males there are company 
directors, a ratio unheard of in economies elsewhere 
usually described as capitalist. 
The joint conclusions of Bainton and Macintyre on 
business development on Lihir are not encouraging: 
‘business development ….has divided people and 
entrenched inequalities’, is based on dependence 
upon the mining company and is unlikely to survive 
6. Lihir
44  See Nick Bainton’s book or that of James Sinclair for important insights into this from a Lihir viewpoint. 
Resource Project LANCOS Page 57
c) In any case, should it be of concern if the multitude 
of small Lihirian companies is not sustainable in 
the sense that they depend more or less entirely on 
the mine for their income? If that income is simply 
thrown away, perhaps so, but then the challenge is 
to introduce means whereby the beneficiaries of such 
income can start to invest in more lasting items, such 
as education or activities which will bring in future 
incomes. This is reinforced on Lihir by the fact that 
most Lihirians are also beneficiaries of Anitua and its 
components, which has now reached a stage where it 
has the potential to operate for many years to come. 
In other words, if the small Lancos try to maximise 
immediate income and simultaneously invest some of 
that in a sustainable way whilst also increasing current 
consumption, whilst Anitua maximises future incomes 
then an almost ideal situation would be arrived at. 
Finally, on the matter of inequality two points need to 
be addressed, in my view, if the Bainton and Macintyre 
conclusions are to be agreed with in their entirety:
a)  What was the level of inequality in Lihir society 
before mining started – not just in cash terms but 
in access to land and political authority? 
b)  While one cannot disagree with Bainton and 
Macintyre that many (most) people on Lihir 
remain rather poor while some Lihirians have 
become wealthy, are absolute levels of income 
rising? Or are there people on Lihir who are 
poorer in absolute terms now than they were in 
1989? Could the increase in average incomes and 
the increase in opportunities for choice for the 
average Lihirian since 1989 (if such increases can 
be shown to have occurred) be said to balance 
out in part the stated increase in ‘entrenched 
inequality’?
In short, if business is such a misguided activity as 
is seemingly suggested by Bainton and Macintyre’s 
earlier work, then why are Lihirians so keen to 
participate in it? Are they being irrational (from any 
standpoint)?  
It should be understood that the above points, in 
the main, only pick at the edges of Bainton and 
Macintyre’s work – the core of it is accepted: that LBD 
has individualised Lihir society and, by making some 
individuals and some groups wealthy while the lives 
of others have improved much less significantly, has 
created new tensions in Lihir society. 
6.1.3 The Project MoA and the Integrated Benefits 
Package
The original, simple (and, with hindsight, naïve) 
object of the project operators (originally Rio Tinto, 
mine closure in its current form. Their studies, they 
believe, explain why ‘landowner businesses often 
fail to expand beyond the immediate region’ of the 
resource project – a phenomenon that is closely tied 
to the Lihirian insistence that any work [for the project] 
done on their land must be done by them and their 
company.. Since these conclusions come from people 
who have not been content to criticise from afar but 
who, on the contrary, have been directly involved 
in assisting the making of policy on Lihir they are 
especially weighty ones. Further, since as they rightly 
comment ‘[t]he contracting situation [on Lihir]….has 
assumed a kind of Byzantine complexity’  and since 
they have had far more experience in trying to trace 
the threads of such complexity over the years than I 
have had in the few weeks of this study, it would be 
foolish here to disagree with their findings. 
But they do not convince me entirely of their 
correctness. For one thing, how is any local business to 
develop in a previously peripheral location like Lihir 
(or Tabubil, Porgera or Bwagaoia) without dependence 
on the protection of some degree of subsidy from, in 
this case, a resource company? The question is not so 
much ‘dependency’ but ‘dependency for how long?’ 
Their case for dependency is a strong one nevertheless 
since the overwhelming majority of Lihir businesses 
remain, almost twenty years after the mine began, 
totally dependent on it.
However, even if that dependency lasts for the whole 
of the life of the mine three other questions arise:
a)  Lihir could have a very long life ahead of it– how 
long does a project have to go on for before it 
begins to lose the stigma, with which many 
observers automatically mark mining projects, of 
being ‘transitory’ and, even worse in the context 
of modern religiosity, ‘unsustainable’.  Couldn’t 
another description of ‘dependence’ under such 
circumstances be ‘a guaranteed income for life’?
b)  Read with care, Bainton and Macintyre do not 
entirely overlook two of the most interesting 
aspects of the Lihir gold mine, but they do tend 
not to highlight them – the facts that the present 
owners of the mine have done very poorly out 
of it recently while landowners, relative to other 
projects, have done rather well and that the 
dependence is not one-way. Newcrest depends 
very heavily on the goodwill of Lihir landowners 
even to scrape by as it currently does. Mutual 
dependence seems to be the norm on Lihir not 
one-way dependence and this might well be, 
once recognised, a stable foundation on which to 
build.
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how or to-whom contracts will be awarded’.   
•  ‘wherever possible ensure that contracts awarded 
by LMC…..are awarded to business entities that 
are owned by Lihirians’;
•  ‘ensure that the wealth generated by Lihirian 
business activities is spread in an equitable 
manner throughout the population of the Island;
•  Having stated that it will not subsidise local 
business, the Plan then went on to list the 
functions of a ‘fully equipped and professionally 
staffed’ BDO which  included: help incorporate 
entities, prepare business plans, prepare financial 
plans and help raise bank finance for entities, 
assist day to day operations, prepare accounts 
and all statutory documentation such as tax 
returns, line up possible joint venture partners, 
provide training, structure contracts during 
construction to ensure that Lihirians could bid 
for them, and introduce an interest free loan 
program as well as a revolving loan guarantee 
program of K1m of which half would be reserved 
for Lakaka (Anitua’s forerunner) , and an interest 
free loan of K200,000 to Lakaka (which would 
also be provided with free business services for 
three years). 
The setting of all these goals was ambitious. 
6.1.4 Early failure
The Lihir LBD program ran into trouble more or less 
from the start of its operations. In 1997 the main 
beneficiary of the ‘unsubsidised’ company support, 
Lakaka Ltd., was deregistered, only re-registering a 
year later. Then, the 1998 audited Financial Statement 
for Lakaka showed net assets to be –K5.1m and the 
company’s loss for the year to have been K2.7m. 
Matters did not improve and in December 1999 
a receiver was appointed for a company that had 
received far more support than any other Lanco in 
PNG resource project history. The first three Lanco 
Umbrella Companies (four if one includes Misima) 
had all failed; and all had to be revived. A meeting 
of creditors (the biggest of whom was Lakaka’s 
previous General Manager) in May 2000 accepted an 
arrangement whereby debts would be paid back over 
a four year period and Lakaka was technically placed 
back in business. To practice business, however, 
it needed finance. There was some difficulty in 
arranging this, not because funds were not offered but 
because the Lihir landowners (LMALA) even in these 
rather dire circumstances showed their independence 
of spirit by refusing to take loans from the Bank of 
the South Pacific. The impasse was eventually broken 
when MRDC was persuaded that Mineral Resources 
Lihir might fill part of the finance gap caused by this 
then Lihir Gold Limited and now Newcrest) was to 
ensure that local people shared in the mine’s benefits 
(and thereby supported its operations). The question 
of balancing the share of benefits against the different 
degrees of mine impact was – as it is in all mining 
projects – more difficult to answer, especially by 
outsiders. Fortunately Lihirians themselves paid 
particular and, in PNG circumstances, virtually 
unique attention to this matter and provided their own 
answers to the question. These may not turn out to be 
perfect or permanent but at least they are from within 
the Lihirian community itself.
The Project Memorandum of Agreement for Lihir is, in 
general, of relatively little importance in terms of LBD. 
It simply states that the project developer (LMC) will 
comply with an approved business development plan 
and review its progress each year. However, in one 
respect it highlights an important aspect of almost all 
mining projects: under the MoA:
1.  the resource company is required to provide 
quarterly reports which list all successful 
tenderers for contracts, the items or services the 
contractors supplied and their place of residence 
as well as reasons why the contract was awarded 
to them
2.  it is also required to submit a list each quarter 
showing New Ireland based tenderers for 
contracts who failed to win contracts and the 
reasons why they failed;
3.  the National Government’s Department of Trade 
and Industry was to chair quarterly meetings to 
review such reports.
Appendix (iv) to Chapter 2 of the 1995 Integrated 
Benefits Package is a more important document for the 
purposes of LBD on Lihir.  When one reads this today, 
the clarity of vision which hindsight always provides 
immediately informs one that whatever quibbles 
one might have about Bainton and Macintyre’s 
conclusions,  the Lihir Management Company set 
itself up for a series of falls in its proposals since it 
aimed at  a situation where:
•  ‘Lihirian involvement will result in the 
development of competitive, well-run business’ 
[the document adds that ‘competition must 
always be limited if some parties to it are being 
subsidised while others are not’) which, more 
realistically and modestly, ‘will remain viable 
beyond the construction phase of the project’;
•  But, LMC ‘will under no circumstances offer to 
subsidise the operations of any business venture’ 
adding rather testily ‘we cannot have landowner 
groups (with or without ‘external’ advice) dictating 
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local contractors was a little less than K45m, so those 
payments have increased thirteen times in just over 
eight years (and, as with other sites considered so far, 
the numbers for ‘other PNG contractors’ suggest that 
if Lihir did not exist a rather large chunk of businesses 
elsewhere in the country would vanish).
This means that the Lihir gold mine awards contracts 
both to Lihir-based and other PNG companies of 
a value higher than those awarded by Ok Tedi and 
Porgera combined. Perhaps this is one reason why 
there is so much zeal for business on Lihir (or perhaps 
the relationship is the other way round). One of the 
reasons for this level of expenditure was that it was 
increased by almost a third in the years 2009 to 
2013 by the project’s push to upgrade processing to 
one million ounces per year; but even allowing for 
that Lihir is easily the most lavishly spending mining 
company in terms of local and national contract 
awards. 
However, this very rapid increase in expenditure by 
the mine between 2007 and 2012 was directly the 
result of the strategic plan [MOPU] adopted to upgrade 
the mine plant so that a regular annual production of 
one million ounces of gold could be achieved. Once 
that plan period ended, expenditure (and therefore 
business opportunities) has declined. This decline 
has been exacerbated by declining gold prices which 
have now caused Newcrest to focus rather sharply on 
cost-cutting. Consequently the steep upward curves in 
Figure 10 have now reversed direction. 
stand. The pre-existing bank loans were refinanced by 
the mine and MR Lihir which each put up secured 
loans of K2.5m while an additional unsecured loan 
of close to K4m was also provided by the mine. All 
interested parties must have agreed that there was 
a loophole in the words ‘Under no circumstances’. 
Even after this and as late as 2007, Lakaka (as Anitua 
was still known then) was in difficulties; only after the 
Board of Directors brought in Colin Vale, who had 
been running NCS successfully, did the company, 
under a new name Anitua, take off.  In this respect 
Anitua’s history is much like that of Porgera’s IPI, 
and the reverse of that of Cloudlands Investments of 
Ok Tedi (which started off successfully but has since 
almost shrunk to nothing).
The  1995 IBP Agreement for the Lihir mine included 
a clause in the proposals for LBD that allowed for 
the review of the ownership and management of the 
company Lihir Business Services that the project set 
up to fulfil the long list of commitments it had made 
under the IBP Agreement. In circumstances that are 
not entirely clear to the present writer this company 
was transferred to the ownership of Anitua in 2008 
– with the proviso that the mine continued to pay a 
major part of its expenses.  In the five years 2009 to 
2013 these averaged a little more than K7m annually. 
The future of LBS depends on the outcome of the 
current review of the IBP Agreement. As the Anitua 
Group Annual Report says of LBS: it ‘has now evolved 
into a significant company … which is an important 
adjunct to the Anitua group that is necessary to support 
and grow existing and new Lihirian businesses.’ 
From this writer’s perspective the significance of LBS 
is very considerable indeed: it represents the only 
organisation in the projects considered so far which 
actually fulfils (or attempts to) the ideal functions of an 
umbrella company with any success. That it has done 
so for several years as a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the most successful mining Lanco in the country is an 
added advantage45.
6.2 Project contract awards and payments
From the beginning of 2006 to the end of June 2014, 
the Lihir gold mine paid out K3.6bn to local Lihir 
companies and their joint venture partners (the latter 
being of relatively small importance) and a further 
K5.7bn to other PNG contractors.  In the 10 years 
before 31 December 2005 the annual average paid to 
45   Nick Bainton, on reading this paragraph in its draft form made two important comments: a) in some ways Anitua ownership of LBS ‘could 
be seen as a major conflict of interest for Anitua, as the Anitua Group competes directly against those very Lancos that LBS is designed to 
support’ and b) ‘few Lihirians see Anitua as ‘their’ company and many expect to develop their own commercial opportunities….[with] …
LBS assist[ing] them to achieve these goals’. The significance of these comments is that in this respect it may well be the case that Anitua 
has more in common with IPI than might be at first thought; rather than being an umbrella company, Anitua, like IPI, first and foremost 
looks after its own interests. When we come to consider whether the idea of the umbrella company has or has not worked this needs to 
be borne in mind.     
Figure 10: LGM annual payments to contractors.
Notes: 1. * the 2005 value is the average for the period 
1996 to 2005; 2. The lines on the graph are cumulative.
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Anitua’s function is to seek out new opportunities for 
the group, and then to provide managerial assistance 
and oversight to wholly-owned and JV companies 
in PNG or abroad. It leaves SME initiatives to Lihir 
Business Services (which it owns 100%) and it has, 
since Lihir landowners decided to go on their own 
independently of the MRDC, left pure investment 
to Lihir Capital Management (originally based in 
Port Moresby with a sister company in Australia). 
One of the specifically unique characteristics of 
Anitua’s relationships with, and attractions for, its JV 
‘associates’ is that it has helped get the JV underway 
by providing funds to its partner.  This in turn is the 
manner in which NCS, its major subsidiary, has also 
operated. There are few, if any, other Lancos in PNG 
that do this – quite the reverse they usually rely on the 
external partner to provide the funds.
Anitua and its subsidiaries (including NCS) employed 
in 2012 approximately 1760 people on Lihir itself 
including 430 females. Of these Lihir employees, 
570 were other PNG nationals who reside elsewhere 
but 530 were non-Lihirians living on the island and 
590 were Lihirians. Part of Anitua’s success is owed 
to migrants to Lihir – who, in other contexts, are 
regarded as a ‘problem’ in the community; but there 
simply are not enough Lihirians available (or willing) 
to work to build up this community-owned company. 
Other than NCS Holdings (below) the only Anitua 
subsidiaries with significant off-Lihir employment are 
two security offshoots operating in Kavieng and East 
New Britain employing 270 persons46. 
6.3.1.2 NCS Holdings Ltd: started off life in 1989 as 
Niolam Catering Services Ltd (Niolam or Aniolam 
being the name of the main Lihir island) and its growth 
from a company solely serving the project on Lihir is 
mirrored by its changes of name; first, to Nationwide 
Catering Services (in 2002); avoiding hubris perhaps, 
6.3 Components of the LBD structure on 
Lihir
To simplify (and possibly to oversimplify) this set of 
interlocking, overlapping business entities some of 
the key elements of its make-up are classed by the 
resource company as follows:
6.3.1 ‘Lihir owned businesses’ or core businesses
The first title (in use on Lihir) is misleading since a) it 
implies other strands are not Lihir-owned (which is not 
the case) and b) it implies that all companies within 
the group are fully owned by all Lihirians (which is 
also not the case). The category might be slightly 
better, but not perfectly, described as businesses that 
have been around since the start of the project and 
which are seen by most Lihirians and the resource 
company as ‘core businesses’. The project describes 
these as: companies formed to operate businesses 
on Lihir, contracted to Newcrest and representing 
all Lihir people. This ideal has not yet been achieved 
but considerable progress towards it has been made. 
There are six businesses in this group.
6.3.1.1 The largest is Anitua Ltd (named Lakaka until 
the end of 2008): Anitua is owned by the investment 
companies of each of the islands’ six major clans 
(Lamatlik 8.2%, Unawos 8.2%, Tinetalgo 2.8%, 
Nikama 3.5%, Nissal 6.5% and Tengawom 2.8%), 
the Nimamar Development Authority 7.5%) and Lihir 
individuals (60.5%). Anitua in turn is the sole owner 
of Anitua Supermarket Ltd, Anitua Mining Services 
Ltd, Anitua Hardware Ltd, Lihir Business Services, 
Lihir Investments Ltd, Anitua Properties Ltd, and 
Anitua Security Services Ltd; and a 50% JV partner in 
Aniokaka Ltd, Lihir Auto Services Ltd, NCS Holdings 
and Anitua Radial Drilling Ltd. NCS Holdings is 
its biggest, most innovative and most successful 
component and will be dealt with separately below. 
Anitua to date can be described as the single most 
successful Lanco associated with the PNG mining 
industry. Its origins can be traced directly to the 
initiative of Lihirian entrepreneurs in 1989 as can 
that of its major subsidiary NCS Holdings Ltd. It has 
attained its position of eminence from an exceptionally 
unpromising location for business: a remote island. 
Even though Lihir is rather more accessible to 
mainland centres of PNG than Misima was and even 
though the Lihir gold mine is very much larger and 
richer than Misima Mines Limited ever was, to have 
achieved such success in such a peripheral location is 
truly noteworthy.   
Figure 11: Growth of Anitua 2001-2013.
46   In December 2014 after this was written Anitua announced that its mining support arm was initiating work in Manus and Bougainville 
and that Anitua itself was investing in a Solomon Islands nickel venture – which latter would open up a range of potential opportunities for 
Anitua subsidiaries.
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agreed by all parties in 2008 that Anitua would 
take over the function. In theory, since Anitua was 
owned by Lihirians – in addition to having a rather 
good business record of its own – prospective clients 
could not only place greater trust in any advice they 
received from an Anitua-managed organisation but 
benefit twice – once from the advice and again from 
the profits Anitua made. In practice, this has not been 
perceived by many Lihirians to be the case; many 
see themselves as receiving few benefits from Anitua 
whilst also being in competition with it for mine works 
contracts. 
Nevertheless, LBS does the work which the basic PNG 
business model assigns to the Umbrella Company idea 
and it does it better than any other such company. This 
is reflected in the fact that the record of LBS-advised 
companies (even including some that are almost 
inactive) in supplying IPA with the required Annual 
Returns, although far from perfect, is very much 
better than for any other resource company with the 
exception of Oil Search.
6.3.1.4 Kuridala Ltd: is equally owned by the six 
island group clans and specialises in equipment and 
plant hire. 
6.3.1.5 Lihir Civil and Construction Ltd: established 
in 1998, had the Unawos clan’s investment vehicle as 
its majority (>62%) owner until 2008. In recent years 
the clan’s shares have increasingly been distributed 
around several of its component sub-clans. 
6.3.1.6 Lihir Contracting Services Ltd: which 
specialises in electrical installations and construction, 
is one of the more successful Lancos on Lihir having 
assets values, in 2012, in excess of K15 million, and 
a workforce of 230. But, if its IPA Annual Return 
for 2012 is accurate, it is an unlikely ‘landowner 
company’, and indeed might not qualify as one at all. 
This is because 66% of its shares are registered in the 
name of a non-Papua New Guinean.
this was shortened to NCS Holdings as its success 
in gaining contracts in several parts of the country 
grew. No other Lanco anywhere in PNG can rival 
Anitua/NCS Holdings’ success in expanding beyond 
its original and highly restricted sphere of operations; 
it now has interests spread across the country but 
notably in Hidden Valley  and Wafi (for the time 
being), Madang, Wewak, Kainantu, Lae Port Moresby 
and the oil/gas fields. NCS funding has enabled its JV 
with Hidden Valley and Ramu Nickel to get started. 
NCS now employs 1,370 people in locations other 
than Lihir.
One of the ironies of NCS expansion is that it has been 
based on a community (Lihir) that is very reluctant 
to allow any island business to fall into the hands of 
outsiders. It is true that this off-island expansion, to 
date, has been limited largely to a single specialist 
sector – large-scale catering – in an area previously 
dominated by international companies and that 
perhaps Anitua may be vulnerable in this regard. But 
it is equally possible that Anitua’s expertise in this 
specialist area could in turn provide it with a stable 
national base from which it could itself become an 
international caterer. 
It is worth noting that of NCS’ more than 1900 
employees, over 900 are women making it one of the 
biggest employers of females in the whole country.    
To assist and support NCS in its early years, it was 
considered desirable that the two largest of the island 
group’s six clans owning land on the project site, 
Tinetalgo and Unawos, should each own 25% of NCS’s 
shares; until May 2013 therefore this company was a JV 
between Anitua and these two clans’ investment arms. 
However, at that time the two clans were persuaded, 
for the good of Lihir as a whole, to sell back to Anitua 
their holdings as part of a general plan on Anitua’s 
part to shape its shareholdings in line with the home-
grown Lihir Development Plan (or Destiny) whereby 
these core businesses will have an ownership pattern 
that accurately reflects the populations of the different 
clans in the island group.
6.3.1.3 Lihir Business Services: was not established 
within Anitua until 2008 but is certainly a core 
business even if, as pointed out in the footnote on 
page 59 above, its location within Anitua may not be 
ideal.. Originally the project developers – as per the 
original mine MoA – established and ran a Business 
Development Office. However the IBP Agreement had 
stipulated that the function of business development 
would be moved from the operating company to 
landowner control and, since no other landowner 
company could match Anitua’s capabilities it was 
Figure 12: Idealised structure of Lihir businesses.
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generated by the push for a million ounces a year 
as well as to address the issue of large numbers of 
small or family based companies competing for the 
same contracts. It was the landowners themselves 
who proposed the SIC model which groups together 
landowners from specified areas within the mine’s 
leases. For instance, Balasie represents owners of 
land occupied by the plant site, Caldera represents 
those of the Luise Caldera portion of the pit, Saberte 
represents the Kapit landowners, Kunaie represents 
those who own land at the island’s airport and 
Londolovit Weir is self explanatory. The SICs cut 
across clan-based affiliations and group landowners 
geographically. Although the model has some benefits 
in terms of economies of scale and although proposed 
by the landowners themselves, the model has not 
been satisfactory for them particularly since some 
have been far more successful than others. Further, 
their establishment has not in fact significantly 
diminished the number of small companies operating 
(or attempting to operate) within the SIC areas in 
competition with the SICs themselves.
All the SICs have been established since 2008. There 
are 11 in all and details for ten have been located on 
the IPA website. Of the latter only four appear to have 
submitted Annual Returns so for the remainder that site 
has no information with respect to their employment 
or to their assets and liabilities (since all are ‘exempt’ 
companies under the Companies Act in terms of 
providing independently audited reports, none have 
such reports). Of the four with an Annual Return their 
combined assets in 2009 were K24.4 million (with one 
alone contributing 77% of this) and liabilities of less 
than K11.5m. The six specific issues companies are 
composed or rather group together a myriad of even 
smaller companies owned, effectively, by individuals. 
Altogether 269 such companies - including 94 under 
Kunaye Investments and 84 grouped under Balasie – 
existed in July 2012.  
The 23 Lihir Lancos for which data was obtained had 
105 Directors (some doubling up occurs). Of these 
eight were females and five of these females were in 
this ‘special’ group of companies49.   
6.3.2 Other on-island businesses 
This comprises four sets of businesses – as separately 
identified by LGM staff – which are dealt with below.
6.3.2.1 Clan investment vehicles: shortly after 
operations started at Lihir, each clan established, 
with the help of the then project BDO, an investment 
arm; all are styled in the same way (_____[clan 
name] Investment Ltd) and all have 10,000 shares47. 
Moreover the ownership of the shares is basically the 
same in each case – all but one or so are in the name 
of the clan company (_____[clan name] Ltd) and one 
is allotted to a clan property company (_____[clan 
name] Properties Ltd). Neither the clan companies 
nor the clan property companies appear to have any 
activity other than to hold the shares of their respective 
investment arms. Further, in terms of active business, 
four of these investment arms appear to be inactive or 
virtually so, other than holding shares in Anitua and 
Kuridala. However, Unawos Investment Ltd also is the 
main investor in Lihir Civil and Construction Ltd and, 
together with Tinetalgo IL, was (until mid-2013) the 
joint venture partner of Anitua in NCS Holdings. 
6.3.2.2 Relocation businesses: These businesses/
companies were established at or shortly after 
construction of the mine began as direct compensation/
replacement of livelihoods for those with pre-existing 
businesses that were demolished to make way for 
the project48. All are owned by relocated persons 
from Putput. It can safely be stated that whatever 
problems these businesses have faced, they have 
certainly succeeded in doing much more than restore 
the pre-mine livelihoods to their owners. While the 
available data is now outdated (from 2008 and 2009 
IPA ARs) it showed that, of the five businesses classed 
as relocation businesses by LGM, the combined 
assets of three were worth K6.6 million with liabilities 
of K4.4 million; prior to the start-up of mining, the 
total income of island residents did not match these 
numbers.
6.3.2.3 ‘Specific issues companies’ and ‘special 
project companies’:  Specific Issues Companies [SIC] 
were established to enable lease area landowners to 
better participate in the commercial opportunities 
47  Possibly the number was arrived at by estimating the largest foreseeable population numbers of each clan.
48   This leads into a major issue. There is a body of opinion among mining community affairs personnel that compensation must be kept 
clearly separate from mine-associated development. The logic for this is that if development, such as community investment in schools, 
comes to be seen as compensation, then there is likely to be no end to demands for ongoing ‘compensation’. Unfortunately, the best 
practice principles of resettlement insist that a pre-existing retailer must be provided with the means to carry on his or her livelihood after 
relocation – which means assisting them to re-establish their business. If one set of people in a project area, albeit resettled, are assisted in 
this way, then other people will (and do) demand similar assistance with business.  In PNG this point is theoretical because, irrespective of 
the merits of the case, business development is now an accepted part of the ‘package’ (something Lihirians were the pioneers of in PNG) 
that accompanies mining development. In other parts of the world it remains an issue.
49   The Boards of Barrick Gold, Chevron, Harmony, Newcrest, Newmont, OTML, Oil Search and St. Barbara collectively had 11 female  (14%) 
and 67 male directors compared to just under 8% for Lihir Board members. 
Resource Project LANCOS Page 63
6.4.2 Smaller Lihir companies
Smaller and increasingly fragmented companies 
certainly justify Bainton and Macintyre’s concerns 
about social change on Lihir. Their concern that 
asset accumulation by the smaller Lihir companies 
is minimal also appears to be entirely borne out by 
the limited IPA data available for these companies. 
However, the circumstances for even tiny local 
businesses on Lihir appear significantly better than at 
other sites: the resource developer has been spending, 
in recent years, more money on local contracts than 
have Ok Tedi and Porgera combined; although internal 
rivalries are evidently severe on Lihir they have not had 
the same result as appears to be the case at Porgera – 
to strangle anything bigger than unincorporated family 
businesses; and Lihirians, despite their own success 
in penetrating other area’s markets have managed 
to keep externally-based businesses out of Lihir to a 
very large extent. In any case, as long as MRLC and 
Anitua are building up financial assets – it can be 
argued - why should not families consume? Doesn’t 
consumption drive other parts of the island economy 
(quite aside from being rather pleasurable in itself).
6.4.3 Lanco employment
Lancos on Lihir employ at least 2,500 people on the 
island (and an additional 1,900 in other parts of the 
country). 
6.4.4 MRL Capital, Lancos and Newcrest Mining
MRLC has established a more or less total degree of 
independence from the resource project that gave 
birth to it. Anitua/NCSH remains largely reliant upon 
it in one way or another and local businesses are 
totally dependent on it. But, as mentioned earlier, 
that dependence is two-way; Newcrest is heavily 
dependent on Lihirian goodwill. It is very much in 
both parties’ interests to act in accordance with that 
reality.
This is especially so now because both parties are now 
at risk. Newcrest’s acquisition of Lihir and its buyback 
of all Lihir shares in 2012 have been under constant 
criticism on world markets. Its December quarter 
2014 figures show that Lihir produced slightly less 
than 161,000oz of gold (significantly less than would 
be required to produce a million ounces a year) at an 
all-in sustaining cost of US$1240 an ounce; the world 
price of gold averaged US$1203 an ounce for the 
quarter. While Lihirians can be proud that they have 
done well out of the mine, they might also recognise 
that they can only continue to do well out of it if the 
mine continues to operate – and at present gold prices 
and mine production costs, there is a possibility that 
those operations are in jeopardy. 
6.4 Lihir summary
Despite the largely valid concerns of Bainton and 
Macintyre discussed earlier, LBD on Lihir when 
viewed as a whole is certainly at present, and has been 
for some years now, the most successful at any mining 
site in PNG, despite what was a very difficult period 
of initial development at an extremely peripheral 
location. That judgement is not only relative to other 
sites (which do not offer a great deal of competition) 
but to the performance of its own component 
elements: investment through MRLC, economic 
activity through Anitua/NCS Holdings, and local level 
business (through the myriad of Lihir entities).
The landowners’ independent investment arm 
(MRLCapital), even though it was established at a 
chaotic time in international finance markets, had a 
flying start thanks both to landowner representatives’ 
tenacity in negotiating for shares in the project and 
to the timing of the later sale of those shares to the 
international market. Although it incurred heavy losses 
(in excess of K100m) in 2008 it made a larger (K117m) 
profit in 2009, the last year for which figures are 
publicly available. It appears to have made progress 
since then and although its officers were unwilling to 
reveal its net worth in June 2014, it seems likely that 
that is at a minimum in the vicinity of K800m. 
6.4.1 Anitua
Anitua continues to find opportunities on Lihir 
(through its farming activities currently undergoing 
major expansion) while NCSH has performed 
extremely well in extending its specialised catering 
services off Lihir. Anitua has publicly recognised that 
with the completion of the first and largest stage of 
construction on the PNG LNG project its JV operations 
there will be less profitable. It has not publicly noted 
(but is almost certainly aware of this) that JVs which 
have worked well so far may not continue to do so 
as local partners seek to take over the whole of the 
business associated with their projects. It will be of 
considerable interest to see in which direction the 
Anitua Group moves next – internationally in existing 
areas of specialisation, across PNG in some new area 
of activity, possibly through acquisition, or regionally 
(through agricultural and food supplies)? These and 
the other larger companies on the island already have 
amassed net assets worth well in excess of K400m so 
they have some cushion – not to fall back on but to 
build with. Its venture into the Solomon Islands nickel 
mining project which not only represents a bold 
financial investment but also opens up the possibility 
of expansion for its mining services and catering 
arms, marks a first for any landowner company in 
PNG (although the MRDC has also been investing in 
overseas ventures on behalf of its landowner clients). 
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When the MoA was revised in 2007 so as to allow 
Emperor Mines to re-start mining more detailed 
business plans were provided. The State was to make 
a grant of K225,000 to a Lanco (Yulai Holdings) plus 
a similar sized grant to the landowners’ association 
to enable them to participate in business, plus K25 
000 to each of the three major landowning clans so 
they might buy shares in Yulai Holdings. The company 
was expected to establish a ‘professionally staffed 
business development office in Waigani to implement 
the Business Development Plan’ although in fact 
its plan submitted as part of the revised MoA was 
to place one BDO at site and one in the company’s 
Port Moresby office and to establish a) a mentoring 
and microfinance-program costing K10,000 annually 
[excluding all staff costs presumably] and later b) a 
freight subsidy program linked to the award of small 
contracts costing K50,000 annually.
How much these programs spent is unknown. But if 
staff were appointed and if the funds specified were 
handed out then their costs in total over the years 
would have been well in excess of K1m and possibly 
more than K2m. With hindsight it might have been 
preferable to place two million in an investment fund 
and avoid all the work and frustrated expectations 
than trying to impose a Porgera-style LBD program on 
a small-scale mine in fact created. 
Yulai Holdings was registered with IPA only in 2008. 
It submitted no Annual Return and has since been 
removed from the IPA register.
Is it worthwhile trying to develop a local business 
development program at a small mine of short duration? 
This question is thrown up by the history of Tolukuma 
a small (<80,000 oz Au per year) mine in Central 
Province which can only be accessed by helicopter. 
Notwithstanding the fact that logistics have made the 
running of this mine by three separate companies 
marginally profitable at best and unprofitable in 
general, nevertheless each effort to revive it has been 
accompanied by plans for local business, plans which 
do not explain how small business is to overcome 
logistic problems the mining companies themselves 
have failed to solve. 
The original 1997 MoA for Tolukuma covered all the 
ground needed to encompass the requirements of a 
Porgera or a Lihir. In terms of LBD this included the 
usual Business Development Plan plus the novel 
requirements that a) the company (originally Clayfield) 
would pay for training in small business by the Small 
Business Development Corporation (SDBP), that b) 
the Central Provincial Government would undertake 
an annual review of the BDP and work with the 
mining company to improve it and the rather strange 
requirement of the mining company that c) it should 
make available to Lanco business personnel access 
to all mine facilities. The State was to make available 
K200,000 loan guarantees providing either SDBP or a 
registered accountant endorsed the relevant business 
proposal. 
7. Petromin (Tolukuma)50
50   Senior staff members of Petromin were interviewed in the course of the research for this paper. However, despite follow up, no material 
information concerning the operations of Tolukuma’s LBD program was provided by the company.
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8.1 Background
There are many significant differences between 
the essential natures of the oil/gas extraction and 
metalliferous mining industries which necessarily 
impact on the types of local business development 
that arise in association with them. One of the most 
important of these – and one which is currently 
challenging Lancos in the oil/gas sectors – is that the 
overwhelming bulk of contract expenditure and of 
employment in the oil/gas sector is provided for during 
construction rather than in operations. Whereas – as 
seen in the cases of the major mines discussed so far – 
it is true that construction is a time of major contracts 
and business opportunities in the mining industry and 
that the first few years of production see a downturn 
in the quantum of such opportunities, as mine life 
continues so these opportunities start to grow again to 
such an extent that at Ok Tedi, Lihir and Porgera today 
far more is being spent on local contracts than at any 
earlier stage. In oil/gas, the fall-off after construction is 
steeper and there is no revival as time passes (unless 
additional construction for expansion occurs).
A second significant difference between the two 
sectors is that, at least in PNG, the changes in 
ownership of petroleum exploration and, to a lesser 
extent, petroleum production licence areas have 
been very frequent in comparison with those in 
metalliferous mining. This set of changes has been 
matched by the frequency of changes in the landowner 
businesses, and their organisation, which have been 
associated with the industry. For any observer, other 
than someone associated with the development of the 
PNG oil and gas sector throughout most of its recent 
evolution, these changes can be extremely difficult 
to piece together. The following subsections, as far as 
8.2.8, are based on:
•  material prepared for this study by John 
Brooksbank who was associated with Oil Search 
for  twenty years. Note that any errors in the text 
are the responsibility of the consultant and not 
John. John’s material has been supplemented 
by….
• …..IPA records where available, and….
•  …interpretations by the consultant of the data 
provided by him as well as by….
• …..interviews with OSL, LNG and Lanco staff.
It is worth stating here that OSL was not only able 
to provide Lanco data more promptly than any 
other site covered in this survey, but the data it did 
provide (covering the period 2004 to 2013) was far 
more detailed than that provided by any other site 
and was more up-to-date even than that available 
on the IPA website (as well as containing no internal 
inconsistencies). In the era of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (to which PNG became a 
signatory in 2014), OSL’s database on Lancos is a 
model that can be recommended to all resource 
operators in PNG.    
8.2 The historical evolution of LBD in the 
PNG oil sector
8.2.1 Introduction
The local business development environment as 
it exists today (2014) in areas that host petroleum 
developments is to a certain extent a result of the 
history of various petroleum developments occurring 
at different times between 1991 (Hides), 1992 
(Kutubu), Gobe (1996/7), Moran (1998) and more 
recently the PNG LNG Project - each spawning 
local regional stakeholders and, consequently, local 
business interests. A major consequence of this has 
been that no umbrella or representative company 
which covered more than a particular portion of the 
oilfields has emerged. Only since the inception of the 
PNG LNG Project, and the start of its construction 
in 2010, have there been moves for any higher level 
coordination of landowner business development. The 
lack of a major ‘umbrella’ landowner contractor in the 
petroleum sector can be explained by this disjointed 
and uncoordinated project development and the 
parochial power bases that the earlier, smaller Lancos 
engendered; as will be seen, this has had significant 
consequences for LBD structures.
8. PNG LNG and Oil Search
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annually as dividends and investments were made, 
including acquisition of real estate in Port Moresby.
As certain individuals became aware of developments 
elsewhere, there were calls for greater involvement 
and other Huli Lancos were formed such as Kawapa 
Development Corporation and Tuguba Development 
Corporation. A three-way joint venture, Petroleum 
Enterprise Joint Venture (PEJV) was formed as well as 
another subsidiary, Mountain Oil Limited, to truck 
naphtha (a by-product of gas extraction) to markets 
in Western Highlands. All these companies were 
managed by GDC.
For various reasons these later-formed Lancos failed 
to operate properly or profitably and ceased activity, 
leaving GDC to run its contracts. Further, when the 
LNG Project was being planned, ExxonMobil decided 
to establish a new umbrella/representative company 
to cover the area over which GDC had, in earlier 
years, had a virtual monopoly. This marginalised it 
to some extent. Despite some management issues in 
recent years GDC continues to operate although its 
turnover is small compared to the incomes earned 
by other Hides area companies during the PNG LNG 
construction period.
The diagram (above) illustrates one important point: 
the variability in payments. Some companies which are 
overwhelming dependent on payments directly from 
resource developers are presented with challenges in 
forward planning.
8.2.3 Kutubu PDL 2
Once Chevron Niugini decided, as a result of their 
exploration drilling activities, that there was sufficient 
oil for a petroleum development to be commercial in 
the early 1990’s moves were initiated to organise local 
landowner representative bodies based on social 
mapping studies. 
In terms of project developers’ obligations to assist 
and promote local business development there is no 
specific requirement in the Oil and Gas Act (1998). 
In the various MOA’s that were signed for each of the 
PDL’s, to which the Developer was not a party, the 
same very general clauses were inserted stating that 
“…the State would use all reasonable endeavours 
to ensure that subject to compliance with price, 
quality and deliverability preference is given, in the 
supply and procurement of materials, equipment 
and services firstly to businesses owned by project 
area landowners, secondly to those from Southern 
Highlands and lastly from elsewhere in PNG.”  Whilst 
bland, this is slightly different to conditions applied to 
the mining industry in which the Mining Act has no 
reference to local preferences even though, since the 
negotiation of the Porgera MoAs, each project MoA 
or MDC has included specific provision for local 
preferences.
In summary, the local enterprises that have been 
established, developed and assisted over the years 
with assistance of the project developers have been 
very much at the discretion of the latter (under very 
considerable pressure from their host communities), 
with little or no direction or support, until recently, 
from Government.
The following paragraphs outline a brief history of the 
local landowner companies that were established in 
each of the petroleum development licence areas.
8.2.2 Hides PDL 1
This small localised gas-to-electricity project was 
operated by BP and then Oil Search Limited. Although 
the Hides region had been found to contain huge 
reserves of gas there was no market by 1990, so a 
fraction of reserves was used to operate turbines to 
generate electricity that was reticulated approximately 
75 kilometres for sale to the Porgera gold mine.
Hides PDL consists of just one graticular block and 
social mapping indicated that its land was owned 
by 7 major clans. Gigira Development Corporation 
Limited (GDC) was incorporated with 7 share classes. 
Individual members of the respective clans could 
purchase shares in the appropriate share class and 
then elect their director in a share class meeting. Share 
classes were, therefore, a specific LBD development 
strategy introduced in PNG for the first time at Hides 
in an attempt to match company formation and 
management with pre-existing social groupings.
GDC was awarded a number of contracts which it 
implemented in joint ventureship with other parties in 
a) labour and staff hire (with JDA), and b) catering and 
camp maintenance (with Eurest). GDC was well run, 
its contracts generated an income that was distributed 
Figure 13: Payments to Gigira Development Corporation by 
Oil Search by year.
Resource Project LANCOS Page 67
1.  Civil works and road maintenance – Maka 
Investments Ltd (upper Fasu).
2.  Security – KSS (after murder of Henry Kapi, shares 
held only by Lower Fasu).
3.  Catering and camp management – Yasuku Oil 
and Gas in joint ventureship with Eurest (Yasuku 
region of Fasu speakers) then as they bought out 
Eurest, who maintained a management contract, 
as Kutubu Catering Services (KCL).
4.  Camp maintenance – Melosie (later Kawaso) 
(Soro region of Fasu speakers).
5.  Road transport – stayed with KTS for many years, 
essentially run by Pagini.
Each of these enterprises became the power base, in 
terms of status and finances, for certain landowner 
leaders - Maka (Paul Yawe, Keith Puara and Mark 
Sakai), KCL (Peter Heno), KSS (John Kapi), Kawaso 
(Kossy Sosoro) and KTS (Sosoro Hewago). The use of 
Lancos as an ‘instrument’ of local politics has impacted 
the ability of these companies to operate properly, 
compliantly and in some cases to pay dividends to 
their shareholders.
It should be noted that this split of operational service 
contracts excludes any involvement by Foe interests 
(Foe are 20% beneficiaries in PDL2) or Huli interests. 
After a land claim, the State recognised a Huli clan as 
having a small percentage ownership of PDL 2 and 
the development of the Moran PDL’s in the late 1990’s 
would not have been possible without the proximity 
of the processing facilities within PDL 2, which led to 
the oft-expressed desire of the Huli for some local BD 
involvement in operations’ service contracts.
8.2.4 South-east Mananda
A portion of one of the PDL graticular blocks covers 
an area known as south-east Mananda, across 
the Hegigio Gorge from the Sisibian villages and 
whose land ownership was disputed between Fasu, 
Onabasalu and Mananda Huli clans. An out-of-court 
agreement in the 1990s resulted in 8.2% of Fasu 
landowner benefits being set aside and periodically 
paid to these clans in line with a variable sharing 
arrangement. 
No production wells were drilled along the SE 
Mananda Ridge at the time of the dispute/settlement. 
When they eventually were in about 2004, in 
association with the pipeline bridge across the 
Gorge, the LBD spin-offs were carried out by an 
unincorporated 3-way joint venture between Fasu, 
Onabasalu and Huli landowner interests, managed by 
Maka Investments. On the completion of construction, 
profits were distributed and the Onabasalu and Huli 
At this time there was no road access to Kutubu (the 
road more or less ended at Margarima) and Kutubu 
was a forgotten and less developed part of Southern 
Highlands. There were few Government services at 
the vestigial Pimaga station and no schools in the 
area other than those run by the APCM (now part of 
Evangelical Church of PNG) and very few individuals 
with any education at all in a population of subsistence 
villagers from the Foe and Fasu ethnic groups. 
Chevron dealt with those few local individuals who 
had received some education – such as the two sons 
of Kapi Nato (Henry and John) from the Fasu village 
of Iorogobaiyu and university student Sosoro Hewago 
from the Foe village of Gesege.
The first company to be set up, touted as the first 
‘umbrella’, was Iagifu Oil and Gas Ltd (IOG) with 
Sosoro Hewago as CEO, with as its shareholders the 
57 (at that time) Fasu ILG’s that had been formed to 
receive the bulk of the statutory benefits from the 
petroleum developments.
The first major project activity was the construction of 
the Kutubu Access Road to join Moro to the Highlands 
Highway at Poroma. A three-way joint venture was 
formed, Kutubu Transport Limited (KTS), between 
IOG, Peripi Development Corporation (Poroma area) 
and Bai Waiba’s Foe Digaso Limited (Foe people)  - 
this purchased plant for hire to the road construction 
contractor.  KTS then joint ventured with Pagini 
Transport to operate a road transport contract for 
services between Lae and Kutubu that operated for 
many years.
This road construction was a lucrative contract and 
when complete Peripi sold out and purchased a 
building in Mendi; the company still exists today (it is 
a shareholder in Trans Wonderland). Foe Digaso also 
sold out and established a sawmill near Tubage along 
the road, that operated for some years before having 
its assets re-possessed by creditors.
IOG at one stage had all the major Chevron Niugini 
operations service contracts – civil works, catering 
and camp management (in joint ventureship with 
Longmont), camp maintenance and also security 
services through a subsidiary Kutubu Security Services 
Ltd (KSS). It had its own large camp at Moro with a 
small group of expatriate supervisors and was a 
profitable operation for some years.
The demise of IOG came about as a result of company 
mismanagement, lack of dividends distribution, lack 
of involvement of emerging, young community 
leaders and a desire from certain of these individuals 
to manage their own enterprises. Over a couple of 
years the service contracts were re-awarded to sub-
regional landowner companies as follows:
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and innumerable meetings and locked up statutory 
royalty and equity dividend benefits in escrow for 
many years before the clans themselves agreed to a 
sharing formula that was passed on to the Government 
and was the basis for a Ministerial Determination 
of same. The competing land claims also impacted 
the structure of the landowner companies formed in 
association with this petroleum development.
Although there are no specific details in the Gobe 
MoA about local business development, Chevron 
Niugini signed an MoU at the same time with the 
Gobe area people that covered various aspects 
of their relationship. With regard to business 
development, it was agreed that there would be 
an umbrella management company that would 
administer a Southern Highlands Project Company 
and a Gulf Project Company. Each of these project 
companies would be owned by clan and sub-clan 
entities (‘clancos’) which, it was thought, would carry 
out contract work. The 1996 MoA (section 5.5) also 
included a State commitment for a payment of K1 
million business seed capital through the landowner 
company management entity. This was the first time 
seed money of this nature was agreed to in the 
petroleum sector.
What actually occurred was the establishment of two 
‘provincial’ companies, owned by smaller clancos, 
who held shares in Gobe Field Engineering Limited 
(GFE) and nominated directors to the GFE Board. 
Almost all contracts available during construction and 
operations were carried out by GFE. Initially during 
operations GFE were awarded contracts for provision 
of security services, catering and camp management, 
civil works and road maintenance.
GFE dividends were paid to its two shareholders, who 
invested them in various ways rather than distributing 
them to their shareholders. Increasing liabilities and 
threatened legal action against Gobe Hongu Ltd 
resulted in GFE buying back some of their shares, 
leaving the company structure as illustrated on the 
following page.
GFE entered into a 3-way joint ventureship with KOI 
and Pagini Holdings to form Gobe Freight Services 
(GFS) to provide a wharfage and trucking service to 
clans incorporated Mananda Umbrella Joint Venture 
Ltd (MUJV), a company that initially had no direct 
contracts from OSL and simply carried out work for 
the Government and other contractors.
8.2.5 Pipeline
The Kutubu PDL 2 MOA agreements also covered 
beneficiaries along the export pipeline PL 2 that 
terminated at the Kumul platform in the Gulf of 
Papua. A landowner company, Kikori Oil Investments 
Limited (KOI), was formed to represent landowners 
from the south bank of the Kaiam crossing of the 
Kikori River to landfall where the pipeline entered 
the river bed between Kopi and Kikori. KOI was 
awarded contracts to manage the Kopi camp and its 
maintenance, maintain an oil spill response team and 
also be involved in the implementation of tax credit 
projects in that part of the Gulf Province.
KOI was initially formed with its shareholding held 
by individual companies representing each ‘tribal’/
language group in the area. These smaller entities 
carried out some minor activities and were involved 
in an unsuccessful joint operatorship to operate Delta 
Stores on Kikori station, which then reverted to its 
previous ownership (John Senior). These smaller 
companies then failed to submit necessary IPA and 
IRC documentation for many years and when it 
was thought that their liabilities could impact KOI 
operations they were dissolved and their shareholding 
transferred to 10 trustees, who also constitute the 
Board of KOI.
It should be noted that Kikori Oil Investments is not 
exempted from the requirement to report to IPA an 
annual independently audited Financial Statement. 
Unfortunately it appears not to have ever done so.
8.2.6 Gobe PDL’s 3 and 4
These licences straddle a number of graticular blocks 
across Gulf and Hela/Southern Highlands provinces 
within which, because of the severe topography, lack 
of surface water or good soil, there were no permanent 
villages. The land was claimed by a number of clans 
whose members were resident outside the PDLs, 
predominantly in villages in the Samberigi valley and 
on the banks of the Kikori River. This ownership dispute 
resulted in two Land Titles Commission (LTC) hearings 
KIKORI OIL INVESTMENTS LTD
 Trustee for Ikobi Kasel Pera Trustee for Rumu Trustee for Kairi Trustee for Kerewo Trustee for Poroma 
 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
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8.2.7 Moran PDL’s 5 and 6
The Moran PDL 5 was the first to be issued under the 
Oil and Gas Act (1998) and whilst this meant that 
the outcome of the Forum discussions was termed 
a Development Agreement rather than an MoA, 
its provisions with regard to business development 
were much the same as previous licence area 
documentation.
Although neither the original 2001, nor the revised 
2005, PDL 5 Development Agreements made 
any specific reference to any LBD grant payment, 
a payment of K1 million was made, although 
inexplicably this was split 50/50 between the Huli 
and Fasu landowner associations representing the 
landowners with an interest in PDL 5, the Homa 
Paua Peoples Association and Apporo’Uri Resource 
Owners Association respectively.
After Moran 1X discovered commercial quantities 
of oil and an extended well test was carried out, an 
extensive and lengthy social mapping exercise was 
carried out in the PDL 5 graticular block to identify 
impacted landowner clans. Despite the Huli multiple 
the petroleum operators between Kopi wharf and 
Gobe. GFS has been consistently profitable and when 
it was decided to buy-out Pagini, the shareholding 
changed and also incorporated minor shareholders 
– Bogasi Investments (owned by a Gobe landowner 
leaders’ clan) and Parauki Investments (owned by a 
Rumu landowner leader’s clan).
When the State agreed to fund the construction of a 
road to join Samberigi station to the Kutubu Pipeline 
Access Track just north of the Kaiam crossing, 
construction of the first section was carried out by an 
established civil contractor. Subsequent sections were 
constructed gradually as State funding was irregularly 
released by Civpac Limited, a 50/50 joint venture 
between GFE and Bogasi Investments, an Imawe 
Bogasi clan company. In 2012/13 GFE sold its share 
in Civpac. 
Although one of the smaller companies in the Gobe 
area, Gobe Catering Services is not exempted from the 
requirement to submit independently audited annual 
reports to IPA – probably because originally it was a 
joint venture with a foreign company. It submitted an 
audited FS for 2012 in late 2013.
Gobe Field Engineering: Shareholding Structure
Note: All shareholders of Gulf Oil Company Ltd and Gobe Hongu Ltd are incorporated clan landowner companies. GFE was 
originally 70/30, Gulf Oil and Gobe Hongu but in 2001 by mutual agreement of the Board of GFE, 30% of the shares of Gobe 
Hongu were re-purchased and allocated to identified SHP clan trustees.
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shareholders belonging to clans in that particular 
area. Whilst on the face of it sharing of interests is 
geographically based, it also reflects an alignment and 
accommodation of local clan politics, albeit under the 
chairmanship of Tony Kila.
MIN (along with MDC) received seed capital funds 
from PNG LNG for business development as a result 
of the UBSA/LBBSA deliberations and used this to 
purchase some items of equipment. MIN has been 
awarded some contract work by OSL, principally road 
maintenance and the company has been involved in 
road construction for the Kutubu LLG SPA.
and overlapping mosaic land tenure system this 
exercise identified 12 major Huli clans with an interest 
in the block, along with Fasu clan interests and some 
areas of dispute.
Prior to payment of statutory benefits other disputant 
clan and sub-clan claimants lodged their interests 
with the State and there are now approximately 
60-70 beneficiary entities for the ministerially-
determined 90% Huli and 10% Fasu landowner 
benefits. However, in terms of business development 
the Fasu clans were affiliated with Maka Investments 
and the 12 Huli clans became the share classes in a 
PDL 5 representative Moran Huli company, Moran 
Development Corporation Limited (MDC). 
Prior to the incorporation of MDC there had been 
some other Moran Huli companies, notably Paua 
Natural Resources, with Tony Kila as its principal 
and the Moran Road Company, formed to enable 
landowners to be involved in the construction of the 
Tubage to Paua road. Neither company lasted very 
long due to mismanagement and leakage of funds.  
MDC was constituted with 12 share classes, each 
representing a major clan group whose individual 
members could buy shares in the appropriate share 
class and elect their director to the Board. MDC was 
never awarded a service contract but participated in 
some extremely lucrative civil construction contracts 
associated with the development of the Moran 
project roads, facilities and rig sites. Underlying 
inter-clan rivalry and involvement of directors in 
operational aspects of the operations, non-payment of 
lease company creditors, combined with ineffective 
management resulted in the financial demise of MDC, 
although the start of PNG LNG construction provided 
an income for some of its plant and it now operates at 
a low level for the benefit of a few individuals.
The declaration of the PDL 6 licence introduced 
a number of new Moran area landowning clans. 
Although oil production from this block from the NW 
Moran well was extremely small, this did not stop 
incorporation of many small companies associated 
with particular individuals, as occurred after PDL 
5 was awarded. More recently the construction of 
the PNG LNG pipeline between Hides and Kutubu 
introduced more affected Moran area Huli clans from 
the north-west and south-east of the PDL blocks.
This situation, plus the effective demise and local 
politics surrounding MDC, led to the establishment 
of another representative company, Moran Ina Naga 
Limited (MIN). The structure of MIN is supposed to 
be inclusive, with a quarter of the shareholding held 
by respective ‘regional’ companies, including MDC 
for PDL 5, each of which would have individual 
8.2.8 Payments by OSL
The graph above shows payments made by OSL 
to geographical clusters of Lancos fulfilling OSL 
contracts over the ten years 2004 to 2013. The figures 
shown are gross incomes derived from OSL-direct 
contracted work. Several of the Lancos that compose 
the geographical areas shown also have investment 
properties that generate incomes, some carry out 
work for other companies (including companies that 
are major contractors to OSL) and some do work 
for government.  Within the geographical groups 
some companies, Civpac or Moran Development 
Corporation, have fallen by the wayside over the 
years whilst others have arisen, including Kutmor, the 
Mananda Umbrella JV, Moran Ina Naga and, most 
notably, Trans Wonderland. 
Many of the individual companies continue to take 
on OSL contracts while also having undertaken major 
work under the PNG LNG project’s major contractors 
– but the latter payments are not included here. A total 
of K1.3 billion worth of OSL contracts are covered 
in the ten years shown with contracts in 2013 being 
worth more than K218m.  
Figure 14: Payments by OSL to Lancos 2002-2013.
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whereas all Hides Gas Development shares were 
to be held by Hides clans. The approach adopted 
by ExxonMobil for the PNG LNG Project has been 
somewhat different. 
8.3 The Gas Project (PNG LNG) and LBD 
innovations
8.3.1 Innovations introduced by ExxonMobil
8.3.1.1 A really big project: The agreement to proceed 
with the PNG LNG project led to a very large increase 
in the extent of investment in the oil/gas region in a 
single stroke. It was not just a project spending tens 
of billions of kina but one that required integrated 
and carefully scheduled and planned development. 
The scale of that planning by ExxonMobil outshone 
anything that had gone before in the resource industry 
in PNG. It is true that the funds available made 
possible the implementation of schemes (such as the 
refurbishment of training facilities in Port Moresby or 
the funding of the Business Enterprise Centre) that the 
resources of even the biggest mining projects would 
have been stretched to rival and that smaller mining 
companies cannot hope to emulate even in a watered-
down form. 
But the PNG LNG project implementation was not 
simply a matter of throwing money at problems but 
setting up new approaches to and structures for LBD 
which were extraordinarily innovative. Whether or 
not they worked well or not is difficult to judge at this 
point in  time, first, because PNG LNG-recognised 
Lancos were awash with cash during construction 
(now ended) and second, because they have only 
been operating a relatively short time (four or five 
years). However, they certainly worked well enough 
to ensure that shipments of gas are now taking place.  
Just prior to the start of construction of the LNG 
Project, its developers issued their ‘National Content 
Plan’ (NCP) which laid out the company’s intentions in 
terms of hiring and training of Papua New Guineans, 
of encouraging both local (impact area51) and Papua 
New Guinean companies to supply the project 
with goods and services and of making ‘strategic’ 
community investments. It was a commitment to 
the development of PNG businesses on a scale no 
preceding project had attempted. The document 
estimated that at the peak of the construction period, 
roughly 12,000 jobs would be created (of which up 
to 3,500 – or about 28% - would be held by PNG 
citizens)[page 15, NCP];  that business opportunities 
to the value of K1.26 billion over the whole of the 
8.2.9 Lessons from OSL for all resource companies
All companies in this study were approached in the 
same way with a request for assistance in terms of:
a) Recent overall payments to Lancos
b) Comments on Lanco performance
c) Company policies in relation to Lancos.
OSL was able to supply all this information in a matter 
of two days and much more besides. They have a full 
record of annual payments to all Lancos dating back 
to 2003; not only do they have full details on the 
origins and skill levels of all workers in every Lanco 
contracted to them but are able to provide forecasts 
of employment for each company three months in 
advance. Whilst it seems likely that Lihir Business 
Services might be in a position also to state the 
situation of Lihir Lancos in this respect (but did not 
make such data available for this study) OSL was the 
only company able to summarise for every one of its 
contracted Lancos their compliance status in regard to 
IRC, IPA, governance and financial reporting issues, 
NASFUND and insurance matters. It was of interest 
that in supplying this information OSL commented 
‘not such a pretty picture….a situation we are 
addressing at present’. But the fact is that OSL is the 
only company in the survey in a position to know 
what the ‘picture’ is and why it ‘is not a pretty one’ 
(and to admit this deficiency publicly).
Oil Search has, more than any other company in the 
resource sector, had a direct, hands-on approach 
to LBD which has set a standard in the degree of 
assistance they have provided to Lancos, by means 
of management guidance, which has proved very 
effective in many ways. In one important way, it 
appears not to have been effective: it has never been 
able to establish an overarching umbrella company 
for its Lancos and one of the effects of this will be 
discussed later. Nevertheless, it has established 
companies and often placed one of its own employees 
in the CEO position or as a director until such time as 
it has been adjudged that such direct representation 
is not required (other forms of direct influence being 
available). For example, when Trans Wonderland was 
incorporated (in September 2002) one of its senior CA 
officers, Larry Andagali was placed in charge of it; he 
still runs it (and other major companies), though has 
long since resigned from his OSL position. Moreover, 
when the shareholding clans were being lined up 
for ownership of Trans Wonderland, OSL managed 
to arrange matters so that shareholding in the new 
company was restricted so that part of its shares were 
to be held by Hides clans and part by Kutubu clans, 
51   The impact area covered all Gas Development Licence areas plus any area within 5km of any pipeline or project facility linked to a pipeline 
when such an area fell outside a PDL; this meant that most of the areas under Petroleum Development Leases - in which Lancos had been 
developed under OSL – now were incorporated under ExxonMobil’s LBD plans. 
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• Maka Investment Corporation
• Kutubu Transport Ltd and Trans Wonderland
• Kutubu Catering Ltd
• Kawaso Ltd
• Yiamo Gira Investments [as per map in NCP p.33]
• Gobe Field Engineering
• Gobe Freight Services
• Kikori Oil Investment
To these companies the NCP added two completely 
new ones: Hides Gas Development Company (which 
became the representative replacement company for 
a swarm of Lancos that had developed earlier in the 
Hides area under, first, BP and later OSL) and Laba 
Holdings (the latter being the Representative Lanco 
for the Port Moresby area villagers, owners of land 
for project sites around the capital). Several of the 
companies that were to participate in the PNG LNG 
project, therefore, were already established ones that 
had grown up under BP, Oil Search and Chevron – and 
several had ongoing contracts with Oil Search.  It is 
important to note that while all these companies had 
work with ExxonMobil, most of them also continued 
to have work with OSL; the payments made by OSL, 
described earlier, are separate from those made by 
PNG LNG. 
The NCP took an original approach to LBD: effectively, 
it passed on the responsibility for such development 
to its major contractors:
  ‘The Company will provide opportunities 
to Representative Lancos in the Project 
Impact Area and help them to develop 
into sustainable businesses where possible 
by requiring EPC Contractors to use 
Representative	 Lancos	 to	 perform	 specified	
services for them and to take the lead role 
in the formation of a suitable business 
structure. …. EPC Contractors will also be 
directed to work with Representative Lancos 
to implement capacity building programs….
The exact nature of the business relationship 
will	be	developed	by	the	EPC	Contractor	(or,	
if	the	Contractor	chooses,	its	subcontractor)	
and the Representative Lanco on an 
individual	basis.’
Given its size, its world wide contracts and its 
relationships with major contractors in the hydrocarbon 
project construction business, ExxonMobil was, 
four year construction period and roughly K200m in 
every year of the 30 year production period would 
be made available; and that K14 million annually, in 
both construction and operating periods would be 
invested in community infrastructure. 
In fact, the peak employment of the project was 
reached in the fourth quarter of 2012 at 21,200 of 
whom approximately 9,700 (or about 46%) were 
PNGns and of these about 6,800 were ‘sourced 
through Lancos’. Thus actual employment greatly 
exceeded the forecasts made in 2009. This was also 
the case in terms of the value of project-generated 
business accruing to PNG businesses. The numbers 
cited in the previous paragraph (and the NCP itself) 
did not distinguish between ‘local’ and ‘nationwide’ 
businesses52. However, as construction was ending 
at the end of March 2014, the value of contracts 
actually awarded to PNG businesses since 2009 
had reached K13.35 billion (US$5.5bn) of which 
K2.64bn (US$1.1bn), or K600m a year, had gone to 
Lancos owned by people in the Project Impact Areas. 
The actual value of Project business generated was, 
therefore, many times the 2009 estimate (and many 
times the value of business enjoyed by Lancos in most 
mining project areas).  
8.3.1.2 Support structures for LBD – the role given to 
contractors: ExxonMobil paid considerable attention 
to the planning of its support structures for local 
business development; even if they had the advantage 
over most other companies covered in this report of 
being able to learn from earlier experience in this field, 
it should be stated that in this respect their plans on 
paper were clearly stated and more comprehensive 
than any of those produced by their predecessors. 
PNG LNG largely operates in the same geographic 
areas as Oil Search had done earlier (and continues to 
do). Consequently, it inherited a shared responsibility 
for many Lancos – what ExxonMobil generally refers 
to as Representative Lancos (rather than ‘umbrella 
companies’) from the earlier oil operations and earlier 
attempts at gas commercialisation (under Chevron). In 
these cases ‘representative’ appears a more appropriate 
descriptor than ‘umbrella’ since the protective aspect 
of umbrella companies was to be provided by 
ExxonMobil major contractors, not ExxonMobil itself, 
whilst the Lancos cover a wide variety of different 
groups. The Representative Companies were listed in 
the NCP as:
• Moran Development Corporation
• Kutubu Security Services
52   While the definition of a ‘representative Lanco’ in the NCP was relatively unambiguous (a company which the LNG Project had determined 
to be pre-qualified to provide supplies and services to the Project whose shareholders represented the broader community in the Project 
Impact Areas), that of a Lanco is distinctly opaque and imprecise (‘a company registered in PNG with the intent of doing business, owned 
by the people of the same clan or clan origin, or owned by a group of clans, who use and/or have title to land in a specific area’). 
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companies for what contracts are available, obviously 
has the potential to create interesting times in the 
immediate future.    
8.3.1.3 The Business Enterprise Centre: ExxonMobil 
generously funded this centre based in Port Moresby at 
what was originally the Bankers College as a training, 
monitoring and evaluation centre for Lancos. Although 
intended for PNG LNG Representative Lancos, other 
‘relevant PNG businesses’ can make use of the 
Centre’s services ‘as required’. All companies wishing 
to work on the PNG LNG project were assessed on 
the basis of their performance to date in the areas of:
• Organisation and governance
• Business management
• Finance
• Personnel
• Safety, Health and Environment
• Quality
• Equipment
• Citizenship and Reputation
On this basis they were classed as unclassified, 
one-star, two-star or three-star businesses. Feedback 
was provided to show how each might improve its 
performance. In turn, contracts offered by the PNG 
LNG project through its Contractors were identified 
as applicable to one-star, two-star or three-star 
companies, thus giving not only the opportunity for 
Lancos to improve but the incentive also, since work 
with more stars was more extensive.
With its training, assessment and business assistance 
services the Business Enterprise Centre effectively 
took on for the LNG project many of the capacity 
building functions imagined (but never realised 
except possibly at Lihir) for an ‘umbrella company’. 
With the end of the first and most important phase of 
PNG LNG construction in early 2014, the end of the 
agreement under which PNG LNG funds the BEC is 
approaching.  Clearly this could become a national 
resource for all infant and growing PNG businesses 
even if its fee structure when working with PNG LNG 
might have to be adjusted downwards for the general 
run of companies. 
8.3.1.4 Links to PNG financing institutions: The LNG 
project has been (so far53) unlike many of the previous 
mining project in another respect: it has, like them, 
stated that ‘it will not be directly involved in providing 
or guaranteeing loans to PNG businesses’ but, unlike 
almost all of them, has not (yet) had to quietly eat its 
theoretically, in a position no mining company in PNG 
has ever been in: its contractors were aware that their 
overall, ongoing relationship with ExxonMobil could 
be negatively affected were they not to successfully 
facilitate LBD for their client in the PNG LNG project. 
The recognition by ExxonMobil of the need to control 
and pass responsibility onto contractors was at a level 
not seen before in PNG’s resource industries; and it 
was most welcome since when one tries to examine 
a large range of issues in the sector, one can trace 
them back originally to the actions of contractors who 
are no longer around and who did not pay the same 
careful attention to community relations that their 
employer, the resource company itself, was trying to 
apply to such matters. It is not clear how this strategy 
of ExxonMobil  worked in detail; overall, combined 
with the other components of it to be described 
shortly, it obviously worked rather well insofar as 
the construction of the project was done efficiently 
and on time. However, interviews suggested that at 
least some Lancos felt that in terms of their capacity 
building, the EPC contractors (and sub-contractors) 
did little to assist them in capacity building. 
This indirect approach to LBD on ExxonMobil’s part 
was not always exercised through its EPC contractors. 
In the northern section of the fields, around Hides, 
it dealt directly with the Hides Gas Development 
Company, which effectively acted as an umbrella 
company in that area. In doing this HGDC is one of 
the best examples across PNG’s resource sector of a so 
far not mentioned use of umbrella companies – it, like 
almost all other such companies, may protect smaller 
local Lancos from the rigours of the free market but 
it definitely protects the resource company from the 
rigours of dealing with lots of landowners who want to 
be businesspeople. Such a structure directs would-be 
entrepreneurs towards the umbrella company rather 
than the resource company.   
Once construction was completed, the ExxonMobil-
led project was to take over from its EPC Contractors 
and ’likewise meet the requirements of Section 129 
of PNG’s Oil and Gas Act and will continue capacity 
building activities’ (NCP 5.2.4). This phase is now 
underway. This presents a situation of some interest 
because many Lancos have contract work with both 
OSL and with the PNG LNG project, yet these two 
companies have very different approaches to LBD – 
one very much hands-on and one, until now, hands-off. 
This, added to the challenges that are already arising 
in terms of a steep reduction in the value of PNG LNG 
contracts and the universal tendency for individuals 
to challenge the bigger multi-clan representative 
53   It is necessary to add this qualifier since a) the construction years have been prosperous ones for the Lancos b) the really testing times for 
their resiliency are only now beginning as contract values decline sharply and c) it is still rather early days in the life of the LNG Project.
Page 74 Resource Project LANCOS
more than half the hydrocarbon Lancos, spread over 
rather large geographical areas. In this regard, these 
Lancos are distinctly different from the overwhelming 
majority of Lancos in the metal mining project areas. 
Such a spread of company control has the theoretical 
advantage of making it more difficult for a small 
group of closely related individuals of one ethnic 
group keeping business benefits for themselves. But 
it also has the disadvantage (in view of the empirical 
evidence of what has tended to happen at almost all 
resource project sites in PNG) of potentially leading 
to the break-up of such broad-based Lancos, both on 
ethnic lines but also – possibly – as ILGs are overtaken 
by individualisation and groups revert to clans, then 
sub-clans, then houselines, and then individuals 
within single families. 
In contrast to the companies with very widespread 
shareholdings, a significant minority of hydrocarbon 
Lancos still have only a single shareholder (or a 
small handful of shareholders) – even though their 
arrangements for directorships indicate that they are 
intended, like the other Lancos, to represent large 
numbers of different groups of people. In view of 
events elsewhere in the resource industry relating to 
Lanco ownership, it would seem advisable that such 
arrangements be phased out as soon as possible.
8.3.1.8 Government support for business: While the 
formal rules governing how a hydrocarbon resource 
project Development Forum shall be run (section 48 
of the Oil and Gas Act) mention a location for the 
Forum close to the project area, it was at Kokopo in 
East New Britain that agreement was reached on the 
future distribution of benefits from the LNG Project – 
the ‘Umbrella Benefits Sharing Agreement’. Item 6e) of 
that Agreement specified that ‘an amount of Kina 120 
million [shall be] made available to assist landowner 
companies in business development activities in 
accordance with guidelines to be developed by the 
NEC and Section 171 of the [Oil and Gas] Act54.’ This 
generosity was unprecedented (other than in respect 
of the 1 million seed money provided by the 1996 
MoA for Gobe PDLs 3 and 4). Item 10(1) made the 
more normal general statements concerning the State’s 
‘best endeavours’ but went further in ‘ensuring’ that:
•  Lancos already working in the LNG area would 
be helped to participate in business opportunities;
•  The project would ‘create business opportunities 
for project area landowners’ not already in 
business….
words as leading Lancos teeter on the edge of failure. 
Its staff have worked closely with a range of lending 
institutions in PNG to find the best ways of financing 
Lancos – and to date this has been successful. 
8.3.1.5 Long-distance downstream links:  Ok Tedi 
has found itself (accidentally) with an impact area 
(and thus a need to consider LBD in that area) much 
greater than it ever planned for; Porgera’s access via 
the Highlands Highway was, from the start of the 
project, a reason why the company has supported 
LBD especially in Laiagam and Enga. Lihir is fortunate 
in this regard – other than giving some minor support 
to LBD on New Ireland it has had no strategic need 
to support LBD other than on Lihir itself. But the 
LNG Project, not only depends, like Porgera, on the 
Highlands Highway for supplies, also pipes its gas for 
processing to Port Moresby. Hence its formal, planned 
support for business extends over a very wide area, 
from Hides to Port Moresby, with less formal support 
also being provided from Hides to Lae.
8.3.1.6 Multiple ethnicities of affected peoples: 
Business structures associated with the LNG Project 
have had to take into account the fact that people of 
different ethnic backgrounds have been recognised as 
having overlapping or shared claims in gas discovery 
areas and, even more certainly, along pipeline routes. 
Although individuals have sought out their own 
business opportunities independently of other ethnic 
groups, the formal approach to LBD has been to 
develop companies with shareholders and directors 
of multiple ethnicities. It is too early as yet to say 
whether or not such arrangements will last, but they 
have served until now. 
8.3.1.7 Arranging shareholdings: Closely related to 
the immediately preceding point, it has been a feature 
of the oil and gas field developments that the Oil and 
Gas Act has specific reference to ‘social mapping’ in 
ways that the Mining Act  does not;  this is the case even 
though the pioneer in – indeed inventor of – social 
mapping, John Burton, spent most of his time in impact 
assessment and monitoring of metal mining projects 
in PNG and that the oil field studies of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s were  largely undertaken by disciples 
of the concept of incorporated land groups (ILG) - a 
concept developed originally in the East Sepik by Tony 
Power. Certainly, the focus of work on social mapping 
in both the original Oil Search era, then the Chevron 
gas-to-Australia period and now the LNG Project has 
been strongly oriented towards the identification and 
recognition of ILGs. This has spilled over into LBD in 
the form of very large numbers of shareholders in rather 
54   Section 171 allows the State to provide to landowners on operational licence areas any additional funds from Consolidated Revenue as it 
thinks appropriate providing that – as constrained under Section c174 of the same Act – the total benefits paid out to landowners does not 
exceed 20% of the net benefits of the relevant project to the State. 
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in other debtors and prepayments in the 
accounts. We were not able to establish 
the completeness and recoverability of 
this amount as we were not provided with 
any supporting documents and break up 
of the amount as to who owes the money 
to the company.
 2.  Direct BDG Expenditures of K1,300,000  
were made during the year. We were not 
able to establish the validity of these 
payments due to a lack of supporting 
documentation and explanation on the 
expenditures……’
It is at least some credit to this company that its CEO, 
as well as the Chairman of its Board, had already been 
replaced even before the auditor made these remarks. 
There is, at least in this case, clear evidence of 
irregularities in the use of BDG funds and it is highly 
probable that more extensive misuse did indeed occur. 
The Department of Trade, Commerce and Industry 
informed this study that one of the conditions attached 
to the BDG was that the use to which such funds had 
been put would be audited by that Department’s 
officers. That review has not yet occurred. 
The second point arising is that this K120m subsidy 
needs to be deducted from the total of net assets of the 
oil/gas Lancos, when – at some future date – up-to-
date statements of their assets and liabilities are lodged 
with the IPA, if a true estimate of the effectiveness of 
asset accumulation by such Lancos is to be arrived at.
8.4 Payments by the LNG Project
As noted earlier between 2009 and March 2014, the 
PNG LNG Project on average was awarding contracts 
worth K600m annually to local Lancos. Unfortunately, 
ExxonMobil was unable to provide data, comparable 
to that provided by OSL, relating to the payments the 
project made to specific Lancos, citing ‘commercial 
confidentiality’ and pointing out, correctly, that their 
quarterly reports do provide detailed information on 
payments to lancos overall. However, the end result 
is that whilst we have the payments made by OSL to 
individual Lancos, comparable data is not available 
for LNG project companies (other than Oil Search). 
8.5 Lanco performance
8.5.1 Assessment difficulties
The great majority of Lancos at all resource projects 
have been dilatory in making ARs to IPA. Those in 
the hydrocarbons sector are no worse than their 
counterparts in the metal mining project areas in 
this respect. However, when this factor is taken 
•  …. and for ‘any umbrella project area companies’.
In short – everyone with a wish to be in business 
would be catered for, a policy so open-ended as to 
challenge prudence.
In a public statement made by the then Minister for 
Petroleum and Energy, William Duma, in April 2010, 
it was observed that:
  ‘The government is obligated to ensure that 
all the K120 million allocated for business 
development grants (BDG) are disbursed to 
all PNG LNG Project area licences.
  The BDG available to each licence area is as 
follows:
 Hides PDL 1 K20m
 Kutubu PDL2 K10m
 Gobe PDLs 3 and 4 K8.2m
 Central Moran PDL 5 K6m
 NW Moran PDL 6 K4m
 South Hides PDL 7 K15m
 Angore PDL 8 K12m
 Juha PDL 9 K11m
 LNG Pipeline K16.128m
 LNG Plant K17.472m  
  The DPE [Department of Petroleum and 
Energy] anticipates that the State will pay out 
100% LBD grant to successful companies 
vetted by it. As construction has already 
started and Portion 152 landowners [i.e. 
plant site landowners] have already received 
20%	of	 their	 LBD	Grant,	 it	 is	only	 fair	 that	
those who have yet to receive the funds must 
get it immediately to fund their companies to 
participate in spin-off business opportunities 
provided	by	the	LNG	project.’
Two points arise from this generosity on the part of the 
State. First, it is widely – if usually privately – alleged 
that these funds were frequently misused and that for 
many ‘Lancos’ the sole purpose of being recognised 
by the State as an approved Lanco eligible to receive 
part of the BDG was to receive that grant – not to do 
any business. Because relatively few of the companies 
receiving the BDGs have submitted ARs to IPA since 
the disbursements of the grants, and even fewer have 
submitted independently audited returns,  it is not 
clear whether these allegations are justified whether 
in terms of limited or of widespread abuse of these 
funds. However, in the one independently audited 
AR available to this study of a Lanco which was a 
recipient of a BDG payment, its auditor commented:
	 ‘Qualified	Opinion
	 1.		The	company	has	an	amount	of	K1,763,777	
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noticeably improved by the middle of 2015; and it 
would be worthwhile revisiting this issue then. What 
follows are, at best, stop gap comments.    
As of the end of 2011, the two most important Lancos 
in the area were Hides Gas Development and Trans 
Wonderland, the former the ‘representative’ company 
established for the LNG Project in the Hides/Angore 
area, the latter the transport company put in place 
originally by OSL staff to ensure that the majority of the 
benefits flowing from the transportation of construction 
goods from Lae to site would end up in the hands of 
landowner companies. Because road access to the 
gas fields was restricted to the Highlands Highway 
from Lae, Trans Wonderland is the only significant 
hydrocarbon Lanco based in that city. In this respect, 
its location brings it into direct competition not only 
with the IPI trucking subsidiary and the transportation 
JV established by Hidden Valley’s NKW, but also with 
older established trucking firms which have long 
used Lae as their base. Having established a good 
working relationship with the LNG project and having 
into account we have no direct or even indirect 
means of knowing what revenues were received by 
those companies that have never submitted (or, in 
most cases, never had to submit) an audited annual 
financial statement. Of the sixteen Lancos shown in 
Appendix A which were established (or only started 
operations in any significant way) after the PNG LNG 
Project was decided upon, eight have never submitted 
even an Annual Return, while five of the remainder 
submitted an AR just as they were commencing 
operations and had neither assets nor liabilities. Even 
for the three that did submit ARs/FSs we know that 
their assets have grown since the last submission. So, 
this means that the oil/gas Lanco ARs of 2009, 2010 
and in a few cases 2011 available on the IPA website 
are of very little use. Very little worthwhile analysis 
can be presented here in view of these facts. If (and 
this is a rather large ‘if’) the companies associated 
primarily with the PNG LNG Project take any notice 
of the IPA’s campaign (commenced in mid-October 
2014) to push all companies in PNG to ensure that 
their ARs are up-to-date, then this situation may be 
Figure 15: Shareholdings of smaller Lancos in the two leading PNG LNG Representative Companies.
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exempt category. Of these, one, Kutubu Transport, is 
predominantly owned by non-local interests while 
another, Kikori Oil and Gas, although required to 
produce Financial Statements has not done so (if 
the IPA records are correct). Conversely, one exempt 
company, Laba Holdings, has produced (although 
it need not do so) independently audited Financial 
Statements.
Laba Holdings: Wisely, and like many of the larger 
hydrocarbon Lancos, Laba Holdings (LH) has its own 
constitution. It was established in June 2009 and is 
owned by the four companies set up by four Motuan 
villages around Port Moresby on whose land gas 
conversion plants and export loading facilities have 
been constructed: Boera, Papa, Lea Lea and Porebada. 
Each of the village companies, which were established 
in 2009 on the basis of ILGs and/or clans/subclans, 
holds one share and appoints two directors to LH. 
Only one of them (Papa Resources Development) has 
submitted any AR to IPA, in that one case for each of the 
three years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Laba Holdings has 
been provided with a series of loans from (or through 
the facilitations of) the LNG consortium which, at the 
end of 2011, amounted to K9.8m. Like all but one 
of the companies shown in Table 10 (below), Laba 
Holdings has invoked subsection 3 of Section 212 of 
the Companies Act so as not to reveal some items of 
financial interest; these include the fees and expenses 
of its directors. 
Given that its shareholding villages all hold land in 
prime locations around the country’s capital, LH has 
a double advantage: it has the support of the LNG 
project and is well placed to capitalise on that 
assistance within the wider commercial markets 
of Port Moresby where, unlike any other Lanco, its 
shareholders own large tracts of land. However, its 
commercial ventures to date (in catering and security 
services) have been neither noticeably different to 
those taken up by almost all Lancos across the country 
and nor had they, by the end of 2011 at least, been 
especially profitable. LH paid out in 2011 one of 
the largest dividends of any Lanco (K4m) when net 
assets totalled only a little more than K5m. This may 
reflect a need to hold the company’s constituent 
shareholders together. There is some pressure from at 
least one of the villages at present to break away from 
the major company. In other words the tendencies 
to fragmentation experienced at all sites may be 
beginning to appear in this carefully constructed 
Lanco.
Gigira Development Corporation: several aspects of 
this company were dealt with earlier. It was previously 
the dominant Lanco in the Hides/Angore area but has 
lost that status now. The figures in the table below refer 
only to years 2010 and 2011 (because these were the 
developed a high profile nationally (as IPI has from 
Porgera) gives Trans Wonderland an edge over these 
pre-existing rivals.
8.5.2 Sunset clauses for local preferences
This raises an issue that applies to all of the larger 
Lancos that have succeeded in expanding into areas 
beyond their original resource project’s impact 
area: should there be a sunset clause in preferential 
treatment of project Lancos? This study has only come 
across one serious attempt by a resource company to 
consider this question openly. The ‘Back to Basics’ 
program at Ok Tedi in 2006 specifically suggested that 
the periods of guidance for Lancos should be strictly 
limited to a set number of years. 
This proposal did not proceed very far partly because 
it was made when OTML was planning for a final mine 
closure five years later in 2011. No other example 
of inserting ‘sunset clauses’ into Lanco planning has 
been encountered.
Without the edge given to local companies by 
preferential LBD clauses at the start of any project, it 
is highly improbable that the populations of project 
areas could ever aspire to build companies that could 
provide resource projects with services and companies 
that would provide those populations with additional 
project benefits. But, it is still worth considering the 
question: for how long should such preferences be in 
force or should they be open-ended?
Should preference clauses apply to local companies 
that perform poorly or even fail? Clearly, in practice 
the answer to this question is ‘yes, in the early years 
of operation’ since both Anitua (in its previous form 
of Lakaka) and IPI have had to be rescued. How 
many times should such companies be rescued – 
Cloudlands was let go by OTML and SMIHL, founded 
only a decade ago is following the same path. 
The question takes on sharper focus when Lancos 
expand beyond their original starting point as IPI, 
Anitua and Trans Wonderland (and others) have 
done. Then they start competing with companies with 
no such company preference/subsidy. The present 
study has no definitive recommendation to make on 
this issue other than that the sorts of limitations on 
preferential treatment of Lancos discussed in OTML’s 
earlier ‘Back to Basics’ paper need wider discussion.
8.5.3 Performance up to the end of 2011
8.5.3.1 Non-exempt companies and companies 
with audited FS: One of the largest (and most 
important) Lancos, Hides Gas Development, is an 
exempt company and therefore does not produce 
independently audited statements; it is considered 
in the next section.  Only six Lancos are in the non-
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labour hire, security, property investments, 
investments in the leading Lancos, projects funded 
by the Asian Development Bank (all mildly profitable, 
all the ‘normal’ sort of Lanco ventures and all based 
on activities inside the Hides area), sawmilling, coffee 
buying, drilling, trade in Lae and a joint venture 
with Kurumbukari landowners at Ramu NiCo (all 
unprofitable and nearly all involving GDC having 
links with businesses beyond Hides). Its most recent 
venture – a lodge for truck drivers along the Highway 
to Lae - is currently being developed.
Gobe Catering:   In contrast to GDC, Gobe Catering 
has a single activity – remote site catering in joint 
venture with P & O and Gulf Oil. In recent years (or 
at least in 2011 and 2012) it made small losses for its 
Gobe Hongu shareholders. Gobe Hongu itself is one 
of the earlier Lancos being established in 1996; it ran 
into trouble quickly and a liquidator was appointed 
in 2001. The process of liquidation was opposed by 
the shareholders who in August 2004 obtained a court 
decision to cease liquidation (when the company’s 
remaining assets were still in the black, at nearly 
half a million kina). However, Gobe Hongu has not 
submitted any ARs to IPA since then so its overall 
health cannot be assessed.  Gobe Catering itself was 
barely surviving when its last AR was submitted. 
last years for which an audited financial statement 
for the company was lodged with IPA). Because the 
company’s income from OSL doubled between 2011 
and 2012 and rose again in 2013, the concerns it 
raises should be tempered by the knowledge that 
trading conditions have improved since the figures 
shown in Table 10 were compiled.
It is fortunate that conditions did improve since by 
the end of 2011 the company’s net asset value and 
retained earnings were nearing zero, the dividend 
paid was miniscule, and approximately K3m of its net 
assets was in the form of monies owed by debtors in 
such poorly documented form that the auditors had 
to mention them as a ‘qualification’ to their audit. 
Yet, in that year, directors almost doubled their fees 
and expenses (even if, it should be added, those fees 
and expenses totalled around US$10,000 per head 
only55). New management has since been installed. 
The situation in which GDC found itself in 2011 left it 
with few options but to cut back its workforce; while 
it reported, in its 2011 AR, having 250 workers, it 
currently (October 2014) has only 50. Indeed it could 
now more or less qualify as an exempt company.
GDC has made extensive efforts to diversify its sources 
of income: it has interests in camp management, 
55   At least GDC did audit its books and did submit the rather negative audit report to IPA indicating the auditor’s qualifications and the fees 
the company paid to its directors – no other company in the table did the last of these.

Revenue 
(K’Million)
Year/ 
Company
OSL Total % 
OSL
Directors Gifts Dividends 
      Kina
Fees/ 
Expenses 
per 
Director
After 
tax 
profit/ 
loss
Assets 
K’Million
Liabilities 
K’Million
Net 
Assets 
K’Milli
on
Retained 
Earnings 
K’Million
Gigira Development Corporation
2010 6.35 6.7 95% 14 33750 408563 12304 -
0.58mK
18.9 14.8 4.1 2.5
2011 3.51 4.6 76% 14 25680 1043 23698 -
2.39mK
15.3 13.4 1.9 0.3
Laba Holdings
2010 Nil 11.3 Nil 9 NS 0 0 13 13.1 -0.1 -0.1
2011 Nil 44.9 Nil 9 NS 4000000
S212 
invoked 5.3mK 26.5 21.2 5.3 5.2
Trans Wonderland
2010 50.3 81.7 62% 10 NS 500000 8.5mK 59 46.7 12.3 10.6
2011 53.2 92.9 57% 10 NS 1700000
S212 
invoked 14.7mK 96 70.2 25.8 23.6
Gobe Catering
2011 4.4 4.9 90% 2* NS Nil -
K75739
2.4 1.7 0.7 0.7
2012 5.2 6 86% 2* NS 145000
S212 
invoked
-K2799 3.1 2.3 0.8 0.7
Kutubu Catering
2009 19.0 31.6 60% 6 Nil 500000 2.5mK 11.4 6.3 5.1 5.1
2010 20.4 36.9 55% 6 Nil 102410
S212 
Invoked^ 2.7mK 15.2 7.4 7.7 7.7

Table 10: Financial data for oil/gas non-exempt companies, various dates
Note: * According to the AR there are 6 directors [3 PNGns 3 Expatriates]. The AR and FS for 2012 disagree as to the ownership 
of the company. ^ Notwithstanding this, the FS shows directors’ fees (not expenses) as K10,107 per head in 2009 and K5,714 
in 2010.
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provisions of Trans Wonderland whereby every 
shareholder, regardless of the number of shares 
she/he holds, has one vote and whereby each 
share class (which is based on geography and 
group membership) elects its own director and 
can hold its own AGM.
•  TWL sets aside 5% of its profits for the support of 
the community through churches, youth groups 
and community investments.  Again, this is seen 
as a smart way of combining the need for strict 
adherence to governing the Lanco under universal 
rules of best practice with the expectations of 
the community (and what most of the rest of the 
world in recent years has chosen to call corporate 
social responsibility).
8.5.3.2 Exempt companies: Of the companies in 
Appendix A which have, in essence, been founded 
to cater for the PNG LNG Project, eight had never, 
when this study was being undertaken, submitted any 
AR to IPA. Consequently nothing can be said of these 
eight companies. Four more PNG LNG-associated 
companies have submitted an AR but only covering 
the first few months of their existence four or five 
years ago; so, similarly, there is effectively no data 
available for them either.  Only three LNG-associated, 
exempt companies have any recent AR: Mananda 
Umbrella [last AR 2011], Kutmor [2011] and Hides 
Gas Development (HGDC) [2010]. When they last 
reported publicly these three companies jointly had 
net assets of K7.5m; however, it is certain that at the 
present time their combined assets are many times 
this amount. HGDC in particular has emerged as one 
of the leading Lancos anywhere in PNG but details of 
its financial performance are not available.
There is considerably more data available for 
those companies which are older and originally 
entirely associated with OSL.  They include: Moran 
Development Corporation (which had negative net 
assets when it last reported to IPA in 2010); Maka 
Investments; Kutubu Security Services; Kawaso; Gobe 
Business Development; Kikori Oil Investments (which 
although non-exempt has no FS and which in 2012 
was barely afloat); Yasuku Gas and Oil and Kutubu 
Transport. The last of these went into joint venture 
with NKWH (of Hidden Valley) but has been replaced, 
effectively, as the original oilfields transport company 
by Trans Wonderland. 
The most successful of these companies is GFS (Gobe 
Freight Services) which had, when it last reported in 
2011, net assets in excess of K10m. It was originally 
established in 1997 to service the transport and 
logistics needs of Chevron and to do that it developed 
its facilities in Port Moresby where it has since 
opened up an office and has successfully developed 
Kutubu Catering: This is wholly owned by Yasuku 
Oil and Gas, which itself draws its shareholders from 
a very wide range of ILGs, LLGs and individuals. 
Yasuku has nine directors, who presumably can speak 
on behalf of this very wide range of shareholders – 
otherwise it is difficult to see how Kutubu Catering 
could have, as it states in its most recent AR to IPA in 
2010, obtained permission from its shareholders not 
to reveal the fees and expenses of its directors.
Trans Wonderland: Along with Hides Gas 
Development, Trans Wonderland is generally 
considered to be one of the OSL/LNG success stories 
in terms of local business development. There is no 
reason to doubt that this acclaim is justified, but a) this 
study cannot add to (or subtract from) that acclaim 
given the lack of publicly available information on the 
company (in the form of FS registered with the IPA) 
since FY 2011 and b) because one of the real tests 
for Trans Wonderland (as for all those companies that 
have prospered during the LNG construction period) 
is only now being met with. 
The Managing Director of Trans Wonderland was not 
available for interview in the course of this study but 
Mr. Andagali has publicly spoken of the challenges the 
company has had to meet on several occasions most 
notably at the PNGCOMP Investment Conference in 
2012:
•  Providing 60% of the community supports a 
Lanco, it will survive and slowly attract the 
original dissenters to its side. [This consultant’s 
opinion is that a significantly higher level of 
support, of 75% or more, would be needed for 
the overall operations of a resource project before 
its developer could feel a degree of security.]
•  A single company is more sustainable than 
a multitude of Lancos a) from a company’s 
viewpoint because the amount of effort required 
of the Business Development staff of the resource 
company in the former case is manageable; 
b) because competition between many local 
companies would lead to dissension and even 
fighting; c) remote areas have few educated 
personnel and thus a multiplicity of companies 
would result in the need to bring in outside 
managers (and run the attendant risks of such a 
strategy).  [This study endorses these views even 
though the tendency at most sites is for there to be 
immense pressure for small entities to operate.]
•  Lancos must have a clearly stated constitution 
and annual audited accounts, views this study 
fully agrees with.
•  In the case of the LNG Project, share classes 
have worked well as have the constitutional 
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whom ExxonMobil will have to deal. The next few 
years will be critical in shaping the outcomes for the 
PNG LNG Lancos – a lame conclusion, but one which 
it would be foolish to go beyond at this stage.
For the oilfield Lancos established earlier in the 
times of BP, Chevron and OSL rather more definite 
conclusions can be drawn. The most significant of 
these are that:
•  Despite the care lavished on their oversight by 
OSL, their record does not seem to be much more 
impressive than that of the Lancos associated with 
metal-mining projects. There have been several 
failures, one or two successes (including one 
company, GFS, that appears to have the potential 
to grow into a significant company that does not 
depend on the hydrocarbons sector) and many 
companies that have ‘got by’ through hard work.
•  There is, since Gigira DC was marginalised by 
the creation of HGDC, no equivalent to Anitua or 
IPI among these earlier companies. Fortunately, 
since the older oil and newer gas project areas 
overlap this may be compensated for by the 
emergence of Trans Wonderland and HGDC.
•  It will be interesting to see how the contrasting 
styles of handling Lancos exhibited by OSL and 
ExxonMobil work out in the next few years.
its transport business in the capital, business which 
is largely unconnected to its original functions. This 
is a good example (and there are few of them) of a 
medium-sized company which is not a company-
recognised umbrella/representative company and 
which has developed an independence of the resource 
project on which it was originally entirely dependent. 
8.6 Conclusions
It is not possible to draw any conclusions about the 
success or otherwise of the Lancos that have grown 
up with the PNG LNG Project. First, there is little 
available data. But, second, even if the data was 
more extensive, the fact that these Lancos are now 
entering several lean years (after the fat years of LNG 
construction) means that they will need to readjust 
rapidly to a more difficult situation. It is not possible to 
say which companies will manage this transition best 
but Laba Holdings, providing it manages to remain 
unified, is in an excellent position to do so given 
that its shareholders have the enormous advantage of 
owning land around Port Moresby. Trans Wonderland 
and HGDC have both developed substantial assets 
with which to exert leverage on their own futures. 
The former is in stiff competition in Lae in its prime 
original business (transport) but has now diversified 
healthily. The latter, HGDC, has the advantage of 
close relations with all the Hides/Angore Lancos with 
Resource Project LANCOS Page 81
to benefit by supplying RNL with services plus limited 
opportunities for business during operations creates 
somewhat different levels of issues at RNL than at 
other metalliferous mine sites in the country.
Third, owned and operated by a Chinese company 
(MCC), RNL is, as one senior executive of the company 
remarked, run differently from the ways other mines in 
the country, managed by non-Chinese, might be. One 
significant difference is the high proportion of foreign 
(Chinese) workers with the project.  Of the total of 
around 1350 workers, just under 740 (or 55%) were 
Chinese as at the end of March 2014 and a further 
0.8% were other foreigners56.  Since relatively few 
locals are employed and since landowners will not 
receive dividend payments for some time yet, this 
implies that local benefits from business are a more 
important component of overall local community 
benefits in association with this project than with 
others.
There is one further consideration that needs to be 
taken into account with this project: it is, to date, 
far from profitable. The high cost of construction 
was compounded by the eighteen-month delay in 
mining occasioned by the legal challenges to the 
project. Additionally, and to some extent as expected, 
it has taken several years for the project to build up 
to full capacity (which is still some time away). One 
consequence of this for local business development 
is that RNL is not in any position to ‘throw money 
around’ in the form of business contracts.
9.2 The theoretical and actual structure of 
Lancos at different levels of operation 
The diagram below shows the Lanco system in 
place – in theory. It looks effective and implies a 
structure whereby the very varied groups in the mine 
9.1 Background
Ramu Nickel (RNL) or Ramu NiCo is somewhat 
different from most other metal mining projects in 
PNG. First, it deals with nickel-cobalt laterite whose 
mining, when compared to that of gold or copper, is 
(relatively) simple but, simultaneously, also requires 
processing plant near to the mine site which is 
(relatively) complex.  Second,  although its footprint is 
in some ways very similar to that of Ok Tedi (a mine also 
connected to a shipping point by a road and a pipeline 
more than 120km in length), right from the start of the 
Ramu project – and perhaps as a result of the lessons 
learned from Ok Tedi by the then Highlands Pacific 
staff members – it was determined that all landowners 
– at the mine, along the pipeline and at the process 
plant site - would be recognised as landowners in 
the project as a whole and share (if not equally) in 
project-generated benefits. RNL has therefore to apply 
its overall community policies, including business 
development, to a wide range of different communal 
groups spread over a very large area. Third, it has 
some characteristics that at least resemble those of the 
oil/gas industry rather more than other metal mining 
activities – massive capital and labour inputs were 
needed upfront in the construction of the Basamuk 
processing plant and the pipeline from Kurumbukari. 
Consequently, business opportunities tended to be 
very much greater during construction (when Lancos 
were only just starting off on their difficult learning 
curve) than during operations. Of course this is true 
to some extent of all mines but it is more marked 
feature of RNL. It bears some comparison with the 
even bigger contrast evident in business opportunities 
between these two periods of operations that is typical 
of the oil/gas industries because during operations the 
workforce required is rather small compared to other 
large scale mines.  A combination of a large impact 
area with a large number of different groups seeking 
9. Ramu Nickel
56   While this causes irritation among many PNG observers, one of the reasons for it is that RNL can hire Chinese workers at a cost significantly 
lower than it can hire PNG workers. Given the project’s financial challenges, it is not entirely surprising that this option is taken. However, 
it is not the sole reason that can be adduced for the employment figures and, one would imagine, the owners might well be advised to aim 
to rebalance the ratio of foreign to local workers.
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•  Provides managerial services to, nor receives 
much income from, Lancos that, in the diagram 
at least,  appear to be ‘lower order’ enterprises;
•  Nor does it act as an agency which is the contact 
point through which RNL contracts pass and are 
then distributed down the hierarchy to the AUCs 
or Clan Lancos. 
To some extent the history of the evolution of the Lancos 
associated with the Ramu Project helps explain why 
this is so and also indicates some additional issues.
When the first Business Development Plan (BDP) was 
put forward in 2000 by Highlands Pacific57, it was 
proposed that three Lanco umbrella companies would 
be established: one for the mine area (Kurumbukari), 
one joint Lanco for the two identified pipeline 
communities (the Maigari Inland community and 
the Wass Matau coastal community) and a third for 
Basamuk (processing plant site).
project impact area are grouped together under the 
protection of the ‘unifying umbrella company’ – 
Raibus Limited. Each of the four impact areas has its 
own ‘area umbrella company’: Kurumbukari, Inland 
Pipeline Communities (Maigari), Coastal Pipelines 
Communities (Wass Matau) and Basamuk. And a 
score of individual clan companies nest at the base 
of the structure. However, in practice, the system is 
neither as unifying nor as closely structured as the 
diagram suggests.
On the positive side of the equation, Raibus Limited 
is owned by the Area Umbrella Companies [AUCs] 
with Kurumbukari (the mine site community) owning 
40% and each of the remaining three AUCs owning 
20% of its shares. Additionally, all the AUC leaders 
interviewed appreciate that there is a need for a 
company which takes on projects that cover the whole 
of the project’s extensive impact area. However, 
Raibus is not an umbrella company in the usual sense 
of the term, since it neither:
57   A new, amended Plan has been signed but not yet publicly released; I am unaware of any amendments it may contain. 
Figure 16: Idealised structure of Lancos at Ramu NiCo.
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audits58 have hired external accounting firms. MSC 
has offered managerial services although a) at present 
only one AUC makes use of them and b) given one 
almost successful attempt by a company employee 
to send one AUC’s money overseas to his own bank 
account, trust in MSC’s services is not especially high 
among Lancos at present59.  The BDO does also offer 
training courses for Lancos and their directors.
The MoA also committed the State to provide ‘a one-
off grant of K1 million capital to assist the landowners 
through their respective umbrella companies to take 
part in business opportunities’ (MoA 12.1) which sum 
‘shall be equally divided….among the landowner 
umbrella companies’ (ibid., 12.2)60 equally. Raibus Ltd 
did not receive a share of these funds; the money went 
to the business arms of the landowner associations, 
the AUCs, even though these, like Raibus, were all 
formally established in 2007. Slightly more puzzling 
is the fact that when, in 2012, the then Prime Minister 
offered Lancos a further K20 million (one tranche of 
which was paid in 2012 and one tranche of which is 
currently the subject of negotiations between Lancos 
and Minister for Mining), Raibus once more was 
excluded from a share in this largesse. One argument 
why this was the case, would be that, since Raibus 
is owned by the AUCs, then it is up to the AUCs to 
decide whether they are going to invest any funds they 
have (either from profits or grants) in Raibus. 2012 
was an election year.
Whatever the case, Raibus is by no means as central or 
as dominant in the overall Lanco structures attached 
to RNL as the diagram above might suggest. It is less 
powerful than the individual AUCs (who own it) and, 
because it has neither shared in grants nor been able 
to provide management services to ‘lower order’ 
Lancos on any regular basis, it has had to find its own 
ways of earning money61. Fortunately, it has been able 
to become the JV partner in the biggest single business 
opportunity the project has thrown up to date62 – that 
with NCS in offering catering services. It has been 
able to do so for two reasons:
The second of these was quickly split into two. The 
reason for such a split was that each of the four areas 
had already established Landowner Associations 
(which remain in place to this day). Each of what 
are now AUCs, it was proposed, was to ‘be the only 
business point of contact for landowner business 
in their area of operations’ (RNJV Project Business 
Development Plan, 2000, 2.3.2). Each would provide 
managerial services to clan-owned Lancos. 
For projects covering the whole of the project impact 
area the Plan was a little ambiguous since it stated 
both that:
a)  The AUCs may participate in joint ventures which 
‘provide services to the whole of the Ramu Nickel 
Project’ (ibid., 2.3.3.1 ff) and
b)  ‘Where services and goods are required across all 
areas, joint ventures will be established….[and] 
will include all landowner umbrella companies’ 
(ibid., 4.0).
It is slightly unclear whether this means that individual 
AUCs could, in joint ventures, serve the whole impact 
area or whether they should all join together to form a 
joint venture with an external partner to provide such 
a service. 
The 2000 BDP also proposed that the Project would 
establish both a Business Development Office (BDO) 
within RNJV which, among other things, would 
‘provide independent auditing services at least 
annually’ to all Lancos and a Management Services 
Company (MSC) which would be independent of RNJV 
to provide management services to Lancos in the form 
of preparation of business and financial plans, help 
Lancos in loan applications, seek out joint venture 
partners for them, and prepare financial accounts and 
income tax returns – and charge fees (full fees after the 
first three years of operations) for such services. In fact 
the Project did establish a BDO and an MSC; however, 
both are within the RNL structure (and recently 
amalgamated). Neither offers ‘independent auditing’ 
services to Lancos; those companies which have had 
58   It should be noted that in terms of audited accounts Raibus Ltd and all the AUCs have had at least some (and most have had all) their 
accounts audited promptly a record that other Lancos elsewhere would (or should) envy. 
59   This is not an event unique to Ramu NiCo -  LBD has long been a honeypot that attracts swindlers and almost every resource site can tell 
similar stories.
60   Maigari claimed at interview they never received their share of this sum. At least one other AUC official scoffed at this claim. I am in no 
position to know exactly what the real story is, but it might be worth noting that the original BDP had Maigari as a joint partner with Wass 
Matau in a single AUC and this may help explain the confusion that now exists. It is also possible that Maigari’s complaint arises out of 
confusion – the original funds from government were actually handed out by RNL. It is possible that Maigari officials imagined, at the time, 
that this money was coming from RNL and was not  -as it was – their share of the government grant. 
61   One subsidiary of Raibus Ltd (Raibus Engineering Ltd) does run a joint venture with a clan Lanco, DK Cleaning. 
62   Although the biggest contract it is not as big as was originally expected since a) it is a catering only contract (as opposed to a camp 
management contract) and b) the workforce catered for by the JV covers only around 50% of the resident workforce and not a much higher 
proportion as the two partners imagined when they bid for it. So it is not as profitable as was originally hoped.
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individual basis rather than on the basis of any sort 
of group membership, clan-based or otherwise. This 
has not (yet?) happened in the RLN impact area. It 
may be that it has not occurred because the benefits 
so far have not been especially large – there appears 
to be a close correlation at PNG metal mining sites 
between the size of the benefits and the degree of clan 
fragmentation; or perhaps it is because the leadership 
of the AUCs has been strong and the communities 
trust their Lanco executives. They have not always had 
reason to do so (as will be seen later).
There are some signs that fragmentation might occur 
in future even if it is of a limited nature at the moment. 
In the areas covered by the Kurumbukari and Maigari 
AUCs, clan, sub-clan and family Lancos have sprung 
up which have attempted to operate independently. 
Although these were envisaged and indeed 
encouraged in the 2000 BDP, the circumstances in 
which they have developed suggest that this is not 
simply a surge in enthusiasm for small enterprises 
but rather individual desires taking over in situations 
where people have reason to be dissatisfied with their 
communal Lancos.
In the Kurumbukari (mine) area these difficulties are 
at their worst; there are ongoing land disputes as well 
as disputes over benefit sharing that are still under 
arbitration. The clans there exhibit a lack of unity not 
present elsewhere in the impact area which antedates 
the arrival of the mine – partly because of pre-existing 
migration into the area and pre-existing arguments 
as to who is and who is not a ‘real’ landowner64. In 
addition, at both Kurumbukari and Maigari the AUCs 
have recently (as nearly all such companies do, big 
or small across virtually all projects at some stage in 
their operations) experienced crises of management. 
In the former, most of the board was replaced and its 
manager’s contract was not extended at the end of 
2013, whereas at the latter the AUC manager (an RNL 
secondee) attempted to abscond with the company 
funds. 
This is not the sole explanation, however, because 
the Basamuk AUC also has recently experienced 
severe problems - not of fraud by any means but of a 
declining profitability, yet in that case, for the moment, 
an energetic new management team has retained 
communal support just as the equally innovative team 
at Wass Matau has retained it. In both these cases, 
the AUCs act as it was envisaged in the 2000 BDP 
that umbrella companies would operate: that is, they 
bid for projects and then distribute the smaller ones 
•  because – as noted above – the AUCs recognise 
that there is a need for a company in which 
they all share to handle projects that cover the 
whole project area. (For the same reason no 
objection has been made by the AUCs to Raibus 
establishing its own 100% owned subsidiaries 
Raibus Security and Raibus Engineering63.)
• because NCS was able to fund the joint venture.
The outcome is Raibus does offer managerial services 
– more or less on the lines envisaged in the BDP as 
being offered by the MSC – but really only to its own 
subsidiaries. It is these that provide Raibus Ltd with 
over 80% of its income.
In short, the diagram is misleading since the real 
power (and attracter of funds) in the project area 
is not even shown there: the four Landowner 
Associations who nominate and elect the directors 
of the AUCs (who in turn nominate the directors of 
Raibus Ltd.). 
However, in some areas even they are not all-powerful. 
At many other sites around the country, the arrival of 
resource companies may at first have strengthened 
clan allegiance because the resource companies have 
emphasised clans in their development proposals and 
because both project developers and government have 
shown a strong tendency to ease the administration of 
benefit distribution (including royalty payments) by 
focussing on clan or other group representatives as 
the channels through which benefits are to be shared 
out. The BDP of 2000 in the present case reflects 
this widespread (and understandable) focus where it 
proposes that:
  ‘The [ownership of the] share capital of the 
…[AUC]….Lanco[s] will be restricted to the 
clan groups  or sub-clan groups within the …
[Lanco]… area. The allocation of shares will 
be based on clan or sub-clan land ownership. 
Individual	 landowners,	 incorporated	 land	
groups or any outside interests will not be 
eligible	 to	 own	 shares	 in	 the…[Lanco]’.	
(BDP,	2000,	2.3.3.1]
As seen elsewhere in the report, benefit distribution 
has tended at many mine sites to have been 
accompanied by a fragmentation of clan systems – 
or to have been simultaneously accompanied by the 
creation of a whole new range of clans previously 
unheard of. Or, in extreme cases, to have led to the 
demand that benefits be paid out on a family or even 
63   Each of the four AUCs nominates one of their own board members (two in the case of Kurumbukari) to the board of Raibus; recently three 
independent directors were also brought in. So, the AUCs control Raibus rather than the other way round.
64   Whatever IFC guidelines on world best practice state as to cut off dates and eligibility in project areas, landowners in PNG tend to have 
their own classification of who is and who is not entitled to be called a landowner and what sort of resident he/she is.
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In other words, the diagram is finally misleading 
where it suggests (as noted earlier) that whereas 
Kurumbukari clans and those of Maigari are linked to 
their respective AUC whereas those in the Wass Matau 
and Basamuk areas are not; in fact, the opposite is the 
case and the Kurumbukari/Maigari clan Lancos are in 
dispute with their AUCs whilst the clans in the Wass 
Matau/Basamuk areas are well integrated into their 
AUCS.
In conclusion, 
•  the structure of the Lancos hierarchy at RNL is 
not really as shown in the diagram above (Figure 
16) but is rather focussed on the four Landowner 
Associations which effectively control the AUCs 
which in turn control Raibus Limited. 
•  two parts of the business development 
organisation at RNL have a passing likeness to 
umbrella companies serving smaller companies 
– the MSC and Raibus. In fact in terms of 
management, Raibus really only serves its 
own immediate subsidiaries and, rather than 
distributing RNL generated projects to the AUCs 
(whose members dominate the Raibus board), 
actually depends on the AUCs ‘allowing’ it to 
partake in any business at all. Further, MSC has 
lost credibility as a result of the recent events and 
although it does still offer management services, 
notably to Maigari, most AUCs now manage on 
their own.
to individual clan businesses. In the Basamuk case, 
local businesses assisted by the AUC are not solely 
based on clan membership but also on particular area 
of residence; the areas are determined by the type of 
company activity (e.g. the limestone area, the plant 
site, the township). At Basamuk the directors are also 
appointed with this mix of clan and area of residence 
in mind.
This apparently is in contrast to the manner in which 
the Kurumbukari and Maigari AUCS have operated to 
date (or at least until the recent changes mentioned 
above occurred). Interviews with six of the clan-based 
Lancos (all in the Kurumbukari and Maigari areas) in 
the course of research for this paper indicated:
•  While three of them had had RNL contracts, all 
but one (DK Cleaning) were extremely dissatisfied 
with both the number of contracts they had been 
offered (most had never had an RNL contract, 
they stated) and/or by the manner in which the 
contracts had been managed (that is, disputes 
about delayed payments had arisen). 
•  One had managed to survive by obtaining 
contracts from the Madang Provincial 
Government and private contracts.
•  All complained, however, not only about either 
the absence or low profitability of RNL contracts 
but, perhaps more importantly about their not 
having received, they stated, any managerial 
service or assistance from any organisation – 
whether MSC, or Raibus or their own AUC. 
•  Their strongest criticisms were of their own AUCs 
which, they alleged, had both wasted government 
funding (see below) and never passed on to 
clans smaller contracts but had kept them for 
themselves. 
•  Dissatisfaction with RNL/MCC focussed on both 
what they considered to be RNL keeping work 
that could be done by local contractors in-
house and extremely tight rates of contract work 
payments.
It is not the purpose of this report to say one way or 
another whether these complaints are valid. But it 
does seem clear that apart from DK Cleaning65 none 
of those interviewed had any RNL contract and that 
they put the blame for this on their AUCs (reserving 
less harsh criticism for RNL). This is one reason why it 
was observed above that the clan Lancos in Maigari 
and Kurumbukari had good reasons for trying to act 
independently.
65   DK Cleaning, although less discontented than the other clan Lancos interviewed, is not especially happy about its own contract which on 
inspection turns out to be between RNL and Raibus Engineering Ltd (REL). DK is not a party to the contract even though some of its directors 
signed the contract as witnesses. They are effectively sub-contractors to REL but without any (sighted) documentation. It is not clear what 
REL contributes to the work involved. In addition to splitting profits with DK, REL also, it was alleged, collects an extra 10% of revenues on 
the grounds that DK does not have any IRC issued Certificate of Compliance.   
Figure 17: Operating structure of Ramu NiCo Lancos.
•  The Wass Matau and Basamuk AUC appear (unless 
a longer period of research proves differently) to 
have the support of their clan Lancos and to act 
both as conduits for smaller contracts suited to 
clan businesses and to offer some managerial 
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At present it is estimated that in 2013 and 2014 the 
annual value of contracts awarded (whether ongoing 
or new) to Lancos of any description by RNL is in the 
range of PGK20-25 million of which the Raibus/NCS 
and Raibus Security contracts account for over 80%. 
In this respect, Raibus is the most important of the 
Lancos and is perceived by many landowners as ‘rich’. 
However, when compared with other projects around 
PNG, the quantum assigned by RNL to local Lanco 
contracts is very small; Hidden Valley, for example, in 
2012 had contracts with its Lancos valued at K125m. 
The concerns of Lancos, therefore, on the issue of 
contract availability are to some extent justified.
9.3.2 Financial assistance to Lancos
In the original 2000 BDP, the then owner, Highlands 
Pacific, stated that it ‘may offer support and assistance 
to a local business enterprise but it will under no 
circumstances offer to subsidise the[ir] operations’ 
(BDP 2000, 1.0 (d)). As has been the case at almost 
all other resource projects located in relatively remote 
areas where landowners have little or no previous 
experience of managing a business, this turned out to 
a rather impractical proposal; some initial subsidies 
need to be provided if such infant enterprises were to 
take root. 
RNL has in fact provided loans to Raibus Ltd in the 
form of PNGK490,000 in cash (loaned monthly at 
K20,000) and K510,000 in second hand equipment 
when it was first established. It further provided a 
loan in the shape of K500,000-worth of second hand 
equipment to Raibus Engineering Ltd when it was set 
up. As at the end of FY2012, Raibus Ltd still owed 
RNL K155,00066.
In the 2000 MoA, the State committed itself to provide 
K1 million as a grant for the establishment of the four 
AUCs and fulfilled that commitment promptly (but not 
without some controversy on the part of Maigari). In 
services to those Lancos. But this does not appear 
to be the case with Maigari and Kurumbukari as 
yet.
•  The underlying divisions within the Kurumbukari 
community which stem from its mix of peoples 
and the earlier migration into the area appear to 
undermine all aspects of social cohesion in the 
area including LBD.  
In other words, on the limited evidence obtained on 
this visit the actual structure of the Lancos associated 
with RNL is more like Figure 17.
9.3 Lanco performance
9.3.1 Contracts awarded by RNL
There is a great deal of complaint from all levels 
of Lancos that ‘RNL is not issuing many contracts’. 
These complaints have some justification (Ramu 
NiCo support for Lancos does compare poorly with 
that offered at most other sites) but only in a qualified 
fashion. The first qualification arises out of the fact, as 
noted in the introduction, that the company has faced 
– and continues to face – serious financial difficulties; 
some would argue that were the project run by anyone 
other than a PRC-backed company like MCC it would 
have closed down. 
Despite this difficulty contracts not only have been 
issued but those to the AUCs have, on an annualised 
basis, been increasing recently. The diagram below 
shows the average annual value of contracts issued by 
RNL at two periods: 1. March 2009 to December 2011 
and 2. July 2012 to June 2013. While the total has 
fallen (as would be expected given that the expensive 
construction phase has moved onto operations), the 
value of contracts to AUCs has actually increased. 
The initial large contracts (for catering and security) 
went to Raibus but since then more contracts have 
gone to the AUCs. 
Figure 18: Ramu NiCo payments to local contractors.
66   RNL was reported to me to have provided K 0.5 million to the Lancos at Basamuk and Kurumbukari but this assistance was not confirmed 
by RNL itself.
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is not a very convincing explanation of the lack 
of dividends during the construction period when 
many millions-worth of kina were awarded to 
Lancos. 
•  Investment in assets. The Raibus Group has 
reportedly assets worth K12.5 million in early 
2014. Wass Matau has built up assets worth K4m. 
Other groups have done less well.
Day-to-day support to community groups and 
individual landowners of the project area is something 
that all Lancos reported as one of their functions. 
Raibus has turned over almost a million kina in its 
years of existence to local people. K280,000 has been 
given to Landowner Associations as well as K174,000 
to clan groups, K79,000 to individuals, K185,000 in 
general community assistance and K167,000 as loans 
and assistance to lower level umbrella companies. All 
Lancos do this – if certainly not in the quantities just 
specified. This raises the question: are the shareholders 
really shareholders? In most cases they did not pay for 
their shares and in no case known have they received 
a dividend. Is the way the Lancos operate here a sort 
of Melanesian modification of the Companies Act?   
2012, an election year, the Prime Minister committed 
the State to provide a further K20 million in two equal 
tranches to the AUCs. The first of these was paid in 
2012 to the four AUCs.
The second is yet to be paid. It is noteworthy, that K20 
million is roughly equivalent to seven times the net 
profits AUCs earned from RNL contract work in 2013.
A further substantial form of financial support to 
Raibus was provided by its joint venture partner in the 
form of a K2 million loan to enable Raibus to set up its 
property arm and to purchase real estate in Madang. 
As of December 31, 2012, Raibus had yet to repay 
K1.26 million of that loan. 
9.3.3 Lanco financial performance
Table 11 provides basic information concerning the 
RNL-associated Lancos. As far as could be established 
during the short research trip, no company has ever 
paid dividends to its shareholders (if one does not 
classify the management fees paid by the Raibus 
subsidiaries to the parent company). There are several 
reasons why this is:
•  Low levels of profitability. Whilst this applies now 
that project construction has been completed, it 
Table 11: Lanco basic data
* Estimates only     ** in 2013 K2.3 million    NA Not applicable.  Important note: the figures in column 3, provided during 
interviews do not match those in Figure 18 which were provided by Ramu NiCo.
Lanco Gross 
Annual 
Revenue 
(mean 
2012-13 
K’Million)
Audited 
up to 
date?
Shares IPA-
registered
Dividends 
Paid
Dependence 
on RNL
Raibus: 
Raibus Ltd 
NCS/Raibus JV 
Raibus Security 
R. Engineering 
R. Property
8 
160 
400 
100 
5
2 
12 
8? 
3? 
0.3
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
?
40% KBK 
20%Maigari 
20% WM 
20% Basamuk
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes
No 
 No 
No 
No 
No
85% 
100% 
70% 
90% 
0%
Kurumbukari 30 1 No –audit 
scheduled 
for July 
2014
1 share Yes No 100%
Maigari 25? 3.2 (2009) 2009 250,000 @ K1 
Held by 
directors
Yes No 100%
Wass Matau 10 2 Yes ? No? No 10%
Basamuk 146 0.8** Yes Non-
transferable
Yes No 40%
Clan Lancos* 150? 0.5? No ? Some No 80% 
Total 1034 <31 NA NA NA NA NA

Workforce
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c)  As at virtually every other resource site nearly 
all Lancos have had near death experiences in 
their infancy. Some of the survivors are showing 
promising signs of having learnt from that 
experience and are adopting an appropriately 
professional approach to business. Others have, 
unfortunately, not learnt that lesson and continue 
with eagerness to await the next dole out of 
K10m from the State rather than adapting to 
circumstances. 
d)  The flow of contracts out of RNL is small 
compared to other resource projects in PNG 
and, given the large number of expectant Lancos, 
generates discontent.
e)  A key issue is that the government grant of K10m 
made in 2012 appears to have been quickly 
wasted and to be a particular cause of discontent 
among clan Lancos. Under no circumstances 
whatever should the expected second tranche of 
K10m be distributed in cash. 
f)  On the positive side, the degree to which Lancos 
try to abide by tax and company regulations (as 
exhibited in the extent to which they have had 
their books audited is exemplary. This is despite 
the fact that the original proposals of the 2000 
BDP – in regard to the provision of local auditing 
resources - have not been followed through with.
g)  A review of the functions of the various forms of 
Lancos is desirable.
Despite the conclusions reached earlier regarding 
the true nature of the Lanco hierarchy, most people 
interviewed perceive the structure as one commanded 
by Raibus with the AUC as officers and the clan Lancos 
as other ranks. And each level is critical of the one 
above it (with the officers blaming the other ranks) for 
the absence of dividends. Clan Lancos, with very good 
reason, cannot understand what the AUCs did with 
their share of the K10m grants from government67. 
Without exception the KBK and Maigari clan Lancos 
(none from Wass Matau or Basamuk were seen) made 
serious allegations about their respective AUC boards 
and their actions with regard to those funds. In turn, 
the AUCs tend to regard Raibus as ‘rich’ and ask why 
it never pays them dividends, whilst Raibus state that 
they have no choice but to make substantial payments 
on a continuous basis to individual, landowner 
associations and Lancos – which prevents them from 
paying dividends.
9.4 Conclusions
The following are my conclusions: 
a)  The nature of the project with its very major up-
front costs combined with a lack of preparedness 
on behalf of the Lancos has meant that Lancos 
were not in any position to reap the business 
harvest when it was at its fullest. Business 
opportunities are now significantly fewer than 
they were during construction.
b)  RNL is not in a financial position to do anything 
other than minimise costs and therefore cannot 
afford to be generous with business contracts.
67   A group of outsiders styled consultants were paid K1.2m of this amount so AUCs in fact received K2.2m each.
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For Simberi, the same question asked of Tolukuma 
arises: is local business development appropriate for 
small mines of limited life span? What sort of mix 
of community benefits is most appropriate: what 
is the best ratio between investment in community 
infrastructure, training, employment, business 
development (on top of compensation and royalties) 
in different sorts of projects? Simberi may make an 
excellent case study for future investigation because 
it has tried to do all these things despite its small size. 
It has, for example, invested over K600,000 in trade 
training in cookery and hospitality (initially to staff its 
own mess); will this turn out to be a more rewarding 
investment both for the company and Simberi people 
than its investment in business?   
The Simberi project mines fewer than 80,000 oz of 
gold (including some silver) annually. In 2009 it was 
estimated to contain 1.4m oz in the currently mined 
oxide ores and 3.5m oz in sulphide ores (whose 
processing would require significant new capital 
investment). It is thought to have a future mine life 
of ten years. The total population living on Simberi is 
uncertain but probably is close to 2000 people now. 
While it is among the smallest of the projects covered 
in this report (with Tolukuma), it can be seen as 
representing a type of mine in PNG that is not unusual 
– the  Kula Gold project on Woodlark Island (which 
has recently received permits to proceed) will be of a 
similar, slightly larger perhaps, size. 
The project has not as yet met with much success, 
being barely profitable at best. Given this, its owners 
(originally Allied Gold, now St. Barbara) have needed to 
trim costs, one of the weightiest of which is managerial 
level labour. The Community Affairs section has two 
back-to-back rostered Papua New Guinean managers 
assisted by six staff who must look after all aspects 
of community affairs; the two managers need to be 
better than multi-skilled under such circumstances. 
The proper management supervision of  the would-
be (over a dozen) and actually operating Lancos 
(fourteen) would seem to require more or less the 
fulltime services of a knowledgeable (and therefore 
well recompensed) business development officer. 
The project is not in much of a position to provide 
this. The approach adopted by St Barbara has been 
to delegate to individual sectional managers the 
award of commercial contracts; for example, the two 
main earthworks contracts were issued by and are 
under the supervision of the Operations Manager, 
the mess/camp joint venture is supervised by the 
Camp Superintendent and other smaller contracts 
are administered by the Finance/Administration 
Department. 
Despite the small size of the population neither 
Allied Gold nor St Barbara (nor, more importantly, the 
people themselves) seem to have managed to unite 
the population sufficiently to lead to its agreeing 
to form a business company that would cover the 
whole island. The nearest thing to an island-wide 
company is, perhaps, the Simberi Island Investments 
Company (formerly Simberi Island Mining Services) 
with 11 directors from five villages which has a 60% 
share in the project’s catering facilities (the mine 
itself is the minor partner). Unfortunately for this 
study, SIIC has never submitted an Annual Return to 
IPA.  Divisiveness within the community is perhaps 
best shown by the fact that the landowners in the pit 
area have established their own company which has 
regularly submitted Annual Returns but these indicate 
that technically (and legally) the company is owned 
by a single shareholder who is also the main supplier 
of timber on the island.
The State provided no grants to establish local business 
but the company did provide soft loans for the purchase 
of machinery and manhaul buses/trucks payable 
over a two-year period. This was required under the 
MoA which also required the company to ‘provide 
initial funding, management support and continuous 
capacity building to Simberi Mining Services Limited’. 
Whilst the MoA required the company to develop a 
business plan, which was to include the formation of 
an island-wide umbrella company, the company itself 
reported to the present consultant that the plan has 
been ‘continuously challenged’ while the umbrella 
10. Simberi:  LBD for a Small Project
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•  Shunammite Engineering owned by a Simberi 
man now resident in Kokopo. This company has 
developed its own maintenance capacity on the 
island so its equipment can be hired out on a wet 
basis. It has begun to expand its operations to 
other parts of New Ireland but its main revenue, 
estimated in 2014 to approach K5.5m, is derived 
from the project. 
All other Lancos are small in comparison with these 
two leaders. The project, having sought the advice of 
foreign consultants, hope to engage with the National 
Agricultural Research Institute to develop poultry and 
vegetable production on Simberi.  
Given the financial constraints on St Barbara and the 
issues the project has faced to date, its performance 
in the area of local business development is 
commendable. But the question remains whether the 
effort and support provided to local companies, only 
two of which are of any note (and only one of these 
appearing to make significant profits) would have 
reaped a higher and more widespread return had it 
been invested in other forms of community assistance. 
concept ‘was not accepted by the landowners’. It is 
worth noting that the requirements of the project in 
terms of LBD are extensive and certainly not much less 
onerous than those imposed on much larger projects.
In 2013 the company paid out K9m in local contracts 
and projects payments in excess of K11-12m for 2014. 
As of mid-2014, there were fourteen Lancos working 
with the mine as well as a further dozen inactive 
entities.  Of the ten Lancos on the IPA database, six 
have only entries relating to their initial registration 
with no further entries (and no Annual Returns), two 
have been removed and only two have submitted 
Annual Returns. The total employment of those entities 
that are active appears to be approximately 140.
The two most prominent Lancos are:
•  the Simberi Pit Owners Ltd which operates 
excavators, dozers, tipper trucks and manhauls 
under dry hire terms, because of minimal 
maintenance capacity. Its gross revenue in 2012 
is likely to be in the region of K6m;
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Elk-Antelope is some way away from production 
but InterOil has already taken steps to assist in the 
establishment of a Lanco in its exploration area. 
Given the experience of the larger oil/gas fields this 
appears prudent since unless steps are taken early 
on to prepare a Lanco for the business opportunities 
which are heavily weighted at the construction 
end of a project, then very sizeable local benefits 
may be lost. While this is especially true of oil/gas 
projects, it is also applicable, though less critically, 
to metal mining projects; while the development 
of a business development plan is not required for 
the latter projects until permission to proceed with 
construction is sought, it may well be to all parties’ 
advantage to have initiated the establishment of a 
local umbrella business (and certainly to initiate some 
form of capacity building and training for business 
management) at an earlier stage.  
Sakura Osura Resources Investments Ltd [SORIL] was 
set up in 2009 on the joint initiative of InterOil and the 
landowners around Wabo where drilling is in progress. 
In addition, InterOil also has some lesser dealings 
with landowners at its facilities in Port Moresby and 
employs four staff members in its LBD section. It has 
already commenced capacity building programs in 
LBD and has experimented with the Personal Viability 
programs so warmly embraced at Lihir (and other sites 
around PNG). It spent K6m in 2013 on local business 
contracts. 
SORIL at first sight seems to be ‘managed’ – as 
many other Lancos are – on the supposition that it is 
community-based (it draws nine directors from across 
the Wabo/Baimuru villages) but in fact for the benefit 
of one person, since there is only one shareholder. 
However, for once, this impression is very misleading; 
until the Minister for Petroleum determines with 
finality who are the landowners of the Elk-Antelope 
field (and associated infrastructure sites), shares 
cannot be allocated. While this procedure carries 
a degree of risk insofar as there is a possibility that 
people supposed to be stakeholders now may later 
be excluded, it seems to be a risk worth taking when 
this is balanced against the need to prepare people in 
advance to take advantage of business opportunities 
when they do arise.
SORIL had a turnover in 2013 of approximately K2m 
and has already entered into a joint venture with 
Pagini Transport to hire out equipment to InterOil. Its 
principal function at present is recruiting labour for 
InterOil work around Wabo but it already has in place 
plans to move into camp management and security if 
and when the drilling moves on to exploitation. As yet 
it has no assets of significance and only two employees. 
Its CEO regards uncertainty as to decision-making (to 
proceed to exploitation) as the major challenge to the 
company.
No-one can be certain when this uncertainty will 
be removed. But everyone can be certain that if a 
decision to proceed to extraction is taken then it will 
be far better to have an operating Lanco already in 
place and with capacity for InterOil to work with, than 
not to prepare for that (very likely) outcome. In short, 
the joint preparatory work being undertaken by SORIL 
and InterOil should be seen as a very worthwhile 
investment on both their parts.
11. Elk-Antelope (InterOil)
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Hidden Valley lies in the uppermost reaches of the 
Watut Valley, the nearest of the original settlements 
being those of the Biangai people, across the 
watershed in the Wau Basin. However, a series of 
Land Court decisions reached in the 1980s assigned 
full ownership of one of the two ore deposits at 
Hidden Valley, Hamata, to Watut clans particularly 
those people resident at Nauti village and split the 
ownership of the other deposit equally between Nauti 
and two of the five Biangai villages (Winima and 
Kwembu). These decisions have therefore split the 
Biangai community and pushed traditional enemies68 
into joint ownership of the mine – and its associated 
umbrella Lanco, N(auti)K(wembu)W(inima). This 
partnership remains an uneasy one and it is to MMJV’s 
credit that they have managed to hold it together.
For many years, the leadership of the three main 
villages involved in Hidden Valley was dominated by 
three individuals  Rex Mauri of Winima, Peter Askai 
of Nauti/Bulolo and Siwi Kawa of Kwembu. These 
three, after many years of tension-filled but pragmatic 
alliance, saw the project through to construction but 
since then Peter and Siwi have died. This has left 
gaps in leadership which are proving difficult to fill 
especially since the sole survivor, Rex Mauri, now has 
his own business interests and since Siwi’s successor, 
his brother Wayang, also appears to have established 
a very successful retail business of his own.
12.2 LBD structure and progress: a unique 
government audit
Under the 2005 MoA that paved the way for the 
development of Hidden Valley, Harmony agreed to 
establish Hidden Valley Services Ltd [HVSL] to provide 
management services to the three village investment 
arms that were to be partners in NKW.  It was hoped 
that the businesses so established would generate 
earnings that in turn would fund ‘sustainable, non-
12.1 Background
From the mid-1980s a series of companies investigated 
the potential of Hidden Valley but did not proceed to 
production. Harmony Gold took over the site in 2003 
and took the gold/silver project to its first gold pour 
in July 2009. In 2009 it joined forces with Newcrest 
to form the Morobe Mining JV which covers both 
Hidden Valley and the highly prospective Wafi/Golpu 
project. At this stage Hidden Valley has a mine life 
that will extend to 2027/8.
Although Harmony publicity materials talk of Hidden 
Valley as being located in an area which is both 
inaccessible and with little infrastructure, in PNG 
mining terms, the mine is in fact relatively close to 
a major urban centre (being 90km south-southwest 
of Lae) and located adjacent to the Wau/Bulolo 
historic goldfields which have led to the area having 
a greater range of socio-economic opportunities than 
most other rural areas of the country, including road 
links (even if those links are fragile) to Lae and the 
Highlands Highway. At one stage Wau’s infrastructure 
was at such a level that it was (in the late 1960s) a 
serious bidder to be the location of the country’s first 
University, whilst its people have consistently made 
attempts to be a supplier of temperate vegetables to 
Lae.
This proximity to Lae has been a critical factor in the 
development of local business for the Hidden Valley 
project and will be of even greater significance for 
Wafi/Golpu once that project is developed. On the 
one hand, proximity to PNG’s second largest city and 
industrial centre has provided opportunities for the 
project’s umbrella Lanco available to no other mining 
project in the country, it has also meant that small 
landowner companies have had difficulty competing 
with the array of mature, Lae-based businesses which 
have serviced mines such as Porgera and the presently 
moth-balled Kainantu for many years.
12. Hidden Valley 
68   When white miners reached the Wau area in the 1920s active warfare between the two groups was under way. Even as the project was 
being planned and initial project infrastructure was being put in place by Harmony, a full scale armed attack by Watut people on Kwembu 
was undertaken.
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documentation in relation to supply and 
procurement (which, with LBD, was the focus of 
the audit);
•  It also generally concluded that there were 
‘anomalies in the shareholder structures, 
appointment of Boards of Directors, and adoption 
of a constitution and the conducting of Annual 
General Meetings’ for all the NKW constituent 
components.
•  On NKW: its shares were ‘inappropriately 
issued’, no formal shareholding lists were sighted 
and the company’s external accountant held 
the company’s shares without there being an 
adequate trust deed in place; there did not exist 
any established process to check the eligibility of 
board members; there was no formal constitution 
‘even after four69 years of work’; no formal AGM 
had been held; Winima Investments Ltd had 
no representative on NKW while the Kwembu 
Investment Limited [KIL] representative had died 
and not been replaced; and, as noted above, 
NKW did not co-operate with the audit team.
•  On Nauti Investments Ltd: shares had not been 
allocated to eligible landowners but instead 
the four directors were also the nominated 
shareholders. No eligibility test had been used in 
the appointment of board members. There was no 
constitution. There had only ever been one AGM. 
The directors obstructed the auditors’ work and 
‘procrastinated’. The directors ‘represented [in 
effect] only four families’ rather than the eligible 
shareholders. 
•  On Winima IL: the company was owned by four 
individuals, the four directors, rather than the 
community – there was no proper shareholder 
certification and no shares had been allocated 
to Winima landowners. There was no Winima 
representation on NKW. No trustee arrangements 
were in place, no ‘proper persons’ test and no 
constitution. No AGM had ever been held.  
•  On Kwembu IL: the four directors (one of whom 
was deceased) were the shareholders. There was 
no constitution, no proper persons test, no trust 
agreement, and no AGM had ever been held.
•  On HVSL: most responsibility for LBD had been 
passed onto NKW Holdings over which HVSL 
implemented inadequate monitoring. It should 
be noted in this regard, however, that HVSL is 
mine related economic activities’. 
In the course of the review of the original MoA by local 
stakeholders, the Department of Trade, Commerce and 
Industry [DTCI] was asked to undertake an audit of the 
structure of Hidden Valley LBD and its components. It 
should be noted that from the time of the negotiations of 
Ok Tedi, this department has always been included in 
the list of stakeholders in resource project negotiations 
but has generally had a low profile particularly when 
compared to the Departments of Finance, Treasury or 
Labour and several others. Prior to the invitation to 
it made by MMJV to undertake this audit of LBD at 
Hidden Valley, it had played an almost invisible role 
in the monitoring of project progress.
This, therefore, was the first audit of its kind in PNG 
and the Department hopes to undertake similar 
audits at all resource sites in the country – despite 
the fact that three government representatives have 
been on the board of NKW for several years. DTCI 
organised the audit to which the IPA seconded two 
of its staff. The audit was finalised in November 2013 
and is regarded by MMJV as a valuable document. 
On the basis of the audit and its past experiences of 
attempting to support LBD at Hidden Valley, MMJV 
is in the process of reviewing the manner in which it 
seeks to establish LBD structure for Wafi/Golpu. 
Consequently, rather than present the present 
consultant’s views of LBD progress at Hidden Valley 
here, the findings of the DTCI Audit are presented in 
summary form:
•  Overall, the auditors noted a lack of co-operation 
during their work from NKW Holdings and 
that HVSL had been unable to provide timely 
Figure 19: Hidden Valley LBD structure.
69   Rather more than four years; more like nine.
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LBD program from MMJV itself down to individuals 
on LIC boards. One of the more interesting aspects of 
it is that Hidden Valley Lancos, on the whole, appear 
to be not especially exceptional - the weaknesses the 
audit identified in Hidden Valley Lanco structures are 
common across all mining project LBD programs (and 
to a lesser degree in the oil/gas projects): directors 
holding shares that are purportedly communal 
without any trustee documentation or arrangements, 
absence of any constitution, infrequency or complete 
absence of any AGM, no evident shareholder register, 
no implementation of any eligibility test for directors, 
and lengthy delays in the reporting of key company 
matters to IPA, especially Annual Returns.  Hidden 
Valley Lancos are by no means unique in this respect 
– in some ways they are typical of the whole resource 
LBD sector (and in one or two ways the LBD situation 
there is better than average). But the government’s 
DTCI has only once actually undertaken such an audit, 
so the Department itself is not immaculate. Without 
some such over-arching, monitoring agency, it will be 
difficult to achieve progress towards compliance. 
12.3 MMJV reaction to the audit: new LBD 
strategies
MMJV reaction to the DTCI audit was positive and 
swift. A series of actions were proposed:
12.3.1 For the three landowner investment companies
•  On shareholding: because in its opinion MMJV 
does not have the authority to do so, the ‘relevant 
state agency’ should supervise restructuring; 
the practice of individuals holding shares in 
trust to cease; some shares in each company to 
be held in trust for future generations; rules on 
purchase and trust-holding of shares to be laid 
out in constitution; shareholdings to be on basis 
of landownership but may be by clans, families 
or individuals.
•  On directorships: each company to appoint 
directors under supervision of Provincial 
Electoral Commission; procedure to be laid out 
in constitution; directors’ manual to be prepared.
•  On constitutions: landowner companies’ 
constitutions and that of NKWH Ltd will be 
designed to complement each other.
12.3.2 For NKW Holdings
•  On shareholding: ‘relevant state agency’ to 
supervise share restructuring that would allow 
each of the three village level companies to buy 
shares and to be issued with share certificates; 
present trustee arrangements to cease.
provided with no legal right to undertake such 
monitoring – it can ask but if NKWH declines 
to answer the case rests there (just as OTML 
has found it difficult to collect data from Lancos 
under contract to it). It had no supplier database 
and did not monitor Lanco suppliers. It had poor 
links to the supply and procurement section.
•  NKWH: Whilst the company is financially highly 
successful and profitable, it was described in the 
audit as an ‘inadequate’ performer in terms of 
helping Lancos and whose management services 
were not operational. Instead it passed on this 
task to private companies which ‘overcharged’ 
for their services. It may be noted that the auditors 
here seem to have adopted the view, taken by 
the original proponents of the umbrella company 
concept, back in the 1970s, that it is the function 
of a company such as it to provide these services. 
NKWH in fact behaves more or less as all 
supposed umbrella companies have done – they 
place the overwhelmingly major portion of their 
efforts on expanding their own business (as have 
done so rather more successfully than others). 
The audit team made the following recommendations:
a)  All three village investment companies (VICs) 
be restructured so that genuine landowners 
are formal shareholders. This recommendation 
echoed MMJV policy whose implementation had 
long and strenuously been opposed by landowner 
leaders;
b)  Individuals should be ‘discouraged’ from holding 
shares in trust for landowners;
c)  Directors of LICs should be properly appointed, 
the chairperson of each LIC should represent it on 
NKWH and all directors receive training in their 
duties;
d)   NKW’s constitution should complement new 
constitutions to be drawn up for each LIC.
e)  AGMs must be regularly held;
f)   HVSL should take back responsibility for LBD 
and link it to supply and procurement;
g)   NKWH should provide management services for 
Lancos using competent professionals who did 
not overcharge and ensure audits.  
This DTCI audit is unique; nothing like it has ever 
been previously done for any resource based Lanco let 
alone the whole structure of LBD of a project. It was 
critical of almost every participant in Hidden Valley’s 
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NKWH Ltd [beyond the measures outlined in 
12.3.2 above] or allow the current structure to‘ 
continue in place.
A number of other recommendations for actions were 
proposed within MMJV for re-organising supply and 
procurement procedures.
12.3.5 Role of Government
The emphasis of these action plans is especially 
interesting because they focus on a) the importance 
they attach to a company having a constitution 
(something which, across resource sites all over the 
country, few Lancos possess) and b) the role they 
wish government agencies to play. Evidently, the 
value of the DTCI audit was seen as sufficiently high 
to outweigh the project’s previous experience of 
government participation in LBD monitoring as make-
weight only, something the audit was reticent about.
12.3.6 Implementation
Adoption of the action plans has, unsurprisingly, 
not been straightforward; ‘unsurprisingly’ since the 
changes proposed by the audit undermine established 
power bases.   One village company (Nauti) initially 
rejected any advice from any consultant provided 
for them by MMJV but some progress was eventually 
made with internal discussions on shareholdings. A 
similar issue arose with Kwembu where the chairman 
of the village company refused to have any dealings 
with an MMJV appointed consultant. Directors of 
the third village company, Winima, were somewhat 
more supportive of consultant’s advice but a dispute 
as to who was, or was not, chairman of the board 
held up any implementation. NKWH which had 
had the same directors, unchanged, for nine years 
– despite the need for re-elections biennially – was 
more co-operative and lodged, on 4th August 2013 
a notice with IPA that the Board ‘resolved to cease 
five Board members and allow two Board of Directors 
to remain to save costs which has cost the company 
over hundreds of thousand kina’. At the time of 
writing it is not clear if any of the action plans have 
actually been implemented. A key issue here is that, 
whilst the recommendations made by the DTCI audit 
make a great deal of sense, only government (the 
DTCI amongst others) has the authority to implement 
them, whereas, to date, such implementation has 
been effectively assigned to MMJV itself – which can 
then be painted by those opposed to the changes as a 
bullying, foreign Goliath.
One other result of the audit has been more directly 
and immediately positive: MMJV has had considerable 
success in persuading landowners at the Wafi-Golpu 
prospect to accept the need for detailed constitutions 
which have been prepared for them.
•  On directorships: elected chairperson of each 
village company to become a director of NKW 
Holdings; government representation on NKWH 
board to continue; two independent directors 
with commercial experience be appointed; 
directors’ manual to be developed.
•  On constitution: a NKWH constitution shall be 
developed and changes to it shall be subject to 
shareholder approval; appointment process for 
directors to be detailed; NKWH constitution to 
complement those of village companies.
•  Annual General Meetings: there shall be an AGM 
including a financial report to the boards of the 
three village companies; within ten days of that 
AGM each village company shall hold a meeting 
to pass on to ordinary shareholders the information 
provided by NKWH. Additional meetings, held 
between AGMs, will be encouraged, so as to 
increase landowner awareness.
12.3.3 For HV Services Ltd (HVSL] (under the control 
of the JV) and its role in LBD
•  HVSL to take back, from NKWH, responsibility 
for the LBD program and to co-ordinate with 
supply and procurement.
•  Create an accessible supplier/contractor 
database.
•  Assist landowner contractors/suppliers to prepare 
contract bids, provide or facilitate training and 
capacity building.
•  All sections to increase the potential of local 
contractors to take effective and efficient 
advantage of the preference clauses contained in 
MoA.
•  Close co-ordination between business 
development staff and those in supply and 
procurement.
•  JV contracts to be designed so that once 
appropriate skills have been developed by local 
partners, they may take over operations in full.
12.3.4 For NKWH
•  Reactivate NKWH Management Services to 
provide management services to Lancos only, 
including in-house accounting services at 
reasonable prices.
•  Undertake a ‘thorough financial and systematic 
audit’ the results of which shall be presented to 
NKWH shareholders…..
•  ….such audits being ‘the basis to either restructure 
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with the Pagini Group in 2007 to establish  Hidden 
Valley Transport and b) with NCS (of Anitua, Lihir) to 
provide catering services for the project. The transport 
business had the advantage, being based in Lae, of 
being able to compete for the non-mine transport 
needs of the city and its links to Madang and the 
whole of the Highlands. This, of course, placed it in 
direct competition with IPI’s and Trans Wonderland’s 
transport businesses and such competition (along 
with competition with other Lae-based transport 
companies) cannot have been anything but good 
for the wider regional economy. The transport JV 
agreement contains a buy-back clause that will 
enable NKW to own the whole operation in 2015 
and a similar arrangement is in place for the third 
of its joint ventures (Hidden Valley Contractors in 
partnership with HBS hires out plant and equipment 
to the project). There is no such clause in the catering 
JV, but it is likely that negotiations with NCS may 
result in NKW eventually becoming the sole catering 
supplier to the project. 
NKW has aggressively sought out non-mine related 
opportunities which have included real estate 
investment in Lae and Wau, housing construction, 
water bottling (this with a firm base demand from the 
project) and, more recently, in contracts associated 
with the Australian Government’s holding centre on 
Manus Island. 
Unfortunately, for the purposes of this study, NKW is 
classed as an ‘exempt’ company – so no independently 
audited Financial Statements are publicly available – 
and the last Annual Return lodged with IPA was that 
of the calendar year 2011. At the end of that year, 
NKW had net assets valued in excess of K20m and 
employed 70 people; but it has grown significantly 
since then, employing more than 160 in Lae70. 
In view of the hefty criticisms made of NKW by the 
DTCI audit, which were summarised above, it is to the 
company’s credit that, so far, it has had by far the most 
successful infancy of an umbrella company at a PNG 
mining site. Unlike IPI or Anitua, it has not stumbled 
financially and had to seek additional assistance from 
MMJV to get re-started. It is, moreover, receptive to the 
action plan for the reformation of the HV LBD program 
and is moving towards providing more business 
management services to landowners companies 
through NKW Management Services. Further, NKWH 
has regularly paid dividends to its shareholders, the 
three LICs; K4m has reportedly been paid out in six 
years of operations, which, if these dividends were 
distributed down to families (which, alas, does not 
12.4 MMJV Hidden Valley payments to 
contractors
In one respect, Hidden Valley/MMJV are certainly 
above average performers in LBD – they have detailed 
records of payments to contractors which were made 
available to this study. The diagram above shows that 
Hidden Valley’s payments to its contractors grew from 
K684m in the full calendar year 2009 to over K1250m 
in 2013. Roughly speaking, 40% of these payments 
have consistently been made to foreign suppliers/
contractors and the balance to PNG suppliers (Lae 
a little over 30%, landowners 12%, the rest of PNG 
16%). 
In 2012, landowner controlled Lancos received just 
over K175m in payments (with a further K3m going 
to non-landowners in the Wau Bulolo area) and in 
2013 the figures were just under K150m and K4m 
respectively, whilst businesses in Lae received K384m 
and K344m. These numbers are impressive not simply 
because of their availability but because of their size. 
Although Hidden Valley in terms of production is a 
much smaller mine than Lihir, Ok Tedi or Porgera its 
payments to local contractors bear comparison with 
its larger brethren. This of course is not necessarily 
good news for all concerned – especially for the 
MMJV partners who barely make a profit out of the 
mine’s operations.  
12.5 Lanco performance
12.5.1 NKW Holdings
The State provided K1m spread over three years in seed 
capital to assist HV landowners to establish NKW. Its 
first ventures of note were to go into joint ventures a) 
Figure 20: Six monthly payments to contractors Hidden 
Valley.
70   In a supplement in The National newspaper in March, 2014, NKW stated that it ‘provides current employment for 214 employees…at the 
Hidden Valley site’ and ‘is also responsible for the livelihood of 302 direct employees’. 
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the IPI board, not especially influential. Nor, given the 
history of relations between the Watut and Biangai 
people, is it likely that they work together.
The only significant IPA-reporting companies that 
this study has been able to locate are those owned 
by the surviving member of the old leadership 
trio under the name of the Black Cat group72.  No 
significant businesses have been located whose 
ownership is in the hands of Nauti or other Watut 
villagers. Even though this may be due to oversight on 
the consultant’s part, it may also reflect the ongoing 
leadership vacuum in that community following the 
death of Peter Askai. Given that the Nauti group and 
their associates have been officially recognised as 
the group with the biggest single share of ownership 
in the HV project, this apparent lack of successful 
Lancos amongst them might be cited as a likely 
cause of ongoing dissatisfaction at the quantum of 
benefits they receive from the project as presently and 
supposedly channelled to them through their own 
investment entities.
appear to have happened71), would represent around 
K4,400 per year for each of the original 151 families 
censused as resident in the three landowner villagers 
in 2000.  
12.5.2  Other Lancos
LBD associated with Hidden Valley is similar overall 
to that at Porgera – one major Lanco dominates 
both through its 100% owned entities and its joint 
ventures with other partners. There is however a major 
difference – whereas IPI is governed by a board of 
directors of powerful local leaders who have largely 
set aside their many differences for the sake of making 
IPI successful and whereas IPI is linked through the 
two Kupiane companies to the Porgeran community 
as a whole – NKWH, although nominally owned by 
its three LICs stands more or less alone. None of the 
three village companies had much in the way of assets 
when they last reported to IPA (the total net value was 
less than K500,000). Further, the LICs’ representatives 
on the NKWH board are, relative to the leaders who 
dealt with the project for many years (as mentioned 
earlier) and certainly relative to their counterparts on 
71   Which raises the question that cannot be answered here: who did receive these funds?
72   This consists of three companies: Black Cat Ltd., Black Cat Security and Black Cat Hires all of which are listed by IPA. Black Cat security 
is reported by IPA to be ‘removed’ – it had not made any reports to IPA since 2008 (and lodged no Annual Returns). It and Black Cat Ltd 
according to the IPA website are both solely owned by Rex Mauri. According to the same source Black Cat Hires is a joint venture between 
Mr. Mauri who owns only 10% of its shares and an outside party (whose place of residence is listed on different documents as either Lae or 
Mt Hagen – but whose representative is a Mt Hagen resident) who controls 90% of the shares. The consultant was assured by MMJV staff 
that Mr. Mauri is the sole owner of Black Cat Hires. Interestingly, the same external party has an identical (90:10 share split) JV  with one 
Nauti resident in the form of Hidden Valley Resources Ltd.
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great majority of mining and hydrocarbon projects 
of PNG represents an extraordinary challenge. 
However, if business success can be achieved in 
such unpromising locations, then the individuals who 
achieve it can teach the rest of the country, including 
those Papua New Guineans would-be entrepreneurs 
located in less disadvantaged locations, a great deal 
about how to meet with commercial success.
13.2 The organisation of this chapter
The remainder of this chapter is presented in five sub-
sections:
a)   a summary of the report’s statistical findings in 
relation to the governance of Lancos
b)   an attempt to summarise the degree of financial 
success met with by Lancos
c)   a review of the overall outcomes relating to 
different strategies implemented since 1980 in 
PNG in the development of LBD
d)   a discussion of general aspects of LBD 
e)   some suggestions as to how the nation and the 
resource industries might build on what success 
has already been achieved
13.3 Statistical summary relating to the 
governance of Lancos
13.3.1 The Lancos in the sample used in this study
Approximately 400 companies were examined in a 
preliminary fashion in the course of this study. Those 
known or found to be inactive73 were eliminated 
and those which were simply holding or other 
companies associated with a company included in 
the study were also eliminated (although some of the 
larger companies in Appendix A do include incomes 
derived from some eliminated companies).  A total of 
13.1 Two qualifications
Over the past thirty years, hundreds of company 
personnel have been engaged to assist in the 
development and support of thousands of landowner 
companies. Whilst it is true that some of the latter may 
have simply expected business to deliver maximum 
rewards for minimum effort at no risk, many more 
have worked extremely hard and experienced steep 
learning curves. In undertaking this study, the present 
consultant has had the privilege of meeting scores of 
Papua New Guinean entrepreneurs, some trying to 
balance communal or clan needs against commercial 
principles, others more simply trying to make a 
success of business for the benefit of themselves and 
their families; almost all have had to work much 
harder than employees working for resource projects, 
obey more rules and learn more new ways of doing 
things just to survive. 
When one bears in mind how many centuries 
it took Europeans to develop the commercial 
principles by which  the progress of PNG’s emerging 
entrepreneurs are judged and then remembers that 
even after all that time Enron-like fiascos, Lehmann 
Brothers meltdowns, international bank conspiracies 
and ‘stratospheric accounting errors’ at Tesco are as 
frequent as they ever were, more than a degree of 
latitude should be granted to PNG landowners who 
are trying to become successful business operators in 
their own lifetimes.
This point is reinforced by a second qualification: to 
attempt to develop business in some of the remotest 
areas of Papua New Guinea is to fly in the face of what 
is known of the development of trade and business 
world-wide and throughout history. Business prospers 
(and always has done) most readily in places, usually 
cities, with excellent links to the rest of the world not 
at peripheral places like Lihir Island or Tabubil. In 
other words, the establishment and successful growth 
of businesses in the remote sites occupied by the 
13. Conclusions and Suggestions
73   Some retained may now be inactive.
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It is not as if the average director of a Lanco, even if he 
is a shareholder, can turn up to AGMs of exemplarily 
managed corporations to find out how such meetings 
are run whenever he feels like it – for the simple 
reason that very few such AGMs (of companies with 
widespread public shareholding) are ever held in PNG. 
It seems to be more common for landowners to fly off 
to Melbourne or Toronto to wave fish about or lecture 
resource companies’ AGMs on human rights, than it is 
for them to be able to observe how companies should 
be run at home75. How many mining or hydrocarbon 
companies operating in the country hold AGMs in 
PNG from which a Lanco manager might learn? More 
broadly, how can a Lanco with an annual turnover of 
two (or even ten) million kina be expected to see any 
incentive in regularly reporting to IPA and the public 
if much larger companies do not? With PNG now 
signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) the lead in good corporate practice, 
including transparency, has to come from the top, 
whether the ‘top’ is occupied by private or public 
entities. 
In the course of this study, only Oil Search was in a 
position to state the degree of its Lancos’ compliance 
with a full range of employer responsibilities. However, 
in Appendix A four indirect and partial indicators 
of compliance are available for all companies in 
the sample. Given the special nature of Lancos, in 
particular the need to control shareholding so as to 
ensure landowners obtain the benefits of companies, 
it can be strongly argued that every Lanco should 
devote some effort to devising its own constitution so 
as to spell out exactly how it is going to be managed. 
It can also be argued that if they take the trouble to 
do this, it is also likely they will show the same sort 
of awareness in complying with the more stringent 
requirements expected of all businesses. Although 
it is not a perfect indicator, the presence or absence 
of a Lanco constitution is of some value in pointing 
towards compliance.
Secondly, promptness is submitting required reports 
and returns to IPA might be considered an indicator of 
the likelihood of companies complying with reporting 
requirements to other agencies – not a perfect one, 
but an indicator nonetheless. Consequently, from 
Appendix A we can calculate a measure of the 
promptness shown by companies in submitting their 
required Annual Returns.
129 companies are included in Appendix A after this 
process of sorting. In a few cases, some are of such 
recent establishment that they do not contribute to the 
different data summaries shown below.
13.3.2 Are there any secrets or short cuts to good 
management?
Even if in places this report has seemed to suggest 
that there might be a ‘Melanesian’ way of running a 
business, the answer to this question is very clear, no. 
There may well be Melanesian ways of dealing with 
customers or of how profits are expended, but there 
are none as far as the management and governance 
of a Lanco are concerned – it is full compliance all 
the way. If a company needs to take special measures 
(and most do), then it needs to set out the rules under 
which such measures will be taken – ideally in its 
constitution. As Robert Grimwade of MMJV argues 
forcefully, just because the Companies Act  says a 
company need not have a constitution, is no reason 
why  a Lancos should not have its own and every 
reason why it must have one if it has the intention 
of making any sort of special provisions for the use 
of its (and its shareholders’) resources.  There is a fair 
(but unfortunately not very good) correlation between 
companies that fulfil compliance requirements and 
those that have achieved financial success74. It would 
be improved if some companies did not fall back so 
frequently on those provisions of Section 212(3) of 
the Companies Act which allow them not to reveal 
some of their transactions (usually with their own 
Directors). Some further improvement might be 
achieved by IPA insisting that the conditions involved 
in Section 221 were strictly adhered to. For example, 
a rather significant number of bigger companies claim 
that their shareholders have agreed that the company 
need not reveal some forms of data, yet there is no 
proof shown in the public records of the IPA that such 
shareholders have actually given this approval. 
There may be short cuts to Lancos earning profits but 
there are none to good management. In this regard, 
once again, the example of Oil Search is one that 
resource companies should be encouraged to follow: 
check that all Lancos awarded contracts do fully 
comply with national regulations.
13.3.3 Aspects of Lanco compliance
Before examining some indicators relating to 
compliance by Lancos, it is worth mentioning that 
those running Lancos in PNG do not have many 
practical examples they can observe and then follow. 
74   In the period between the preparation of the first draft of this section (late November 2014) and the finalisation of the section (February 
2015), one of the most prominent Lancos has brought all its reports to IPA up to date. This will have increased the strength of the correlation 
between compliance and financial performance from ‘fair’ to ‘good’ for Lancos as a whole.
75  At least some of the fish wavers and HR lecturers now help manage or direct Lancos themselves. 
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terms of whether they are handing in reports to IPA or 
willing to let studies like this have data but, because 
it appears likely that in some cases such opacity is 
aimed at keeping community shareholders in the dark.
13.3.3.1 Lancos with and without a constitution of 
their own: Table 12 shows that around a quarter of all 
the companies in Appendix A have developed their 
own constitutions.
No Lanco has shares that are publicly traded. Almost 
all restrict shareholding to particular groups of people. 
It is considered to be of critical importance that these 
facts alone should require Lancos to have detailed 
constitutions. The OSL/LNG Lancos in particular 
– because many of them cover large numbers of 
people in different ethnic groups – have deliberately 
developed complex shareholding classes and other 
devices to assist them to hold their companies 
together; this is almost certainly the reason why they 
exhibit the highest proportion of companies with 
constitutions, which explain and lay down the rules 
relating to such shareholding arrangements, in Table 
12, and is to be applauded. But overall, the proportion 
of Lancos with constitutions is rather low and suggests 
that to some extent there has been a lack of care in the 
establishment of many of them.  
13.3.3.2 Promptness in submission of AR to IPA: It 
should be made clear that the data in Table 13 and 
Figure 21 refer to ARs registered in the IPA database, 
not to whether or not a company has actually 
prepared an AR. For example, IPI, Anitua and many 
other companies have independently audited and up-
to-date FSs and Annual Reports for their shareholders 
but these are not all to be found on the website. Some 
companies, notably those associated with Ramu 
NiCo – in the course of interviews – were even able 
to present independently audited FSs even though, as 
Thirdly, for all Lancos that report to IPA, even those 
which are tardy in doing so, we can calculate the 
frequency with which directors are replaced. This is 
the weakest of the indirect indicators since it is by 
no means clear whether low levels of replacement of 
directors are beneficial or otherwise in the running 
of the company. On the one hand, there were many 
instances encountered in the course of interviews for 
this study in which respondents noted that leaders 
within the wider landowner society appointed, 
because of their general leadership roles, to Lanco 
boards had proved both hindrances to good business 
practice and, then, difficult to remove from office. On 
the other hand, a low turnover of directors can also 
mean that management can operate within a stable 
environment. This third indicator is not commented 
upon here, but is dealt with in a separate set of 
paragraphs. (see 13.3.4)
Fourth, the Companies Act exempts most small 
companies from having to submit independent external 
audits. This limits the compliance requirements of 
the majority of Lancos. The data for this indicator is 
available for almost all companies in Appendix A. 
It is very evident that, ideally, more specific indicators 
might be developed – such as the regularity of AGMs, 
tax submissions, provisions for worker compensation 
etc – but such information could only be collected 
anecdotally through interviews for a small number 
of companies shown in the time available for this 
study. Despite this weakness in the data available, it 
is evident that there are strong grounds for suspecting 
that significant numbers of Lancos do not comply 
with a wide range of requirements; entries on the IPA 
database regarding requests for permission to defer a 
Lanco AGM are very common. Some Lancos appear 
to be reluctant to be transparent in their dealings. 
The latter is particularly worrisome, not so much in 
Table 12: Numbers and proportions of Lancos with and without individual constitutions
 Site Number with constitution Number without Proportion with (%)
 Ok Tedi 11 26 30
 OSL/PNG LNG 12 20 38
 Ramu NiCo 1 4 20
 Porgera 2 13 13
 Lihir 5 20 20
 Hidden Valley 2 9 18
 Simberi 0 3 0
 Elk-Antelope 0 1 0
 Overall 33 96 26
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In any case, the overall figures indicate that there is 
considerable room for improvement in the submission 
of Annual Returns and/or their inclusion on the IPA 
website. The existing requirement that such returns be 
made appears not to be observed by the majority of 
Lancos shown in Appendix A.
13.3.3.3  Exempt companies: Of the 129 companies 
shown in Appendix A, 104 (81%) are  exempted from 
undertaking annual independent third party audits. 
The older resource sites tend to have higher than 
average proportions of non-exempt companies.  The 
proportions that have to undertake independent audits 
are: Ok Tedi and Porgera both 27%, Oil Search 22%, 
Lihir 12%, Hidden Valley 9% and all others zero.
13.3.4  Directors
In this section Hidden Valley, Simberi, Tolukuma and 
Elk-Antelope Lancos are omitted as being of recent 
origin and/or too small. 
The study covered 677 directors of whom 594 are 
analysed here. Many individuals are on the boards 
of more than one company; on Lihir, one male is a 
director of at least eight companies, one at Ok Tedi is 
on the boards of seven and many are on three or four 
boards76. So the actual number of individuals – rather 
than being 594 – is closer to 450. Females make up 
just under 6% of all directors and,  because it includes 
the eight directors of Ipili Wanda (the commercial 
arm of the Porgera Women’s Association), the Porgera 
sample in Appendix A had the highest proportion (at 
just over 20%). 
exempt companies, they are not required to do so; 
but these FSs (and associated ARs) are not shown on 
the site (and may not have been submitted yet to IPA).
It is of interest to note, in terms of this particular 
indicator, that the sites which have engendered 
the most successful large Lancos actually have a 
performance that is apparently not as good as sites 
where Lanco problems have been especially great. 
This may be a function of the sample of companies 
taken but it might also be an accurate indication of 
the attention paid by resource companies to the IPA 
requirements in a particular sense: perhaps those sites 
where Lanco problems (or potential for problems) 
have been perceived by resource companies as a 
risk to operations, more attention has been paid to 
compliance. 
Table 13: Lanco reporting to IPA of Annual Returns 
 Site Up to date 1-3 years in >3 years in Mean no. of years 
   arrears arrears in arrears
 Ok Tedi 7 23 7 2.1
 OSL/PNG LNG 5 18 9 2.5
 Rami NiCo* 0 2 3 4.0
 Porgera 4 5 6 2.9
 Lihir 1 15 9 3.9
 Hidden Valley 1 10 0 1.0
 Simberi 0 2 1 2.7
 Overall 18 75 35 2.6
Note: * It is emphasised that this indicator relates to whether an AR appears on the IPA website NOT to whether an AR 
(or FS) has been produced by the Lanco. The Ramu NiCo entry illustrates this since it is known, through the interviews 
undertaken there, that all the bigger companies not only had reasonably up-to-date ARs but had gone beyond compliance 
by having commissioned independent financial audits even when exempted from such a requirement.
Figure 21: Promptness of AR submissions to IPA (all sites).
76   MRDC companies, of which there are fifteen, are not included here. Some MRDC employees are directors of all, or nearly all of them and 
Provincial representatives of Hela and Gulf are on all the gas/oil companies.  
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The approximate turn-over rate for directors across the 
major sites has been 8% a year, with the lowest rate 
recorded at Porgera. Porgera also recorded the lowest 
number of directors per Lanco, largely thanks to the 
observed number of very small companies. All the 
metal-mining Lancos had between 4 and 5 directors 
per Lanco whereas both the OSL and LNG Lancos 
reflect the wider geographic spread of Lancos had 
significantly more at nine on average.  Interestingly, in 
view of the length of time that the OSL-based Lancos 
have been operating, they had slightly more directors 
than even the LNG Lancos; this, suggests that the 
structures set in place under OSL have managed to 
hold together, despite  the tendency to fragment 
shown at most other sites.
The length of service of directors is self-evidently 
primarily linked to the age of the project even if the 
turn-over rate will have some influence of the value 
recorded. Interestingly, only in Ok Tedi’s case is the 
relationship between the age of the project and the 
length of director service broken – which almost 
certainly reflects the recurrent failure at Ok Tedi of the 
largest companies.  
Female directors are few, forty out of 677 or 6% of 
the total. They were, relatively, most common among 
Lihir companies (probably because the sample 
includes so many small Lancos), at Porgera (due 
entirely to the inclusion of Ipili Wanda, the business 
arm of the Porgera women’s association) and Ok Tedi 
(where two small Lancos are run by private women 
entrepreneurs).  
A wide variety of shareholding arrangements are in 
place across PNG Lancos. They range from companies 
with thousands of direct shareholders (in the oil and 
gas fields) to single shareholder entities. In Table 15 
an attempt is made to classify them; some may well 
not fit the category they have been placed in.  For 
example, the ? placed against IPI arises from the fact 
that the company’s returns to IPA show the directors 
as shareholders not as trustees for the communities 
people assume they represent. Further, several of the 
companies shown as ‘subsidiaries’ in Lihir, might 
be better classified as ‘small companies with evenly 
spread shareholdings’.
The companies of interest – and possible concern – 
in the table below are those with headings in red: 
on the one hand, Lancos which appear to be owned 
communally but, according to their entries on the IPA 
website, are actually owned by a small number of 
people, usually directors and sometimes by a single 
individual; on the other hand, small Lancos may have 
several directors but the shares are held by a sub-
section of the directors, not all of them.  Between 
them these two categories account for 28% of the 
total sample.
13.3.5 Reports to shareholders and relations with 
them
While one can assess, with reasonable accuracy, the 
promptness of Lancos’ reporting to IPA, this study was 
unable to gain much statistical coverage of the more 
important question of their promptness in reporting to 
their shareholders. Moreover, one can only present 
anecdotal evidence concerning shareholders’ views 
regarding their Lancos. Consequently, what follows 
must be regarded with more than the usual degree of 
caution.
Table 14: Data on Lanco directors 
 Site No. directors No. former Turnover of Directors/ Average length 
   directors directors/year Lanco of service per 
      director (years)
 Ok Tedi 136 195 9% 4.9 8.1
 Oil Search* 109 129 7% 9.1 11.8
 Porgera 63 72 6% 4.2 9.5
 Lihir 114 87 7% 5 8.2
 Ramu 29 23 13% 5.8 4.6
 LNG* 143 69 10% 8.9   3.2
 Total 594 575 8% 5.3 6.4
Note: * In Appendix A Lancos in the OSL/LNG area are arranged roughly according to whether they were established when 
OSL was operating alone (or rather with BP, Santos and Chevron) or were established once the LNG started. This distinction 
has not been used as a basis for analysis so far but it will be used occasionally from now on. It is of obvious significance in 
this case. 
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Table 15: Types of shareholding in Lancos 
 
‘Communally held’ companies ‘Family’ and/or small companiesSite Subsidiaries
Widespread 
shareholding
Highly concentrated 
shareholding
Evenly distributed 
shares
Concentrated 
shareholding
Madang Star IH Tabubil Engin’g FCS  W & W Tabubil SS
Azobelle Camp Admin’n Cloudlands Hore Binkia Eng Bugum
SMP&I Faiwol Holdings Kana Kumgit  Suku 
 Faiwol Investment HWDC Umeng 
 Star Mt Clothing(?) Tabubil Hotels Adiyap 
 Tawap Kamen  KS Investments 
 H’way Transport  Handup 
 KCS  Mepu Investments 
 LOTIC  Kiunga SS 
 North Fly Rubber  Tabubil Auto 
 Tabubil Traders  Tabubil Bakery 
 SMIHL   
Ok Tedi
 Kiunga Co-op   
 Tugu Tapira Hides 4 Holdings Bebahoya T. Laitepo
 Angore Moran Ina Naga Komo Dai Hides Hiwa
 HGDC Kutmor SE Mananda UJV Tuguba H’ldgs
 Mananda Umbrella   Timalia Gangulu
 Trans Wonderland   
 Laba Holdings   
LNG
 Yiamo Gira   
Kutubu Catering Gigira DC Kutubu TS  Kawaso 
Eurest Gigira Moran DC   
GFS Maka Investment   
 Kutubu SS   
 Gobe Bus Dev’t   
 Kikori Oil   
 Yasuku Oil & Gas   
Oil Search
 Kewapa   
Kupiane Inv’ment IPI (?) IPIli Wanda Total Cleaning EJ Sisters
 Kupiane Yuu 
Anduane
 Soakofa Mapai Transport
   Mapai Contractors 
   Tupa Resources 
   Jim Leo Express 
   Mayadams 
   Geps 
   Kairik Cleaners 
Porgera
   Peroko 
 Raibus Kurumbukari  
  Maigari  
  Wass Matau  
Ramu
  Basamuk E/prises  
LBS NCS H’dings Lihir Construction Saberte Kalo
Lamatlik IL Kuridala  Caldera 
Nikama IL Lihir Civil &C  Kunaye 
Nissan IL Anitua  Londolovit Weir 
Tengawom IL   Nenelam 
Tinetalgo IL   Niu Londolovit 
Unawos IL   Bacasa 
   Noram 
   Kunaye 
   Unapual 
   Maron 
Lihir
   Sivetal 
NKW C & T  NKWH Black Cat 
NKW MS  Nauti  
NCS(HV)  Kuembu  
  Winima  
  HV Contractors  
  HV Transport  
Hidden Valley
  B Cat Hire   
  Simberi Island IL Shunammite Simberi
  Simberi Pit Owners  
Elk-Antelope   Sakura Osura*  
 
Note:  * concentration of shares due to delay in identifying who is eligible to own them. 
Table 15: Types of Lanco shareholding structures
Note: * concentration of shares due to delay in identifying who is eligible to own them.
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a)   the exemption rules relating to independent audits 
contained in the Companies Act be revisited 
b)   the rules in that Act which allow directors not 
to report their own incomes and expenses if all 
shareholders agree to that course of action be 
more thoroughly policed.
c)   Annual Reports to IPA contain a statement of 
dividends paid.
This would at least allow third parties to make 
an assessment as to whether or not shareholder 
complaints had any justification.
13.4.2 Relating performance to Lancos’ stated aims
There is a further consideration however: different 
Lancos may have set different aims for themselves. 
To assess their level of success needs to compare 
performance in the light of such aims. So what is 
any particular Lanco’s aim in terms of financial 
performance? Is it, to over-simplify the options, 
primarily to accumulate assets or is it to maximise 
dividend payments? Depending on the circumstances, 
either aim can be considered perfectly legitimate 
and/or logical. In terms of post-mine closure sources 
of income, accumulation of assets might seem, to 
outsiders, to be the preferable strategy; but people 
who previously have had very small incomes and who 
have a desire to see immediate benefits may regard the 
payment of dividends as a primary goal – especially 
in the early years of their company’s existence. The 
problem here is that, given that so few companies have 
constitutions and that – even amongst the minority 
that do have them – few specify what their financial 
goals actually are, then it is difficult to judge whether 
goals have been met. Presumably the basic goal of all 
is, at the very least, to survive.
This suggests yet another good reason why it is to 
be strongly recommended that any and all Lancos 
that are established on the basis of representing a 
landowner community should take the trouble to 
have their own constitution which clearly sets out 
their overall financial performance goals.
13.4.2  Lanco ‘survival’ rates
Over the years, many Lancos have failed and 
disappeared from public view. Without knowing 
precisely how many Lancos have not managed to 
achieve this rather basic aim, it is not possible to 
calculate precisely the survival rate of Lancos. 
However, an indirect way of measuring survival 
is possible by comparing the average age of Lancos 
at different sites , expressing this as a percentage of 
the age of the project and then comparing the result 
of that calculation with the age of the project as in 
Figure 22.
Given that proviso, there must be some concern 
regarding the relations between some Lancos and 
their shareholders and in particular between some 
of the larger umbrella or representative companies 
and the communities whose post-mining futures are 
rather dependent upon them. For example, it has been 
reported above that: 
a)  the landowners of the Hidden Valley project are 
dissatisfied with HKW despite that company’s 
rather good financial performance;
b)  Bainton and Macintyre’s papers suggest that 
even Anitua does not get universal approval from 
Lihirians despite its rather outstanding records 
in the areas of both governance and financial 
performance – as might be indicated by the 
plethora of small companies that try to obtain 
contracts with the mine;
c)  Significant sections of the Porgera community 
continue to express dissatisfaction with the 
relations they have with IPI.
Several other companies could be mentioned in this 
regard. None of the above statements can be regarded 
as very strong ones - and each taken on its own might 
be summarily dismissed, if taken in isolation, as the 
complaints of a small minority. But, one cannot dismiss 
the possibility that they are matters of genuine concern 
from shareholders who see few benefits of their equity 
holdings whilst directors of those companies seem to 
be doing rather well.      
This concern, if it is a valid one, may be a result of 
poor communications with shareholders, especially 
in the case of companies which do not hold regular 
AGMs. However, as section 13.5 will suggest there 
could be other reasons.
13.4 Statistical summary of Lanco financial 
performance and economic impact
13.4.1 Possible improvements in performance 
reporting
 Many indicators of financial performance that might 
be used for companies whose shares are held by, and 
traded among, the general public are not applicable 
to most (if not all) Lancos under consideration. For 
most Lancos in this study the lack of available data 
also rules out many more common forms of analysis 
used for listed companies. In view of the relatively 
widespread reports of dissatisfaction of community 
shareholders with their purportedly representative 
Lancos, there is a case for regulations to be changed 
so as to ensure that: 
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  ‘Resource sectors have weak linkages with 
the rest of the economy because imported 
inputs and capital intensive production 
generate little employment; therefore the 
real impact on the overall economy depends 
on	how	the	wealth	is	used’.77 
Without question, how resource-generated wealth is 
spent is of the highest significance. But it is in relation 
to the first clauses of this sentence that some questions 
do arise. To restate what was noted earlier: First, 
exactly what sort of non-traditional industry of any 
financial significance could it not be said that such 
an industry would have weak links with the rest of 
the economy in a country like PNG? Would not any 
such activity have to import most of its capital inputs 
initially (if not for longer)? Compared with almost all 
pre-existing economic activities in an unindustrialised 
economy, would not almost any ‘modern’ activity be 
relatively capital intensive? It is agreed that mining and 
even more so oil and gas extraction are more capital 
intensive than most industries, but only in degree.
Secondly, in the context of Papua New Guinea and 
particularly in the context of this study, are the linkages 
really as weak as this quotation assumes them to be? 
Is the employment (and associated economic activity) 
generated quite as so small as to be virtually worth 
ignoring? Ever since Ok Tedi’s development (and, it 
could be argued, even before that in the BCL case), 
Papua New Guinea has put considerable effort into 
getting resource companies to obtain as many of their 
supplies as possible within the country and, in most 
cases, from the area they impact upon. Now, it is true 
that this policy may not have bared its teeth (if it has 
any) very often for the simple reason that there aren’t 
any manufacturers of 150 ton trucks, or seismometers, 
of high grade steel for pipeline construction and the 
like in PNG. But the country does have (and since Ok 
Tedi’s start up, has increasingly had) firms in Lae and 
Port Moresby who can import industrial chemicals, 
equipment, trucks and all the paraphernalia required 
by the resources industries and each of these 
companies, both by obtaining a profit from importing 
and supplying them to resource companies and by 
employing Papua New Guineans to deliver them, write 
out invoices for them, repair and service them, adds to 
the GDP of the country. Further than that, how many 
accountants (in urban areas) are employed in PNG 
keeping the books for the companies in this survey? 
The relationship is a very close one (at r = -0.95) and 
shows that the older the project is, the smaller is the 
average age of Lancos (as expressed as a proportion of 
the age of the project). In other words, it tells us what 
we would expect it to do: the older a project is the 
more Lancos have disappeared (or alternatively, the 
more, newer Lancos have accumulated at the site). 
Whereas at newer sites the age of the Lancos still 
existing is close to 100% of the age of the project, at 
Ok Tedi (which is represented by the symbol on Figure 
22 furthest to the right) Lancos average age is around 
16 years, or half the age of the project.  However, 
this is only an indirect measure and is not especially 
precise either since not only does it measure the failure 
rate of older Lancos but it includes the effect of  new 
Lancos which spring up all the time and thus reduce 
the ‘average age of the project Lancos’.  Nevertheless, 
it has to be remarked that an average age of 16 years 
for Ok Tedi Lancos is rather impressive. This is far 
better than most studies in other countries of SME 
business success/failure might suggest and is certainly 
no worse than the figures reported for Australia (see 
p.15 in chapter 1 above). Whether this is a reflection 
of the efforts put into LBD either by the entity’s owners 
or by the resource company is a question that cannot 
be answered from the results of this study.  
13.4.3 Employment by Lancos
As observed in the introduction to this report (section 
2.4.1 above) it is a virtual mantra of commentators on 
the mining/hydrocarbon industries (especially those 
critical of them) that they form enclaves and have very 
weak links with the rest of the nation and thus does 
not stimulate the growth of the wider economy. Here 
is an example of such a statement:
Figure	22:	Relative	‘survival’	rates	between	sites.
77   Carolyn Fischer, 2007, ‘International Experience with Benefit-Sharing Instruments for Extractive Industries’, Resources	 for	 the	 Future,	
Washington. There is a double whammy potentially involved here with which critics can assault the PNG resources sector. This particular 
line of criticism is that the industry is not linked to the rest of the economy and ‘That Is A Bad Thing’. However, if, as will be attempted in 
the following paragraphs, it can be shown that in fact the linkages are rather strong, then the argument can be reversed – but with the same 
result - becoming: ‘PNG’s economy is so closely linked to that of its resources sector that any down turn in the latter will have catastrophic 
effects on the nation as a whole which is A Very Bad Thing’.
Page 106 Resource Project LANCOS
will be around 25,000 – or two and a half times the 
direct employment the mines offer. 
These figures exclude the oil and gas fields’ 
employment. OSL is a relatively small employer 
(800 or so persons of whom around 700 are Papua 
New Guinean) as is InterOil even though the latter 
is steadily increasing its workforce; together the two 
companies might be said to employ 1,500 people in 
round numbers in PNG.  The construction phase of 
PNG LNG project has been a huge employer; a peak of 
close to 20,000 employees was reached in mid-2013, 
which had fallen to 14,700 by the year end and will 
have continued to fall sharply since then.. Of these, 
40% have been, more or less throughout the whole 
construction period, Papua New Guineans (or 5,700 
in the last quarter of 2013). Assuming ExxonMobil’s 
forecasts to be correct it is reasonable to state that by 
mid-2015 it will employ 1,500 people. Thus direct 
employment in the hydrocarbons sector (excluding 
the myriad of lesser oil and gas companies) at present 
probably greatly exceeds 3.000 people.  Appendix 
A indicates that even when there is no data for 
employment by a significant proportion of the Lancos 
in the oil and gas fields (and includes no data for any 
Lancos, such as those emerging at the Stanley Field, 
at projects not yet in operation), those for which data 
does exist employed at least 5,800. In other words the 
ratio of hydrocarbon Lancos employment to that of 
the hydrocarbon resource companies is rather greater 
(at 6000 to 3000 or 2:1) than that for metal mining 
(15,000 to 10,000 or 1.5:1). 
If we total these numbers we arrive at the conclusion 
that at least 34,000 people are employed in the two 
sectors by the resource companies and their Lancos 
combined at or close to sites across the country or in 
head offices. 
But in addition, we also know (see Table 16 below) 
that whereas resource companies gave contracts to 
Lancos (which employed 21,000 people) in 2014 
worth roughly K1.6 billion, they also awarded 
contracts worth approximately K1.85 billion to other 
PNG companies, elsewhere in the country. If the ratio 
of contracts to employment was the same for these 
non-Lancos as that for Lancos (where it was K77,000 
in contracts to one job), then these non-Lanco 
payments would have generated a further 24,000 
jobs. This would give a total of 58,000 jobs created 
in the country consisting of at least 13,000 in direct 
employment by resource companies and 45,000 
to Lancos and other contractors across the country. 
It is probable that the ratio for non-Lancos was less 
favourable to job creation and that therefore the 
total just mentioned is a little high – but on the other 
hand there are reasons for supposing that the Lanco 
employment quoted is on the low side and that non-
How many people are employed in PNG’s many 
airline companies that earn a portion or a majority of 
their income from the resource sector?  How many of 
Port Moresby’s hotel rooms each night are occupied 
by employees of resource companies? And, to stretch 
the bow even longer, how many people earn a living 
in the media or in NGOs or get promotion through 
their research publications from commenting on the 
resource industries in PNG? 
To be more specific how many people do the Lancos in 
this study employ (we will look at broader economic 
impacts shortly)?  The data in Appendix A are:
•  wobbly because they (largely) come from ARs 
submitted to IPA and because these returns are 
for different years. But if anything they therefore 
understate the numbers of people employed by 
Lancos in 2013 (with the notable exception of 
the LNG Lancos - it is certain that employment in 
connection with the PNG LNG project for 2014 
will have fallen since 2013). However, since so 
many companies – even those in Appendix A - at 
the LNG project have had no AR (and thus no 
data) and since even those that have reported 
did do when employment numbers there were 
still on the rise, we can be more or less certain 
that the PNG LNG figures shown in Appendix 
A significantly understate the numbers that 
have been employed there in the recent past. 
To remove this particular source of weakness, 
employment figures in the following paragraphs 
distinguish between the total and the total with 
PNG LNG figures excluded;
•  incomplete because only companies listed with 
IPA (and not all of those either) are shown. 
At some sites the total numbers employed by 
Lancos will be greatly understated as a result. 
At Ok Tedi, several hundred employed in small 
Lancos around Kiunga are not covered here and 
at Porgera the profusion of small family groups 
running manhaul buses and other businesses 
not on the IPA register will also employ many 
hundreds.
Given these cautions, then PNG employment directly 
with OTML, PJV, Lihir, Hidden Valley, Ramu NiCo, 
and Simberi in 2013 totalled around 10,000 persons. 
The mining Lancos covered in this study employed at 
least 11,000 (including NCS and Anitua employees off 
Lihir). The actual total will be significantly higher than 
that, probably close to 15,000, given the cautions just 
mentioned, so even when not taking into account the 
indirect employment generated both by the mines 
themselves and their associated Lancos in other areas 
of Papua New Guinea then the total employment 
associated within the vicinity of the sites themselves 
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Lancos they are much more common. It is estimated 
that between 2500 and 3000 females are employed 
by the Lancos covered by this study or a little over 
20% of the total workforce. This is largely because 
so many of the bigger Lancos are concerned with 
camp maintenance and cleaning. The single biggest 
employer of women, other than in this field, is the 
Star Mountains Clothing Company at Tabubil with 
more than a hundred females employees engaged in 
sewing.
13.4.4 Lanco revenues and project payments to the 
wider PNG economy
Recent years’ expenditure on Lanco contracts by 
the PNG LNG project have dwarfed all other site 
expenditures on this item and the effect of this 
expenditure is visible not only in PNG economic 
statistics but in everyday life, especially in Port 
Moresby. These expenditures are already falling 
sharply, and will continue to do so and the impact this 
decline will have not just on Lancos but on businesses 
in Port Moresby (and Lae) will be a very good 
indication as to the strength of that project’s linkages 
with the wider economy (and will either confirm or 
put a dent into the opinions expressed by Fischer). 
For the present purposes, therefore, it is assumed 
that the PNG LNG project’s projections relating to 
its inputs into local businesses once construction of 
the first phase of the project is completed will apply: 
that is that such expenditure will amount to around 
US$200 million annually (or about K500m). Lancos in 
the project’s impact area, concerned about declining 
revenue, are already placing pressure on the project 
to allocate higher order contracts to them rather than 
to outsiders. In what follows, I have assumed that 
payments to local Lancos each year will amount to 
around K300m and payments to other PNG businesses 
might amount to K200m.  
Table 16 shows in rounded numbers the probable 
flows of resource company contracts both to local 
Lancos and to other PNG contractors in 2014. The 
total represents around 7% of PNG’s GDP. It is more 
likely to be an underestimate than an overestimate 
(since it is almost certain that PNG LNG payments will 
be greater than shown and since Oil Search figures 
are not included – although Lihir expenditure may be 
overstated in the table):
The PNG policy of encouraging resource companies 
to obtain goods and services from local and national 
suppliers can hardly be called unsuccessful when it 
shows results like these. Local Lancos seem to have 
annual revenues of more than a billion kina (and 
had much more than that during the construction 
of PNG LNG) whilst the industry’s links with other, 
non-Lanco businesses approximates to two billion 
kina. When one adds in the revenues that some of 
Lanco employment around resource sites is higher 
than that estimated. So a total in the region of 55,000 
to 60,000 jobs does not seem unreasonable. 
Even without including multiplier effects any further 
my own conclusion is that this number does not 
equate to Fischer’s ‘little employment’.
This survey cannot provide precise data on the origins 
of Lanco employees. The only sources of information 
tapped for the study were a) the information collected 
in interviews of a small number (37) of sampled 
companies and b) snippets of information relating 
to employees with a minimum wage of K100,000 
that can be gleaned from Lancos that submit audited 
Financial Statements. The former data source suggests 
that whilst eighty percent of Lanco employees are 
described by their employers as ‘local’, the majority 
of these are local residents now, but many of them 
are in fact migrants from nearby areas outside the 
‘preferred’ areas for company employment. As far as 
high paid employees are concerned, only the largest 
Lancos (perhaps thirty in all) can even contemplate 
hiring such employees, usually at the highest 
managerial level in the company. All the rest must try 
and do without high flyers. In particular, expatriates 
are rarely employed by Lancos. If we discount those 
seconded by resource companies to help set up or run 
strategically important Lancos, no more than thirty 
expatriates were employed by the Lancos in the study 
with Anitua being the leading employer as well as one 
medium sized Lanco associated with Ok Tedi which 
employed six foreigners; this latter rather proves the 
point since the company in question could barely 
make a profit as its wages bill was so high.
Despite this absence of firm data some points can be 
made about employment by Lancos. For most residents 
of resource project impact areas, employment with the 
resource company is the most immediately possible and 
single biggest benefit obtainable. Resource companies 
tend to pay significantly higher wages than other 
elements of the economy; the lowest paid workers at 
one (metal-mining) resource project, for example, are 
paid a minimum of K20,000 annually. Lancos – as far 
as this study was able to establish through interviews – 
pay wages more in line with non-resource companies 
around the country. Consequently, it is unlikely that 
any resident of a resource project impact area who 
falls into a category of people who have been given a 
high priority for employment with the company will 
opt to work for a Lanco. We would expect Lancos to 
employ a higher proportion of non-residents than the 
resource companies themselves. Of course, I cannot 
be sure of this conclusion and would suggest that this 
topic could fruitfully be examined further.
While women directors are few, as employees of 
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study. But some rough approximate indications exist 
and these are shown in Table 17.
While the data shown in the Table are sub-optimal, 
since they refer to a range of different years, they show 
some interesting, very general contrasts between sites 
which might require further investigation.
•  The significance of a site having a successful 
large Lanco, is suggested by the contrast in the 
Lanco assets of Porgera and Lihir on the one hand 
and Ok Tedi in particular on the other;  
•  Overall asset accumulation is rather low in 
relation to the revenues that have flowed through 
the Lancos over the years. At Ok Tedi, the average 
annual accumulation of Lanco assets since the 
start of operations has been around K4m and 
the value of all assets accumulated over that 32 
the bigger Lancos now earn from sources other than 
the resources industry, then one is talking of local 
level Lancos handling revenues approximating to 4% 
of the national GDP (US$15.3bn in 2013) and total 
flow of payments from resource companies to local 
businesses worth around 7.5% of GDP. These are not 
trivial numbers even if, as Fischer and others argue, 
how resource revenues are spent remains a major 
issue.
13.4.5 Asset accumulation   
Is LBD accumulating assets or are profits largely spent 
on dividend payments? How does asset accumulation 
by means of LBD compare with asset accumulation 
through investment via the MRDC (or similar) funds? 
Accurate answers to such questions require much 
more work than was done in (and far more accurate 
and comparable data than were available to) this 
Table 16: Likely flows of payments from resource companies to Lancos and PNG businesses in 2014 
(K’ Millions)
 Site Flows to local Lancos Flows to other PNG businesses
 Ok Tedi 230 240
 Porgera 160 230
 Lihir 580 520
 Hidden Valley 90 660 (Lae mostly)
 Simberi 10 ?
 Ramu NiCo 25 ?
    Subtotal 1095 1650++
 OSL 220 ?
 PNG LNG (see text) 300 200
 Total 1615 (=US$ 645m) 1850++ (= US$740m)
Note: Numbers relate ONLY to Lanco income from resource companies; since several earn income from other sources, the 
totals understate total Lanco revenues.
Table 17: Net assets of Lancos and of investment funds managed by MRDC (K’Million)
 Site Net Assets of Lancos in this study Net Assets in MRDC managed funds
 Ok Tedi 128 329[09]
 Porgera 345 9[07]
 Lihir 368 445[09]
 Hidden Valley 20 NA
 Oil 89 286[09]
Note: Lihir MRDC fund became independent in 2009; MRE (Porgera) no data after 2007; Oil/gas Areas – MRDC funds relate 
ONLY to petroleum resources, not gas. Lanco assets as of last AR – since these are usually 3 years out of date the figures are 
understatements of the present position.
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mine’s original equity from its developers and 
then selling off those shares at more or less the 
very best time in the mine’s history. The Lihirian 
managers of the fund (since it left the control 
of MRDC in 2008/09) were not in a position 
to reveal the value of their 2014 assets when 
interviewed but it is likely that the fund’s assets 
now are valued at close to or in excess of double 
the number shown in table 17. 
•  Because of delays in the submission of ARs to 
IPA, the value shown in the Table for the oilfields 
is believed to be lower than the funds presently 
being managed (and several times lower than the 
funds now being managed for the hydrocarbon 
sector as a whole). It is reasonable to believe that 
whilst Lancos in these areas may be increasingly 
concerned that their future rate of asset 
accumulation will be slow (given that contract 
work values will fall now that major construction 
is completed), funds with the MRDC will grow 
rapidly as royalties and other fees continue to 
flow into them.
In short, in all cases except Porgera, asset accumulation 
has been more successful (and much more easily 
accomplished) through investment than through the 
operation of Lanco businesses. So if it is true that 
Lanco business has benefitted the few rather than 
the community at large, then the holders of such a 
view can take comfort from the fact that – providing 
the MRDC and other investment funds are prudently 
managed – there are much larger assets available for 
the whole community accumulating in the investment 
funds.
A final possible implication of the data in table 17 
is this: if significant community funds are being 
accumulated for future use, does this not make the 
short-term maximisation of consumption of mine 
benefits obtained through small-scale business more 
justifiable, more logical even? If investment funds and 
the larger representative Lancos are accumulating 
assets, what is wrong with smaller Lancos enjoying 
the fruits, hard won, of their labour? Does everything 
have to be sustainable for everyone?  
Figure 23 shows the performance of each company 
for which there are available data over its life in 
terms of the annual value of its accumulated assets. 
It needs to be stressed that this is only one way of 
measuring a company’s performance and that what 
might seem a ‘poor’ performance on this indicator 
must be referred to a) the Lanco’s aims and b) other 
year period of Lanco activity is somewhat less 
than the total revenues that OTML paid to Lancos 
in 2012 alone. The comparable annual rates of 
accumulation among Porgera Lancos (which 
is largely IPI) at around K17m and among Lihir 
Lancos (mainly NCS/Anitua) at around K20m are 
much healthier. The Lancos in the oilfields have 
seemingly rather low rates of accumulation of 
assets given the size of the revenues they have 
received, although this is partly a function of the 
absence of data for some Lancos and the out-of-
date data available for others. It certainly appears 
that if assets are to be accumulated by means of 
Lanco business for the long-term, the presence 
of a large, communally owned representative 
company is an essential pre-requisite.  
•  All the investment fund data is outdated, but in 
the absence of MRDC being willing to release 
any newer information (as yet), we must make do 
with what is publicly available. Fortunately for 
Ok Tedi and Western Province people, their two 
investment funds have, with considerably less 
effort than is required in normal Lanco business 
endeavour, accumulated assets rather more 
quickly than the private businesses operating 
in their area78. Of course, this relative success, 
when compared to the accumulation of Lanco 
assets would pale if we were to compare the 
funds accumulated under the PNGSDP. 
•  By contrast, the MRE (Porgera and Enga) fund 
was, by 2009 in an extremely unhealthy position; 
it would extremely interesting to know a) why 
this was so and b) whether or not it has recovered 
since 2009. As for the first of these questions, it 
is believed that MRE lost heavily on its strategy in 
selling its share of the project’s gold production 
(which it undertakes quite independently of other 
shareholders in the project). It will be recalled 
that more than most MRDC-managed funds, 
the MRE board membership was balanced in 
favour of landowners. If the MRE funds have not 
recovered since 2009, then the significance of 
Lanco assets, and particularly those of IPI, for the 
future of Porgera people is greatly increased since 
the weight of sustaining mine benefits will fall on 
that company.
•  Lihir is easily the best performer in Table 17. 
Not only have its private Lancos (Anitua/
NCS) done well but its investment funds have 
performed excellently. This is partly due to the 
Lihir landowners wresting a larger share of the 
78   The two funds (one for Western Province as a whole and one for Ok Tedi people) had had, up to 2009, the same rate of success – both were 
worth between K70m and K80m.
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Figure 23 shows, as has been previously been referred 
to, that effectively Lancos operate in a dual system: 
there is a small layer of large companies that operate 
on a large scale, across several sectors and across a 
wide geographical region and which, today at least, 
are now accumulating significant assets while the 
great majority of companies are small, tied to a single 
resource site, performing a particular function and not 
able (or choosing not) to accumulate much in the way 
of assets. The clustering of crosses at the base of each 
site’s column in Figure 23 indicates what most Lancos 
do: they accumulate assets, if at all, very slowly. Thirty 
nine of those shown have on average accumulated 
assets at an annual average rate of less than K100,000 
and only 25 have an accumulation rate in excess of 
half a million kina per year. In the present consultant’s 
opinion, this is not surprising; as stated several times 
earlier, why should we expect small companies to 
accumulate assets any more than we would expect 
them to be able to move part of their operations (as 
larger Lancos can) to a large urban market? Even 
though these companies do not have to submit 
audited financial returns, it was very evident from the 
interviews carried out during this study (if unprovable 
statistically) that they get by on small profit margins, 
only just survive irregular cash flow problems and do 
not make their shareholders wealthy. It is the dozen or 
so large Lancos where the wealth lies.
13.5 Outcomes of various LBD strategies
13.5.1 Has the concept of umbrella companies 
proved workable?
13.5.1.1 Umbrella companies as incubators/
protectors of small Lancos: If one accepts the definition 
of an umbrella company, which was adopted back in 
1980 for the original Ok Tedi project, to be one which 
provides shelter to infant companies by assisting them 
with business and compliance advice, then the only 
umbrella company to have succeeded at all in this 
fashion appears to be Anitua. Even Anitua, according 
to Bainton and Macintyre’s accounts can hardly be 
said to be a fulsome success given the dissatisfaction 
said to be voiced by many Lihirians at the assistance 
they actually obtain from LBS in setting up their 
own businesses. But at least Anitua does offer such a 
service. At Porgera, IPI cannot be said to do so and, 
like Anitua for the main part, has concentrated, with 
success, its efforts on developing its own interests even 
if these are in the name of the Porgera community as 
a whole. Raibus at Madang does not operate as an 
umbrella company, in the sense in use here, even 
if it is described as such by all concerned with that 
project. The same goes for NKW Holdings – although 
changes are currently underway there. At Ok Tedi 
itself there is no remaining umbrella company, even 
if a revival of the concept was being considered there 
indicators of performance. There are 93 Lancos in 
all in the diagram which contains some surprises as 
well as also confirming earlier conclusions. In terms 
of confirming earlier impressions, the outstanding 
performance of Lihir (overwhelmingly due to Anitua 
and NCSH), the similar dominance of Porgeran Lancos 
by IPI and Kupiane Investments and the relatively 
weak performance of the Ok Tedi Lancos (where there 
is no such large leading company) are all relevant. 
The LNG data used are rather thin and not too much 
significance should be read into them, even if they 
were doing well in this respect when the most recent 
available data was provided.
The two surprises in Figure 23 are:
•  Lancos originally set up to serve OSL (but 
continuing to trade since the arrival of the PNG 
LNG project) have not accumulated many assets 
and those that they have accumulated have been 
acquired slowly. Their overall performance in 
this respect is no better than that of the Ok Tedi 
Lancos despite the thoroughness that OSL staff 
have exercised in assisting these Lancos. This 
may well be due to the fact that there appears to 
have emerged no oilfield equivalent to Anitua or 
IPI -  
•  Hidden Valley Lancos (i.e. those associated with 
NKWH rather than the individual landowner 
investment companies) have had a good start. 
This may be due at least in part to their location 
in Lae (as well as to energetic management).
Figure 23: Annual average level of asset accumulation by 
Lancos at each site.
Note: Each X represents one Lanco; the values shown 
beneath each project name shows the average for all Lancos 
at that site; Lihir includes two small companies that had 
just been established at the time of their last IPA report with 
funds from the project which were included in their assets. 
Many other companies have received similar subsidies 
which are included in their assets.
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assured, however) of being sustainable and generating 
large assets.
13.5.1.3 The future for umbrella/representative 
companies: From the above, it is reasonable to 
conclude that
•  It is difficult to envisage how businesses can be 
started in remote areas without the umbrella 
concept being applied in some way. 
•  Umbrella companies, in general, have not really 
nurtured smaller local companies even if, with 
considerable help from the resource companies, 
they have themselves (and in some cases) 
prospered commercially…. 
•  …..and it is equally difficult to envisage LBD 
leading to asset accumulation for the future 
benefit of the community without the existence 
of a large, representative company. 
•  Since the evidence presented here strongly, but 
not unambiguously, points to the conclusion 
that most of the larger Lancos, designated as 
‘representative’ or ‘umbrella’ companies are 
unlikely to support the growth of smaller ones 
but are more likely to gather up all business 
opportunities for themselves, then the ‘nurturing 
support’ aspect of the umbrella concept needs 
to be retained by the resource company itself.
13.5.2 What success have resource companies had in 
establishing and guiding Lancos?
In theory, given that resource companies are the 
biggest source of funds for Lancos, especially in the 
earliest days of their existence, companies could be 
expected to exert more or less full control over them. 
However, in practice and as companies develop, most 
resource projects appear to have only a fair level of 
influence over their semi-dependent Lancos and an 
even weaker one on those Lancos that are maturing 
beyond dependence on the resource company. This 
appears to be partly a natural sequence of events but 
also, at least in part, because of internal weaknesses 
or perhaps inconsistencies in the implementation of 
LBD policy by companies and also by some lack of 
follow through by responsible government agencies. 
In relation to the resource companies, one can point 
to OTML which, after two major attempts (first under 
Siop and then under the Back to Basics program), 
found that it was increasingly unable to gather accurate 
statistics on local Lancos, is currently trying to re-
assert more control over them. Porgera is confronted 
with hundreds of individual business entities, very few 
of which are formally registered with IPA, clamouring 
for individual small contracts; it is doubted if anyone 
at PJV would dare to claim that they have the Lancos 
in mid-2014. So, overall, it can be concluded that 
umbrella companies have not generally served as a 
means of incubating smaller local Lancos. 
If this is the case at most sites, then the question arises: 
what other agency could take on this role? Without 
support in their initial stages it seems highly improbable 
that local businesses in remote areas of the country 
could ever arise. So, since resource companies are, as 
part of their licence to operate, bound to help develop 
local business, the answer is clear: the resource 
companies themselves are the only organisations 
likely to perform this function. They are the ones who 
control the award of contracts and for whom,  access 
to reasonably efficient Lanco contractors  who can do 
work cheaper than the company itself (or more distant 
contractors) can is a net advantage. 
A corollary of this conclusion is that the term used 
by the PNG LNG project – ‘representative company’ 
– is a more accurate, though not perfectly accurate, 
term to describe the larger Lancos than is ‘umbrella 
company’. The need to insert the reservation the 
previous sentence arises because it is not entirely 
clear that all these large Lancos actually do represent 
the impacted communities as a whole; some do more 
nearly approach this ideal than others.
13.5.1.2 Have umbrella/representative companies 
succeeded commercially? For the time being, the 
umbrella companies at Lihir and Porgera can be 
said to have done very well after falling into trouble 
early on; those at Ok Tedi have failed. No equivalent 
company has emerged on the oilfields. This, according 
to John Brooksbank (see section 8.2.1. above) was due 
to disjointed project development and competition 
between, rather than co-operation amongst, parochial 
power bases. But they have a second chance insofar 
as the gasfield developments may help one (or more) 
emerge. The gasfield developments themselves have 
put in place several large representative companies, 
including Laba Holdings in Port Moresby. It is too 
early to say whether those at Ramu, Hidden Valley 
or the gasfields will succeed but Trans Wonderland 
and NKWH have had promising starts. Moreover, 
in the two cases where the umbrella/representative 
companies have succeeded commercially (IPI and 
Anitua), they have done so rather spectacularly 
and have also shown themselves to be capable of 
accumulating assets which will provide them with 
the potential to be successful for many years to come. 
No other Lancos have done this although a few, by 
dint of very hard work over many years during which 
they have slowly accumulated assets, are worthy of 
notice. In other words, if one is tempted to dismiss 
umbrella/representative companies entirely, then one 
should bear in mind that these  Lancos  have proven, 
once properly established, capable (not necessarily 
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In short, there is more than one reason to recommend 
that resource companies keep a close track of the 
contractors, including Lancos, they hire. Other 
resource companies should, now that PNG has signed 
up to the EITI, seriously consider trying to emulate the 
Oil Search model of data collection for their Lancos 
and other contractors. But to do so, perhaps they need 
a little more assistance from the State than is usually 
forthcoming.
13.5.3 Has the PNG national policy of pushing 
resource developers into supporting LBD been 
successful?
While there have been many failures among Lancos, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the overall policy 
thrust of insisting that resource project developers 
commit to LBD has been quite successful given the 
challenges that its implementation has had to face. 
Perhaps this is why the Prime Minister, as noted in the 
opening of this study, is keen for even greater efforts to 
be made in the area.
However, two qualifications need to be made to the 
conclusion just reached: the State’s own policies 
towards LBD have shifted very considerably over time 
and, other than a degree of supervision exercised by 
some of its officers of the process of implementing 
LBD by the companies, its own direct contributions 
to this success have – until quite recently – been very 
limited.
13.5.3.1 Changing government policy towards LBD: 
When Ok Tedi was being planned, local business 
development was a part of the planning but government 
itself gave no financial support to it; all assistance was 
to come from the resource company. The Ipili people of 
Porgera managed to negotiate financial support in the 
form of government guarantees for their representative 
company as well as some direct financial support. 
Lihir people also obtained some financial support 
from government. In all these (and other) cases the 
principal government role was to monitor the resource 
companies’ performance. However, the development 
of the PNG LNG project set a very different set of 
precedents with the State agreeing to provide business 
arms of ILGs with a million kina ‘seed money’. In the 
most recent case of the Stanley Gas Project K30m 
was provided by the State; this sum is equivalent to 
total assets accumulated by the most successful Lanco 
at Ok Tedi over a fifteen year period.   Whatever the 
future role of the State as a seed-funder of LBD (and it 
will be difficult for it to abandon this role), there are 
potentially and actually much more important roles 
for the State and its agencies in the encouragement 
of good practice amongst Lancos (see 13.6 below).
13.5.3.2 State input into LBD to date: Whilst the State 
has become increasingly generous in its financial 
under control. Lihir seemingly abdicated, with relief, 
its responsibilities in this area when Lihir Business 
Services was taken over by Anitua. Even ExxonMobil 
passed on the responsibility for LBD capacity-building 
to its major contractors during construction. To a large 
degree, this was a deliberate aspect of that company’s 
policy which is that its National Content Plan is to 
create independent, free-standing PNG companies. It 
will be of interest to see if will ever need to modify 
this strategy, and, if it does need to, whether it can re-
assert control now that the first construction phase is 
ended and business opportunities decline. 
One company is a clear exception to this conclusion: 
Oil Search may not exactly control the Lancos which 
work with it but it does the next best thing: it knows 
their workforce numbers and composition, it knows 
their degree of compliance with national business 
requirements, and it keeps full records (and is willing 
to make them publicly available) of its payments to 
the companies. This last might seem to be a rather 
simple, elementary form of data keeping – but OSL 
was the only company that could provide the present 
study with the results of such accounting which did 
not contain errors and which extended for more than 
a decade.
Of course resource companies should not expect to 
be able to control Lancos – the whole point of LBD is 
to generate business that eventually stands on its own 
feet and controls itself. But since any failure of any 
sort associated with resource projects will generally 
said, especially by the resource industry’s ideological 
opponents, to be the industry’s ‘fault’, then simply 
as a matter of self-interest the industry needs to at 
least consistently keep tabs on what is happening to 
the Lancos it has helped to create and which are to 
some degree dependent upon it. It is self-evidently 
not easy to do this and to keep track of contractors 
including Lancos, but the OSL case shows that it is 
not impossible. 
Further, it is not only in the matter of LBD that accurate 
and continuous data collection on contractors of all 
sorts can pay dividends. In the very different area of 
trying to deal with the problems of project-associated 
inward migration, it is very clear at mining sites around 
the world that unless contractors are kept under 
control, then no matter what measures the resource 
company takes in its efforts to restrict such migration, 
they will tend to be undermined by the behaviour of 
contractors. Even in this study this link between LBD 
and migration is evident – one of the most popular 
forms of business taken up by landowners is labour 
hire. This automatically is liable to lead to in-migration 
as local labour hire Lancos are almost certain to bring 
in non-locals, even if these people are solemnly 
declared to be ‘original residents’.
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support from all their respective local communities. 
This is not to say that LBD is an inefficient means 
of providing benefits to impacted populations. This 
study cannot arrive at such a conclusion and it will 
require detailed studies at a number of sites of the 
effectiveness of employment, training, royalty, equity 
and compensation payments, investment, community 
infrastructure investment to show which of these 
(or any other) resource project investments in the 
communities has had the best returns for different 
stakeholders, whether those returns be expressed 
in purely financial terms or in terms of community 
satisfaction.
13.5.5 Can community-based companies work or is 
fragmentation inevitable?
The answer is that fragmentation in most cases does 
seem to take over but that in a few cases, communal 
unity of ownership can be maintained. Most of the 
exceptions so far are in the PNG LNG area but given 
the prosperity generated during the construction of 
that project, and the short time that has elapsed in 
the evolution of the project, it is certainly too early 
to say that the issues associated with fragmentation 
have been overcome there.  Even within the PNG 
LNG project there is already some sign of a tendency 
towards fragmentation within the LABA group. 
Outside of that project, and of Oil Search operations, 
only a very few companies have managed to maintain 
a widespread shareholding largely under the control 
of clans or other large social groups over a long period 
of time. IPI and Anitua are the biggest examples of 
this, but it also happens that among the few medium 
or small companies that have avoided fragmentation 
are some of the best performing ones – Camp 
Administration and Faiwol Investors for example at 
Ok Tedi; indeed the clans around the Ok Tedi project 
have shown remarkable staying powers despite many 
meeting with disappointing investments in the past. 
Outside of Ok Tedi, it seems as if either very strong 
leadership or good leadership accompanied by regular 
dividend payments are the keys to maintaining such 
support (and that the latter is likely to be ultimately 
more important than the former).  The leadership is 
required to ensure that infant companies are allowed 
to build up retained earnings and not forced to 
distribute all profits shortly after they are earned; but 
delicate judgement is required as to when to start 
paying dividends if shareholders are not either to lose 
patience with the company or lose faith in its board 
members. 
It was observed in the course of this study that several 
companies – Raibus at Madang for example – feel 
obliged to make donations or loans to community 
members, and give this as one of the reasons why they 
have not paid dividends. This is taking CSR too far 
assistance to Lancos, until only a few years ago the 
role it was assigned in the various MoAs governing 
stakeholder commitments in resource projects 
was simply that of monitoring LBD progress and 
insuring that resource companies were fulfilling 
their commitments. Companies were supposed to 
submit periodic (three or six-monthly) reports on 
LBD, contracts awarded and supplies and services 
contracted for, and government-led committees would 
oversee them. In fact, these arrangements have rather 
lapsed at almost all sites.  LBD has met, as seen above, 
with some success but, other than having introduced 
its support by others as a policy, the State cannot take 
a great deal of credit for this success, because, until 
quite recently, it has contributed little to it.
However, things are changing and not only in terms 
of the State throwing cash at LBD. The MRA has been 
particularly active at some sites, most evidently at 
Ramu Nickel, as the agent for the construction of 
community infrastructure – and in fulfilling this role it 
has been very active in liaising with and encouraging 
local businesses. At Madang, the MRA was the only 
stakeholder in the mine that received unanimous 
praise from the people (mainly small business owners) 
interviewed for this study. 
Further, as described earlier, the audit of LBD at 
Hidden Valley by the team led by DCTI but including 
IPA staff members has been received as a trail-blazing 
and exceptionally useful exercise by almost all 
stakeholders at that project. Whether the Department 
(or IPA) have the resources to extend such audits to 
other projects remains to be seen.  However, with 
Prime Minister O’Neill’s push for SMEs  illustrated by 
his address to the 2014 PNG Mining and Petroleum 
Investment Conference, there are evidently some 
prospects of this occurring.
13.5.4 LBD’s role in the mix of project benefits 
It is by no means clear what the relative benefits to 
any community impacted by a resource project are 
from the various components of the benefit packages 
presently in place. In terms of generating income, 
it was seen earlier (Table 17) that simply investing 
proceeds from landowner equity has accumulated 
more assets than have LBD operations at almost 
all sites. Further, providing MRDC follows prudent 
investment policies in future and providing the funds 
it generates are distributed equitably among the 
landowners its branches represent, such investments 
are likely to benefit many more people in project-
impacted communities than are LBD programs. This is 
because most of the smaller Lancos are for the benefit 
of only a small subset of the impacted population.  As 
for the larger Lancos, the ‘representative ‘ or ‘umbrella’ 
Lancos, their undoubted financial success over the 
last six or seven years has not yet, it seems, won over 
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who should be expected to build up businesses during 
a project’s life that can be carried on, in a similar 
fashion and with similar characteristics, after project 
closure so as to provide a post-project closure income 
for the community.
13.5.7 How does a company wean itself from its 
original dependence on a particular resource project? 
One key here appears to be ‘set up at least part of 
the business in an urban location where business 
opportunities are less restricted than at the resource 
site’. It is evidently not THE key since Anitua did 
not (at first) follow such a strategy but rather went 
in for selling its expertise in a particular field (mass 
catering) in a wide variety of places across PNG. Of 
the 25 Lihir Lancos shown in Appendix A, all but 
two have their office on the island. But Anitua has 
located its investment activities off Lihir. And IPI’s 
real successes started to mount up once it acquired 
a Lae base for part of its operations just as the one 
really bright spot for Hidden Valley landowners (in 
business) is that NKW was able to exert leverage from 
its location in Lae. Further, at least some of the Ramu 
project Lancos would probably not have survived 
had they not been able to taken up non-project work 
around Madang, while several of the offspring of the 
PNG LNG project and OSL have invested heavily 
in urban activities (and real estate) in Port Moresby. 
Twenty-one of the 32 hydrocarbon Lancos shown in 
Appendix A have their offices in Port Moresby (and 
the biggest of all, Trans Wonderland has its in Lae). 
Conversely, the Ok Tedi landowners have hardly been 
able to bestir themselves to invest in Kiunga, where 
many service opportunities today are under foreign 
control, let alone Port Moresby. Other than the cluster 
of companies established by Warren Dutton out of 
his Kiunga base, the only Port Moresby activity by Ok 
Tedi-dependent companies outside of investment in a 
house or two, was actually stimulated by the manager 
of the branch of MRSM – in a hotel, although it is 
true that the Star Mountains Clothing Company has 
managed to expand to Lae.
13.5.8 Are there any obvious characteristics in 
common among the currently more successful 
companies?
It would be remiss to overlook one not very palatable 
fact about many of the more successful companies: 
who runs the two biggest companies at Ok Tedi 
(MRSM and Ningerum Transport), who are the CEOs 
of IPI, Anitua and HGDC, and the COO of NKW? 
Foreigners or naturalised citizens.  Should one take 
this as a weakness? On the whole, the answer is no, 
for several reasons. First, although a good CEO is 
essential to any business, a good Board of Directors 
is often just as important; the CEO is part of a team 
in a well-run company. The boards of all these 
– after all their shareholders (who forego dividends) 
are, by reason of restrictions on shareholding in the 
companies, community members too.
However, whilst eventual fragmentation seems to be 
the norm, when business structures are first established 
it is most acceptable to communities that community-
based companies are given priority – even if it can 
reasonably be expected that they will fragment at 
a later stage. In this sense, the umbrella company 
strategy is closely related to this issue – commit to it, 
but be prepared to see it collapse, if it has not become 
sufficiently established before individual ambitions 
take over.  
13.5.6 Should a company wean itself away from the 
original project?
If almost all sites exhibit a tendency for the 
individualisation of Lancos even where one or two 
larger Lancos exist, then most Lancos will not be big 
enough to even contemplate moving away from the 
project that gave rise to them. Lancos that are tied to 
a specific resource site are unlikely to ooutlive that 
site. In that sense they are unsustainable (though 
with mines with long lives  - like Ok Tedi or Lihir – a 
business tied to a particular project can last for three, 
four or five decade, for long enough to hardly warrant 
being called ‘unsustainable’).. But while the original 
business may not be sustainable, what of the profits it 
generates? –whether or not they are sustainable will 
depend on the use to which they are put.  Just because 
a business is unlikely to last beyond the life of the 
mine does not mean that the effort put into it does 
not reap sustainable rewards – if profits are invested 
wisely, the original effort in a relatively short-lived 
business might bring benefits for many years. This 
is precisely the reason why a development strategy 
based on mining is not necessarily unsustainable: 
because its benefits can be put to use long after the 
mine has closed. In short, to expect all Lancos to be 
sustainable in the sense of their business built up to 
serve the resource project to outlive that project is 
rather ridiculous; smaller Lancos in particular really 
cannot expect to do otherwise. What they could be 
encouraged to do is to invest the profits they make in 
this way into activities that will outlast the project’s 
life. 
In other words, it is unreasonable to expect all the 
smaller Lancos to be ‘sustainable’ in their original 
form. It is reasonable however that – as with project 
employees’ use of their wages – resource companies 
should consider educating local business owners and 
shareholders on other forms of investment that will 
outlast resource operations. Some small Lancos might 
well survive mine closure and that is to be encouraged. 
However, it should be one of the duties of the larger 
Lancos, who represent the communities as a whole, 
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announced its intention to transfer a cleaning 
contract (once the contract period ended) from one 
small group of landowners to the business arm of the 
Porgera women’s association, the previous contract 
owners managed to organise considerable opposition 
to the move and one of its four major shareholders 
observed that since the mine had taken his land then it 
was its duty to provide him with a business for the rest 
of his life. He regarded his business as compensation. 
On a much bigger scale, the Lihir Integrated 
Benefits Package also tends to blur the line between 
compensation sensu stricto and other benefits. That 
Porgera landowner’s view is almost certainly shared 
by the great majority of impacted landowners at 
resource sites across PNG. Further it is a view with 
a degree of justification; world best practice is that 
projects shall at a minimum restore livelihoods which 
the original level of compensation at Porgera may 
(or may not) have done – in this case the landowner 
thinks it did not. What world best practice does not 
give any guidance on is what maximum improvement 
in the livelihood of an impacted person might be; it 
leaves such issues – which are challenges to be dealt 
with on a daily basis by projects – up in the air. 
This is an unfortunate, because it implies that the 
original compensation given for the complainant’s 
land was inadequate (in the view of the landowner) 
and was only made up for by the free gift of a business 
which has paid him – in director’s fees, allowances and 
in dividends hundreds of thousands of kina over the 
years. This, in turn, implies that everyone at Porgera 
who gave up land should have also had an income like 
his every year as real compensation. Without passing 
any judgement on how his company ran the contract 
awarded to it, his view further implies that such a level 
of compensation is required no matter how well (or 
badly) run this ‘business-as-compensation’ has been.
Ideally, LBD is a benefit of project development and 
not compensation. If this distinction is not made clear 
then it is likely that there is little or no incentive for 
a Lanco to be well managed.  Unfortunately, the 
very first plan for LBD – at Ok Tedi in 1979/80 by a 
team that included the present consultant – made the 
mistake of pushing for Lanco development effectively 
as a substitute for the lack (at that time) of several real 
forms of compensation to landowners; to some extent 
that recommendation confused the issue and that 
confusion has continued to this day. In practical terms 
by now it is virtually impossible to disentangle what is 
compensation and what is a benefit in terms of LBD. 
It is a situation that will have to be lived with it seems. 
companies are fully staffed by Papua New Guineans. 
Secondly all the CEOs in the companies mentioned 
have more than two decades experience in helping 
run businesses.  Very few Papua New Guineans at 
resource sites can as yet match this. Thirdly, some of 
the larger companies, and most of the smaller ones, 
that are achieving success are doing so entirely under 
Papua New Guinean leadership especially those 
working with OSL and the PNG LNG project but also 
at Ok Tedi and Madang. In short, there are emerging 
at all levels of Lancos competent Papua New Guinean 
CEOs and managers; certainly Lancos are moving 
quickly towards localisation of management but have 
not fully achieved it yet79.
A second rather vaguer characteristic should not go 
unmentioned: some form of non-material stimulation 
seems to be linked with success. The confidence 
of both the Lihir and the Huli people that they will 
succeed in business, and the apparent connection 
between this confidence and long-held cultural beliefs 
have already been mentioned. Further, it is interesting 
that the two most successful middle-level companies 
at Ok Tedi have been or are run by individuals with 
strong and overtly expressed orthodox Christian 
beliefs: the Camp Administration Annual Reports 
attribute the ultimate source of the company’s success 
to the blessings of Almighty God, while Faiwol 
Investors still (after 30 years in business) pay tithes to 
the church in Olsobip. On Lihir the basic philosophy 
of the Tan movement for Personal Viability (which has 
now spread to several other sites) seems to have been 
based, at least in part, on the old Protestant belief in 
personal responsibility in all aspects of one’s life, not 
least in participating in business and other forms of 
hard work for the financial improvement of the family. 
In an area which has been often in the past and to a 
lesser extent still is today liable to attract confidence 
tricksters and unprincipled carpet-baggers it is, at 
the very least, refreshing to see businesses being run 
(and run successfully) by individuals with an internal 
source of ethical values in addition to anything the IPA 
or the Companies Act might provide.
Aside from these factors, the basic principles of 
business seem to apply: slow and steady, balancing 
cash accumulation against investment, take 
reasonable risks, keep the functions of the board and 
the executives separate, and treat employees and 
customers well.
13.5.9 LBD as everlasting compensation?
When, during the course of this study, the PJV 
79   There is an additional reason which needs a mention as it is an almost universal truth: business and trade throughout history and in all parts 
of the world has been initiated and stimulated by outsiders who are often in a position to recognise commercial possibilities in any given 
area better than do its residents.
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In short, therefore the conclusion appears to be that 
joint ventures have their uses in the early stages of 
LBD but those uses must be carefully prescribed when 
they are first initiated. 
13.6 The future of Lancos
At the time of writing this report, both metal and 
hydrocarbon prices are continuing to weaken. This 
will place some stress on local business development 
as projects seek, as most will, to find ways of reducing 
costs. No Lanco, not even the largest, is in a position 
to avoid such stresses. So, until such time as prices 
pick up again the ongoing close relationships 
between Lancos, resource projects, communities and 
the various levels of PNG government will need to be 
ones of co-operation and ones that recognise the fact 
of their mutual dependence.
However, potentially, all the building blocks of a 
continually improving national system for LBD are in 
place. Whether or not the links between these blocks 
can be strengthened to ensure the progress of all 
stakeholders will be a matter for close consultation 
and co-operation. In this concluding section, what are 
believed to be the key individual stakeholders in and 
facilitators are identified and some suggestions are 
provided which might help achieve progress.    
13.6.1 The role of the State
In his address to the 2014 Mining and Petroleum 
Investment Conference, Prime Minister O’Neill 
offered his government’s assistance in advancing local 
business development. The following suggestions are 
made with this offer in mind. The first area where 
the State could play a more helpful role is in guiding 
resource companies as to what is expected of them 
in terms of local business development. Resource 
companies sign up, when starting up a project, to 
very detailed requirements laid down by the State 
in most aspects of the project.  But they receive 
very little guidance on what is expected of them in 
the way of local business development – and, until 
recently, almost no assistance from that source in 
the monitoring of Lancos and their compliance with 
national regulations. In terms of guidance, there 
is remarkably little difference in the wording of the 
‘business development clauses’ applicable to the 
Hidden Valley project to that designed for Ok Tedi 
twenty five years earlier – if anything the earlier project 
received slightly more specific guidance. Equally, 
there is remarkably little difference in the wording of 
these same clauses in project MoAs for a small project 
like Simberi or a large one. But even though people of 
Pigiput might well have had expectations of managing 
another Anitua, how is a tiny project like Simberi 
supposed to run a business development program of 
the sort that is possible on Lihir?        
The more general issue this dispute over the Porgera 
contract raises is whether or not it might be desirable 
to have time limits, or ‘sunset clauses’, built into 
preference for and assistance to Lancos. The only 
instance of a company attempting to develop such 
a policy this study has come across was the Back to 
Basics program of 2006 at Ok Tedi – which, it should 
be remembered, was proposed at a time when it 
was thought that project would cease operations 
in 2012/12.  There are several aspects to this issue 
amongst which are:
a)  if the emphasis of LBD at a particular project site 
– as with the LNG project – is to be on a single 
‘representative’ company, a strategy that has 
many advantages to it, then does this mean that, 
throughout the whole life of the project only that 
single company and no other has preference for 
project business? 
b)  how many times has a Lanco to be rescued (and 
by whom?) if it runs into serious financial trouble?
c)   once an umbrella/representative company 
diversifies itself both in terms of its sources of 
revenue and its business locations away from the 
original project, does it always retain its preferred 
status? Does it continue to operate in national 
business with the added advantage of having 
preferential treatment in the project area? 
This study has not gathered sufficient information to 
give answers to any of these questions, but they need 
to be addressed by the industry as a whole.
13.5.10 Do Joint Ventures work?
Several interviewees, especially managers within 
resource companies, argued strongly that ultimately 
many joint ventures had not proved to be beneficial 
for landowner businesses. These interviewees 
generally conceded that such arrangements are often 
necessary for large, standard types of local business 
when businesses are first being established (in the late 
exploration stage). However even then it was stressed 
that care needs to be taken in the forms of contracts 
drawn up relating to joint ventures, particularly 
to ensure that the outside partner’s shares can be 
redeemed by the local participant. 
The limited evidence available from this study tends 
to reinforce those views. If the bigger local Lancos 
have, in general, not leant over backwards to help 
other local companies through their infancy, it is 
unrealistic to expect external companies to find it in 
their interests to do so. There are examples of joint 
ventures two or more decades old which appear to 
have accumulated very few assets and which are still 
controlled by outside interests, sometimes by foreign-
owned entities.
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make the writing of reports such as this one easier; 
it is one means whereby ongoing disputes between 
communities as a whole and Lancos might be 
mediated insofar as they would assist any mediator to 
accurately assess what are the ultimate destinations of 
LBD benefits.
13.6.1.3 The Companies Act: There are several 
instances in this report of fairly large Lancos which not 
only do not report to IPA very promptly, but, because 
they are classified as exempt (a status which in at least 
some cases seems puzzling in view of the rules for 
exemption)  do not have to submit audited reports. 
If, as is sometimes the case, AGMs are infrequent or 
have never been held, and especially if the Lanco is 
purportedly owned by whole communities, then how 
are supposed shareholders ever to find out the status 
of the company acting in their names?  Whilst the 
provisions of section 212 (3) under which a company 
need not disclose various aspects of its operations, 
including payments to its directors if all shareholders 
agree to such non-disclosure, are understandable, 
where – even if appearances are to the contrary – 
all shares are held by directors, those provisions 
can lead to a lack of transparency, especially when 
no proof that shareholders have agreed to non-
disclosure appears to be required. 
Associated with this is the fact that perhaps in two thirds 
of all the Lancos listed in Appendix A, in their Annual 
Returns to IPA, directors are major shareholders but 
are stated in those ARs as NOT being shareholders.   
It would appear that some minor revisions of the 
Companies Act would reduce the potential for 
ongoing conflict and arguments over the distribution 
of LBD benefits.
13.6.1.4 The Department of Trade, Commerce and 
Industry: The audit undertaken by DTCI of the whole 
LBD program of the Hidden Valley project was an 
extremely valuable exercise and one never before 
undertaken. It showed that the Department could play 
an ongoing role as a national level arbiter and judge 
of the manner in which such programs are managed. 
As matter of fact, the Department has effectively 
always had this power in most projects since it can be 
found written into most projects’ MoAs. But it appears 
that it did not have either the resources (or perhaps 
the willingness?) to exercise it. Whether or not the 
Hidden Valley audit was a one-off event is yet to be 
seen, but clearly a structure can be envisaged wherein 
the Department could play a key and continuing role 
in the general upgrading of standards both of Lanco 
operations and the ways in which resource companies 
manage their business development programs. 
It should be noted that whilst DTCI led the audit, the 
team which did most of the work depended heavily 
The second area – a responsibility which, in fact the 
State has always claimed for itself since the days of 
the Ok Tedi agreements – is in monitoring LBD. All 
the necessary agencies to do this are in place – there is 
no need to create any new ones. With only relatively 
few additional funds but a considerable increase in 
co-ordination, it seems probable that considerable 
strengthening of Lanco operations could be achieved. 
As noted earlier, the resource companies have no 
authority to discipline or close down Lancos (and, 
in view of local politics, should in any case have no 
desire to be given such authority). There is a degree 
of monitoring resource companies they can fulfil (i.e. 
by building conditions into the award of contracts on 
such matters as compliance with national [as well as 
site] safety, labour hire and business requirements) but 
ultimately only the State has the authority (at least in 
legal, if not always in real, terms) to pull errant Lancos 
into line. 
In terms of monitoring a number of State agencies 
already play key roles which could be improved even 
further: 
13.6.1.1 The Mineral Resources Authority: In the 
course of the interviews undertaken for this study 
one State agency was commented upon favourably 
by many respondents: the MRA. Almost all these 
compliments came in relation to Lancos’ experience 
of working on MRA-funded projects which arise when 
the State, through MRA, provides funds as part of an 
MoA or other agreement . Thus MRA is in a position to 
assess the competency of the Lancos it deals with on 
a day-to-day basis, much like the resource companies 
themselves, and thus take a somewhat different 
approach from other government agencies.  
13.6.1.2 Investment Promotion Authority: The IPA 
website was the single most valuable resource in the 
preparation of this report. An IFC project is currently 
in process of finalising the improvement of IPA 
operations (including the website) still further and 
as the conclusions of this report were being written, 
the IPA was in the midst of an information publicity 
campaign urging all companies to log on to their 
website and bring their entries up to date. If the ease 
of searching the site (e.g. by location of the company’s 
centre of operations) was improved, then the sole 
major weaknesses of the site remaining are likely to 
be:
•  the failure of many companies to actually lodge 
Annual Returns on time, 
•  and the power (or commitment) of the IPA to 
enforce its lodgement rules. 
Up-to-date lodgement of transparent and full Lanco 
annual returns is not just something that would 
Page 118 Resource Project LANCOS
sorts of reverses and crises and all have attempted to 
deal with such crises independently of one another. 
The PNGCOMP session on Lancos at its August 2014 
meeting in Lae appears to have been the first time ever 
that they compared notes on this particular aspect of 
their socio-economic impacts. There is certainly scope 
for the Chamber to prepare, by means of consultation 
with business development practitioners already in 
place, a Guide for Local Business Development.
More generally, given the variety of potential 
stakeholders in the improvement of Lanco performance 
listed above, it would be in the best interest of all of 
them for the PNGCOMP to take the lead in bringing 
all parties together to establish and agree upon a 
structure in which all could contribute but leave the 
regulatory agencies in an uncompromised position as 
the ultimate arbiters of what is in PNG’s best interests 
overall.
As a community affairs specialist, the present 
consultant is envious of the amount of effort the 
mining industry puts into matters of safety – whilst 
understanding why that is so. If a small fraction of 
the effort put into safety was devoted to raising the 
awareness – especially in PNG circumstances – of the 
critical nature of community matters, then perhaps 
there would be fewer problems for the industry to deal 
with. It is noted that the mining sector runs an annual 
safety week where all sites get together and keenly 
compete against one another for best practice safety 
awards. Such events are appreciated by the industry 
and have been very successful. Other countries 
heavily involved in the industry have similar events, 
but some, including the Philippines, go further and 
have national awards for a variety of aspects of the 
industry including environmental management and 
community programs. In terms of local business 
development, one simple way of raising awareness 
would be for the Chamber to find ways of sponsoring 
an annual awards night which could include awards 
for:
• the best resource company LBD program
•  the best resource company associated large Lanco 
(with an annual turnover in excess of K75m)   
•  the best resource company associated small 
company (with an annual turnover less than 
K75m).
The criteria by which ‘best’ could be assessed would 
include, governance, compliance, shareholder 
relations, innovation and sustainability.
For many years the Chamber has attempted to 
become a central collecting point for all manner of 
statistics relating to mining and hydrocarbon activities 
on staff seconded from IPA. It is not the intention of 
this report to suggest which agency of the State should 
undertake specific tasks, but it is evident that whether 
or not DTCI or IPA were to take the lead in acting as 
a formal monitor of LBD programs at different sites, 
either of them would require more skilled resources.
13.6.1.5 MRDC: The MRDC frequently issues press 
releases to inform the public about its investments, 
which is an initiative to be welcomed. What it does 
not do is report to IPA promptly and provide to the 
public details of its accounts including information, 
independently audited, about the value of the 
investments it has made. It is unreasonable to expect 
small and medium sized Lancos to be prompt in their 
reporting of ARs if MRDC, which deals with hundreds 
of millions of kina of landowner investments does not 
set a good example. 
13.6.2 Private sector organisations
13.6.2.1 The future of the Business Enterprise Centre: 
With the winding down of the first and most important 
phase of PNG LNG construction, the BEC, which was 
established by the project, will now lose a significant 
portion of its automatic funding from ExxonMobil. It 
has built up an excellent reputation in the five years of 
its operations and, whilst it will continue to gain new 
clients as oil/gas exploration/exploitation continues 
to expand, it is likely to face a period of significantly 
reduced activity shortly. 
Its courses for the training of Lanco directors are 
especially valued across most resource projects in PNG 
and there is no reason why these should not continue 
to be of high value. But its focus whilst working largely 
with ExxonMobil was on company assessment; were 
that focus to shift a little from assessment more in 
the direction of business management services then 
it would also be a valuable and more importantly 
national centre for small business excellence. For 
some mining companies, especially smaller ones with 
limited resources, it is possible that using BEC services 
could be more effective than committing  resources 
which are in short supply to on site specialist business 
development officers. The one qualification that may 
need to be made is that the fees charged by BEC 
for such advice, having been used to dealing with 
a multi-billion dollar gas project, may need to be 
revised downwards if it is to attract smaller Lancos 
and smaller resource project operators as clients.  
13.6.2.2 Continuing roles for the PNG Chamber 
of Mines and Petroleum: Across all resource sites, 
companies face the same sorts of challenges in 
helping establish and then – to some degree – 
sustaining Lancos. Interestingly they all seem to have 
developed their approach to these issues in virtual 
isolation from one another, all have met with the same 
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Ventures between inexperienced local businesses 
and outsiders.  It is to be understood that this is not 
necessarily a criticism of such outsiders – they are after 
the best deal for themselves and cannot be blamed for 
wishing to achieve that.  Unfortunately several of the 
less satisfactory JVs were put in place by the Business 
Development Offices of the resources company. 
This is unfortunate because it suggests that one 
cannot simply advise that all JVs arranged on behalf 
of local landowner businesses need to be overseen 
by resource company staff. Even though resource 
company staff are, in this consultant’s opinion, by far 
the persons best placed to continue to arrange such 
JVs, it appears desirable to provide them with better 
guidelines and examples of previous JVs, both good 
and bad – probably a function of the PNGCOMP.
Companies newly arrived in PNG often have very 
considerable experience elsewhere of the sponsoring 
of local suppliers (if not exactly of LBD) and may 
have important lessons that existing companies could 
learn from. Many smaller companies, especially in the 
mining sector – but they also exist in the hydrocarbon 
sector, have little or no idea what is expected of them 
in the LBD area and can certainly learn from pre-
existing companies’ experience. The circulation of 
LBD experiences at different site, of which this is one 
example, may assist in this learning process.
13.6.2.4 Landowner companies: Whatever the model 
imagined for Lancos has been in the past, a fairly clear 
pattern of Lanco development has emerged:
a)  at several long-established sites, such as at 
Porgera or Lihir (and possibly now at Hidden 
Valley), a representative company has, after 
considerable struggle and near collapse, 
emerged successfully. By ‘successfully’ I mean 
that it is competed well in the open commercial 
market and shed at least part of its dependence 
on the project that gave rise to it. But, in all three 
cases mentioned, such companies have not been 
especially successful in performing ‘umbrella’ 
functions; indeed their within their project sites 
they are more or less the only Lanco operating 
(though perhaps Lihir is a partial exception to 
this) as smaller companies seem to have not been 
able to grow in the shadow they cast. At newer 
gas sites, similar representative companies have 
also emerged and, although it is too early to be 
sure, many have already shown some signs of 
success. The success these companies have had 
in accumulating assets is very good news and has 
the potential to provide the communities that own 
them with income for many years to come; but 
only if such representative companies continue 
to act prudently but with initiative, and only if 
they are governed well, keep their shareholders 
in the country. Data on Lancos – for reasons indicated 
elsewhere in this report – are critical in indicating the 
extent to which these industries support economic 
activity both around the sites of their operations and 
more widely across all sectors of PNG. The Chamber 
should re-double its earlier efforts to collect from all 
its members statistics relating to all aspects of the 
extractive industries in PNG including those relating 
to business development. 
13.6.2.3 Resource companies: The history of LBD in 
Papua New Guinea strongly suggests that, despite the 
effort required of resource companies, a reasonably 
efficient local business sector accessible to all projects 
has in fact proved useful to the companies themselves, 
not necessarily in terms of maintaining social licence 
to operate, but in terms of project operations.  History 
also demonstrates the absolute necessity of LBD 
receiving very considerable support if it is to become 
self-sustaining and that this support needs to be 
provided for several years after initial establishment. 
While it may be that the PNG LNG approach to 
LBD will prove, through the degree of training it 
involved, the best model to follow and one which 
might circumvent local businesses’ dependence on 
the resource project that creates them, at almost all 
other sites such supervision has had to be provided. In 
the past emphasis has generally been placed on some 
sort of umbrella company or representative company 
offering such support. However, this generally either 
impedes the larger company from following its own 
best interests and/or results in dissatisfaction amongst 
the smaller Lancos.  It is difficult to come to any 
conclusion other than that the support services to 
infant local businesses (the ‘umbrella’ functions) need 
to be located within the resource company or in some 
organisation supported by the resource company that 
is itself not involved in business. 
Resource companies have done a reasonably good 
job in developing LBD in Papua New Guinea and 
deserve credit for this even if they have done so in 
response to the demands made of them by the State 
and its laws and regulations. One area where they 
can increase their contribution to the development of 
associated local business is to encourage (or continue 
to encourage) best practice in LBD by insisting that 
the contractors to whom they award business are 
compliant with national reporting requirements 
as well as practicing transparency with their own 
shareholders. In this regard, Oil Search’s efforts need 
to picked out for special commendation. 
While several Lancos have now grown and have 
garnered experience to such an extent that they 
can properly look after their own interests in this 
regard, there have been unsatisfactory aspects 
to the establishment and maintenance of Joint 
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initial site location, so too this is the only way in 
which sustainable benefits from small, short-lived 
projects in isolated locations might be generated 
through LBD. It might also be worthwhile for such 
projects, or projects like them in future (such as 
Woodlark), to be granted a greater degree of 
flexibility in the manner in which LBD fits into 
the overall communal benefits packages of a 
project as opposed to imposing upon them the 
programs applied to much larger projects.      
The key to success (in addition to good governance 
and business acumen) both for small projects and 
large ones in terms both of growth and sustainability 
therefore appears to be: expand beyond the site that 
gave rise to them.  
13.7 Final observation
When this consultant reflects on what seemed 
possible in terms of local business at places like Ok 
Tedi in 1979 or at Lihir in 1986, and compares that 
with what has actually happened at such places, then 
the overwhelming conclusion is one of astonishment 
at the progress that has been achieved80.  It is easy 
to overlook this basic fact when confronted with the 
ongoing, day-to-day challenges that need to be met 
to make such achievements possible and the mistakes 
that are made on the way - as well as with some of the 
less pleasant outcomes of the process. 
The great majority of local business associated with 
resource projects in PNG has grown up on the 
assumption (usually held by outsiders) that it can 
represent the interests of and be owned by communities. 
Business has been grafted onto ‘traditional’ (but 
continually evolving) structures – few of which are 
properly appreciated by those who have introduced 
these new forms of economic activity; indeed, it 
seems likely that the members of those communities 
themselves have a far from full appreciation of what 
the evolution of their social structures imply for them. 
This has been well-intentioned and has the potential, 
it is true, to provide benefits for communities in 
resource project areas long after such projects have 
ceased to operate.  But it is also true that, if the 
destination proverbially arrived at on roads paved 
with good intentions is to be avoided, in this case, 
‘tradition’ alone is an inadequate guide. 
The greatest potential danger involved in LBD in Papua 
New Guinea is that its successes benefit only a very 
few people and that good intentions, expressed by 
trying to match LBD structures to imagined traditional 
social structures, run the risk of realising that potential. 
In this case the outside world’s experience and 
fully informed of their activities, and fully comply 
with best commercial practice. Because they 
are increasingly independent from the resource 
companies that helped create them, the resource 
companies are in no position to fully monitor 
their progress an longer – such monitoring has 
to be undertaken by the normal State agencies 
charged with the oversight of regular businesses. 
b)  at other sites, notably Ok Tedi (and possibly 
those associated with Oil Search), representative 
companies have not emerged or have emerged and 
then failed. Although at these sites, unlike those 
sites where powerful representative companies 
have emerged, a rather large number of Lancos 
have flourished very few have succeeded in 
entering the national mainstream of business and 
most of them remain overwhelmingly dependent 
on the resource companies with which they are 
associated. Asset accumulation is weak. Because 
of this dependence, their sustainability in their 
existing form beyond the life of their associated 
resource project has to be doubted. This is not 
necessarily an indication of failure since if such 
companies can invest the short-term profits 
they make in other forms of activity which have 
sustainable outcomes, such as investment in either 
financial projects or in educating the children of 
their shareholders, then an alternative sustainable 
outcome might be achieved.  Resource projects 
might consider putting some effort into assisting 
such Lancos to achieve such outcomes.
c)  at several small sites LBD has not been successful 
– notably at Tolukuma, the now closed Misima 
and the mothballed Kainantu gold project and 
it is struggling at Simberi. In all these cases, the 
projects are so small, that the gains to be made 
from LBD during operations are (or were) likely to 
be very small in relation to the effort required to 
establish them. In addition, their isolation (with 
the exception of Kainantu) is so great that it is 
improbable that any business activity established 
at site to service the project in the course of 
operations would outlast the resource project 
itself. The project will not result in any reduction 
in the isolation geography has bequeathed to 
such sites. Perhaps a closely supervised (by 
the resource company in partnership with the 
community) program of investment of short-
term profits from project-servicing activities in 
opportunities well away form the resource site at 
a more accessible location would work. Just as 
the really large Lancos have only begun to grow 
once they spread their activities well beyond their 
80   This, in my opinion, applies equally well to Papua New Guinea’s accomplishments as a nation in its brief history.
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they are doing and need to ensure that any benefits 
accrued by the business as distributed amongst the 
community according to the rules of the company’s 
agreed constitution.     
If anyone has any doubt as to whether mining benefits 
and companies based on mining can be sustainable 
consider this: the world’s oldest surviving limited 
liability company is a paper/pulp manufacturer in 
Finland called Stora Enso. It was originally founded 
727 years ago in 1288......as a copper mining 
company.
accumulated understanding of what constitute the 
basis of good (if not perfect) business practice need to 
be followed faithfully, regardless of custom, if the twin 
objectives of most LBD (financial success with benefits 
to the community as a whole) are to have a chance 
of success: and that starts with a carefully thought 
out company constitution which spells out what the 
company’s aims are and how it will be managed 
and is followed up by full information flow to its 
shareholders. In less fancy language, local businesses 
that are supposed to represent their communities need 
to do better at letting their communities know what 
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DATA DERIVED FROM IPA COMPANY REGISTER
Companies shown in bold have financial statements shown separately
Companies highlighted in yellow were interviewed
Companies highlighted in blue were interviewed by a third party on our behalf
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1. OVERVIEW
  This study should provide an analysis of the 
magnitude, scope, and contribution of the 
resource project landowner umbrella companies 
and other project landowner companies and 
businesses as well as an assessment of issues 
and challenges common to these operations with 
recommendations for possible improvement.
2.  ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE PROJECT 
LANDOWNER UMBRELLA COMPANIES
  The report should provide an in depth analysis 
of the umbrella landowner companies in PNG 
including but not limited to: 
 • Anitua (Lihir)
 • NKW Holdings (Hidden Valley)
 • Raibus (Ramu)
 • IPI (Porgera),
 • Star Mountain Holdings Limited (Ok Tedi)
 • Laba Holdings (PNG LNG)
 •  Hides Gas Development Company (PNG 
LNG)
 •  Trans Wonderland (Oilfields and PNG LNG)
 •  Gobe Field Engineering (Oilfields and PNG 
LNG)
 •  Gobe Freight Services (Oilfields and PNG 
LNG)
 •  Kutubu Catering (Oilfields and PNG LNG)
 •  Kutubu Security Services (Oilfields and PNG 
LNG)
 •  Kawaso (Oilfields and PNG LNG)
 •  Maka Investment Corporation (Oilfields and 
PNG LNG)
 •  Manada Umbrella JV (Oilfields and PNG 
LNG)
 •  Kikori Oil Investments (Oilfields and PNG 
LNG)
 •  Mineral Resources Development Group of 
Companies
  - Mineral Resource Star Mountains (Ok Tedi)
  -  Mineral Resources Enga (2.5% LO equity 
in Porgera, 2.5% EPG equity)
  - Mineral Resources Madang
  - Petroleum Resources Gobe
  - Petroleum Resources Kutubu
  - Mineral Resources Moran
  -  Gas Resources Kutubu, Gobe, Moran, 
Hides 4, Gigira, Juha, Angore
 The analysis should include the following:
  Business:  structure, location(s), size, diversity, 
subsidiaries, joint ventures, directors, 
management, start up (seed funding), future 
outlook
  Board: composition, background of directors, 
training of directors, board fees
  Compliance: compliance with provisions of PNG 
Companies Act, governance and transparency
 Financial:  turnover, profit, dividends, assets
  Shareholders:  number, landowners only or 
spread across PNG, dividend policy/returns
  Employees:  number, expat/PNG, birth province 
of PNG employees, gender, training
 History:  formation, growth, setbacks, problems
  The final report should provide a clear 
understanding of the economic contribution 
of the individual companies on a provincial, 
regional and/or national basis as relevant.
  The report should also provide an insight into 
the issues and challenges these companies are 
facing including but not limited to concerns that 
are related to their structure and management, 
APPENDIX B:
Terms of Reference for a Study of Resource Project 
Landowner Companies and Businesses in PNG
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contribution to local and provincial economies 
including employment.
  Comment on issues and obstacles faced by these 
enterprises and why these have arisen.  Include 
recommendations on how these issues might be 
addressed.
4. DATA AND INFORMATION COLLECTION
  Data and other information required from the 
landowner companies and the respective resource 
projects to complete this consultancy will be 
gathered through interviews with management/
directors of landowner businesses and the project 
business development managers, surveys, written 
requests for data, and other methods selected 
by the consultant.  The Chamber will advise 
project management and management of the 
landowner companies listed above of the study 
before the consultants site visit.  Where required, 
introductions to company management will 
be facilitated by the Chamber and Chamber 
Members from the respective resource projects.
directors, shareholder structure, business 
activities, compliance and dividend distribution 
with appropriate recommendations for 
improvement where relevant.
3.  OTHER LANDOWNER COMPANIES AND 
BUSINESSES
  Analyse the scope of other resource project 
landowner companies and businesses associated 
with the respective projects that have spawned 
the major landowner umbrella companies.  It 
is envisaged that this will encompass the larger 
clan companies down to family and individual 
businesses.  Specific information should be 
provided on the larger companies (turnover of at 
least K15 million per annum) but the smaller ones 
(turnover of between K1 million and K15 million 
per annum) could be aggregated.  Comment on 
the success of the various businesses and the 
problems and issues.
  The report should provide a clear picture of 
the overall magnitude and significance of these 
businesses on a combined basis, and their 
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